




ILLEGAL MIGRATION (TAHRIIB) IN PUNTLAND

A MIXED-METHODS STUDY

PUNTLAND DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH CENTER (PDRC)
EAST AFRICA UNIVERSITY (EAU)

GAROWE, PUNTLAND, SOMALIA
2026

ILLEGAL MIGRATION ROUTES : SOMALIA TO EUROPE



DOCUMENT INFORMATION

Document Type	Study Report
Language	English
Study Area	Badhan, Bosaso, Galkayo, Garowe — Puntland, Somalia
Research Design	Mixed methods (quantitative survey + qualitative KIIs and FGDs)
Quantitative Sample	406 survey respondents
Qualitative Sample	90 participants — 16 KIIs and 8 FGDs
Core Focus	Drivers, intentions, meanings, and responses to Tahriib
Year	2026

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1. ABOUT THE ORGANIZATIONS

1.1 Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC)

Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC) is a local Somali non-governmental research and policy institution based in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia. PDRC conducts applied research, policy analysis, dialogue processes, governance programming, peacebuilding initiatives, public consultations, civic education, and evidence-based development work across Somalia. PDRC operates in politically sensitive, resource-constrained, and institutionally fragile environments, with a mandate to produce research that is practically useful to policymakers, communities, and development partners. Its thematic work covers governance, conflict resolution, democratization, social research, and humanitarian programming.

www.pdrcomalia.org

1.2 East Africa University (EAU)

East Africa University (EAU) is a private higher education institution based in Bosaso, Puntland, Somalia. EAU is one of Puntland's leading universities, providing undergraduate and postgraduate education across a range of disciplines, including business, education, health sciences, and social sciences. EAU is committed to academic research, community service, and the development of qualified professionals who contribute to peace and sustainable development in Somalia and the wider region.

eau.edu.so

Published in Garowe, Puntland, Somalia, 2026

The views expressed in this publication are those of the research participants and do not necessarily reflect the positions of any individual institution or government.

2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was designed, funded, conducted, and produced jointly by PDRC and EAU using their own institutional resources, without external funding. The study reflects the shared commitment of both institutions to evidence-based research that serves policymakers, communities, and development actors working on youth and migration in Puntland.

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Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC) and East Africa University (EAU) express their sincere appreciation to everyone who contributed to this study.

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The research team is grateful to all participants of this study, including formal authorities, civil society organizations, community groups, and respondents of the key informants, focus group participants, and survey respondents across Badhan, Bossaso, Galkayo, and Garowe, who gave their time and openly shared their knowledge and experiences. Their contributions are the foundation of this report

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents findings from a mixed-methods study on illegal youth migration, known in Somali as Tahriib, conducted jointly by the Puntland Development and Research Center (PDRC) and East Africa University (EAU) across four districts in Puntland, Somalia: Badhan, Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe. The study combined a quantitative survey of 406 respondents with 16 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and 8 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) involving 90 participants drawn from six stakeholder groups: youth, parents, local officials, teachers, headteachers, and community leaders.

Tahriib is a Somali term that refers to irregular migration. While the phenomenon cuts across age groups, young people between the ages of 15 and 34 constitute the primary affected population. In the study sample, 90 percent of respondents fall within this bracket.

The study finds that irregular migration in Puntland has evolved from a crisis-driven survival strategy into a deeply embedded social, economic, and psychological condition. Thirty-two percent of survey respondents (131 of 406) stated an intention to migrate within the next five years, while a further 21 percent (84) remained uncertain but open to migration. Critically, the findings challenge the common assumption that Tahriib is driven primarily by unemployment. Institutional mismanagement, including corruption, nepotism, and the clan-based 4.5 power-sharing system, emerged as the most strongly cited push factor, with 81 percent of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that mismanagement in public institutions encourages migration, compared to 78 percent for poverty and social insecurity, and 75 percent for unemployment.

Other major findings include the following. Social migration exposure is pervasive: 74 percent of respondents reported having family members or friends who migrated in the past five years, with Europe as the dominant destination (78 percent of those cases). Migration aspirations increase with education level: diploma holders have the highest migration intention rate (46 percent), followed by secondary school and university graduates (both around 33 to 34 percent). Employment status does not eliminate migration intention: jobless respondents have the highest rate (42 percent), but 29 percent of formally employed respondents and 34 percent of students also plan to migrate. Migration intentions are near-equal by gender, with both male and female respondents at 32 percent, signaling a rapidly narrowing gender gap. Destination perceptions are dominated by safety and security abroad (74 percent agreement) and job opportunities (72 percent), rather than family reunification alone.

Enabling systems, including organized smuggling networks, digital recruitment through social media, and informal financial arrangements, reduce practical barriers and sustain irregular migration flows despite widespread awareness of the associated risks of death, detention, and exploitation. Risk awareness alone does not deter migration when local conditions feel equally hopeless.

The study recommends a coordinated set of interventions targeting the identified structural drivers: reform of merit-based employment in public institutions, expansion of market-relevant education and vocational training, psychosocial and civic engagement programs for youth, and strengthened community, family, and institutional frameworks. These recommendations are grounded directly in the quantitative and qualitative evidence from the four study districts.

4. INTRODUCTION

Irregular youth migration, commonly referred to in Somali discourse as Tahriib, has become one of the most pressing governance, social protection, and development challenges in Puntland. Tahriib is a Somali term that describes the act of irregular or clandestine migration. It is not inherently age-restricted: people of various ages engage in Tahriib. However, young people between the ages of 15 and 34 are overwhelmingly the primary affected group, and this study focuses on youth as its central population of concern. Where the sample captures older respondents through convenience selection, this is acknowledged in the methodology.

The issue has moved beyond isolated household decisions. In many communities across the study districts, Tahriib now intersects with education, employment, family expectation, insecurity, citizenship, and identity. The growing social visibility of migration through peer networks, digital media, remittance stories, and family reunification narratives has further normalized the phenomenon. At the same time, documented accounts of death at sea, detention in Libya and Sudan, extortion, abuse, and psychological trauma reveal the very high human cost of irregular movement.

Puntland offers a particularly valuable setting for studying this phenomenon because its districts present distinct contextual profiles within a single administrative region. Bosaso functions as a major commercial and mobility hub where migration has become deeply normalized through economic aspiration. Galkayo reflects a context where insecurity and social fragmentation are more visible, directly shaping migration dynamics. Garowe, as the administrative capital, presents an educated and governance-oriented population whose migration aspirations are closely tied to institutional frustration. Badhan represents a peripheral district where weak services, unemployment, and community-level moral concern remain strongly salient. Studying these four districts together makes it possible to identify both common structural drivers and place-specific differences that single-site studies cannot capture.

Despite increasing attention to irregular migration in Somalia, responses have mostly focused on enforcement and short-term awareness campaigns, neglecting the interconnected structural causes of Tahriib. Interventions often treat economic hardship, governance failures, social influence, and insecurity as separate issues rather than parts of an interconnected system, leading to fragmented and ineffective responses. The main challenge is not a lack of awareness among policymakers or young people, but a deficient understanding of the phenomenon and the political will to address its root causes. This study aims to fill that gap by providing evidence from four districts in Puntland to support institutional learning, stakeholder dialogue, and more effective policies.

5. BACKGROUND

Irregular migration has been a feature of Somali life for decades, shaped initially by the collapse of the state in 1991 and subsequently by persistent economic fragility, governance deficits, insecurity, and social change. What began as a crisis-driven response has, over time, become a structured social and economic trend embedded in community life. Remittances from the Somali diaspora now represent a critical pillar of household income, estimated at approximately 23 percent of GDP, one of the highest rates globally relative to economic size (World Bank, 2023). Recent data from the four study districts show that migration is no longer limited to the most economically marginalized. It now includes people across educational and employment categories, from university graduates to skilled tradespeople to students who have yet to enter the labor market. This pattern is consistent with broader findings on irregular migration from fragile and conflict-affected contexts, which document that migration decisions are shaped by a complex interplay of economic, social, governance, and security factors rather than poverty alone (Czaika & Weisner, 2025; Hagen-Zanker et al., 2025).

Community perceptions of migration have shifted significantly. Tahriib is widely understood to carry serious risks, including death en route, trafficking, detention, and financial exploitation, yet is increasingly viewed as a rational and even prestigious response to limited local opportunities. Families often support and financially enable migration, expecting future returns through remittances and eventual family reunifications. Migration decisions are frequently collective, shaped by household expectations, peer networks, and diaspora connections (UNDP, 2021). Economic conditions are central drivers. Puntland faces limited formal employment, low and unstable wages, and a narrow economic base concentrated in trade, government, and remittances. Young people entering the labor market face persistent barriers resulting from mismatches between education systems and employer demand. Youth unemployment and underemployment are among the highest in the region, generating significant migration pressure (African Development Bank, 2020).

Economic factors alone, however, do not explain the persistence of Tahriib. Governance failures substantially shape both opportunities and perceptions. Qualitative evidence consistently identifies corruption, clan-based favoritism, and a lack of transparency in public recruitment as major grievances among youth. Transparency International consistently ranks Somalia among the world's highest-perceived-corruption countries (Transparency International, 2023). This institutional context is not merely a background condition: it is experienced by young people as a direct mechanism of exclusion that closes off legitimate pathways to advancement.

Security dynamics further contribute to migration pressures. Although Puntland is more stable than many other parts of Somalia, localized clan tensions, insecurity in peripheral areas, and broader threats create an environment of uncertainty. For many households, even moderate insecurity, when combined with economic hardship and institutional distrust, is sufficient to tip migration decisions toward departure (UNHCR, 2022).

Social influence has become increasingly important in shaping migration behavior. Seventy-four percent of respondents in this study reported having family members or friends who migrated in the past five years. Digital media, particularly Facebook and TikTok, play a powerful role in shaping aspirations, projecting idealized images of life abroad while systematically underrepresenting the risks involved. Diaspora networks simultaneously provide financial and informational support that lowers practical barriers to migration (Chonka, 2023).

Migration routes have become more organized and commercially structured over time. Informal smuggling networks link Puntland to transit corridors through Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, Malawi, and onward to Europe. These networks operate across multiple countries, providing logistical coordination while exposing migrants to significant risks, including exploitation, forced debt, detention, and violence (UNODC, 2018). Despite the sophistication and danger of these routes, young people with few perceived alternatives at home continue to engage them.

6. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES & QUESTIONS

6.1 General Objective

To analyze the drivers, intentions, social meanings, and enabling conditions of illegal youth migration (Tahriib) in Badhan, Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe, and to generate evidence-based recommendations to reduce migration pressures and strengthen youth resilience in Puntland

6.2 Specific Objectives

- To describe the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents and their exposure to migration.
- To assess the prevalence of migration intentions, repeated migration thoughts, and household migration networks.
- To examine the role of economic factors, including unemployment, low wages, and limited livelihood opportunities.
- To analyze the influence of governance challenges, including corruption, discrimination, and institutional trust.
- To investigate the role of insecurity, social instability, and protection concerns.
- To assess the influence of education-employment mismatch, social media, peer networks, and status aspirations.
- To integrate quantitative and qualitative findings into a comprehensive explanatory framework and evidence-based policy recommendations.

6.3 Research Questions

- What are the key socio-demographic characteristics of youth experiencing migration pressure in the four districts?
- How prevalent are migration intentions, prior migration attempts, and household migration networks?
- How do economic factors such as unemployment, low wages, and limited opportunities influence migration decisions?
- To what extent do governance challenges, including corruption, discrimination, and weak institutional trust, shape migration aspirations?
- How do insecurity, instability, and protection concerns affect migration decisions across the districts?
- What role do social media, peer influence, family networks, and status perceptions play in normalizing Tahriib?
- How can quantitative and qualitative findings be integrated to identify effective and context-specific policy responses?

7. LITERATURE REVIEW

7.1 Introduction

This literature review synthesizes existing research on irregular youth migration relevant to the Puntland context. The review draws on academic scholarship, global migration reports, and Somali-specific studies to situate the present research within the existing evidence base, identify key analytical frameworks, and highlight the gaps this study addresses. Given the study's focus on Puntland as the unit of analysis, particular weight is given to sources that speak directly to the Somali context, while relevant comparative material from the East African and broader Sub-Saharan African migration literature is used to complement locally grounded evidence.

7.2 Theoretical Foundations

- Classical push-pull theory, as articulated by Lee (1966), identifies adverse conditions at origin and attractive conditions at destination as the primary forces shaping migration decisions. Contemporary scholarship has substantially refined this framework. Van Hear, Bakewell, and Long (2018) propose the concept of "driver complexes," arguing that migration is shaped by combinations of interrelated factors rather than isolated push or pull forces. This framing is directly relevant to the Puntland case, where economic exclusion, governance failure, insecurity, and social influence operate simultaneously and reinforce one another.
- De Haas (2021) elaborates the aspirations-capabilities framework, which understands migration as a function of people's aspirations for change and their practical capabilities to act on those aspirations. This is a useful lens for understanding the Puntland findings: many young people aspire to migrate but face financial, logistical, or social barriers to doing so. Equally important is Carling's (2002) concept of "involuntary immobility," describing those who wish to migrate but cannot, which helps explain the frustration and psychological detachment visible in the qualitative data from all four study districts. These frameworks, taken together, structure the analysis in Section 13.

7.3 Migration Drivers and Root Causes

- A substantial body of research examines the relative importance of economic, governance, and sociocultural factors in driving irregular migration. Czaika and Weisner (2025), drawing on a large-scale survey across 26 research areas in Africa and Asia, find that hardships such as poverty, weak governance, and insecurity are not, on their own, sufficient to drive migration aspirations. Rather, migration intentions are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and sociocultural factors, with network effects and migration-related social norms playing central roles. This aligns closely with the findings of this study.
- Hagen-Zanker et al. (2025), using multilevel analysis across 25 communities in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, find that both individual and community-level determinants shape migration aspirations. Their observation that individual-level factors are far from consistent across communities underscores the importance of studying migration at the district level rather than treating national populations as uniform; a methodological commitment this study takes seriously.

7.4 The Somali Context: Tahriib

Ali (2016) provides the most comprehensive household-level study of Tahriib from Puntland and Somaliland, based on 180 interviews conducted in 2015 and 2016. The study found that at the time of the research, approximately 90 percent of migrants were aged 25 or younger at departure, and that nearly two-thirds left while enrolled in educational institutions. These findings provide useful historical context, though a decade has passed and migration dynamics have continued to evolve. The present study was designed in part to update and extend this evidence base.

Ali (2016) also documents the critical role of the "leave now, pay later" smuggling model, which lowers upfront financial barriers while creating severe vulnerability to exploitation and ransom demands. Families reported spending an average of approximately USD 7,700 on Tahriib-related expenses, predominantly for ransom payments. Social pressure, particularly on men to fulfill provider roles, and the influence of peers who have migrated are also identified as significant drivers, consistent with the findings of the present study.

Chonka (2023) examines social media and youth migration in urban Somaliland, documenting three categories of digital harm affecting those who are involuntarily immobile: employment and visa scams, "like-bait competitions," and suspect scholarship schemes. His work highlights that social media does not simply encourage migration; it also exposes non-mobile youth to exploitation. These findings inform the analysis of digital influence in Section 9.7 of this report.

7.5 Governance, Corruption, and Institutional Trust

The relationship between governance quality and migration is well established in comparative literature. Castles (2004) demonstrates that migration policies consistently fail when they address symptoms, irregular flows, rather than root causes, including the structural inequalities that make migration appear rational to young people. The Somalia National Youth Policy (Federal Government of Somalia, 2017) acknowledges migration as a priority concern, though implementation capacity remains severely constrained. Critically, the Policy's attribution of migration in part to youth's "poor judgment with emotional immaturity" reflects a tendency to blame young people for structurally driven behavior; a framing that contrasts sharply with the evidence from this study and from the broader literature, which consistently points to institutional and economic failures rather than individual moral deficits.

PDRC's own earlier analysis, "Puntland Youth: Challenges, Prospects and Opportunities" (PDRC, 2013), documented youth unemployment, limited educational opportunities, environmental displacement, and the decline of traditional livelihoods as key drivers of youth alienation and migration. The present study builds on and updates that institutional knowledge.

7.6 Gender Dimensions of Migration

Global data show that the share of female migrants has been decreasing since 2000, with migration becoming more male-dominated globally (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024). The Somali context broadly reflects this pattern in actual migration flows. However, aspirations may be converging faster than flows, as the present study documents. The qualitative evidence from all four districts indicates rapidly increasing female migration aspirations, driven by social media influence, growing aspirations for education and employment, and peer network effects among young women. These findings suggest that gender-responsive programming is increasingly necessary even in contexts where historical migration has been male-dominated.

7.7 Research Gaps and Study Contribution

Existing research on Tahriib has tended to focus on single drivers: economic hardship, social media, or governance, without adequately examining how these factors interact. Ali's (2016) study remains the most comprehensive primary-data source, but its geographic scope spans two regions and its data is over a decade old. Chonka (2023) addresses digital dimensions but focuses on Somaliland. No recent mixed-methods study has examined Tahriib specifically across multiple Puntland districts with integrated quantitative and qualitative data collection. This study addresses that gap by providing multi-district, multi-method evidence from Puntland alone, enabling place-specific comparisons while maintaining analytical coherence.

8. METHODOLOGY

8.1 Research Design

The study follows an integrated mixed-methods design combining a structured quantitative survey with qualitative Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The design is cross-sectional in timing and explanatory in purpose. The survey provides broad descriptive evidence on migration attitudes, intentions, and drivers across the four districts, while the qualitative component provides deeper interpretation of meaning, causation, and context. Quantitative patterns are used to identify scale and prevalence; qualitative evidence is used to explain mechanisms, contradictions, and local variation. Findings in Section 9 are presented in integrated form, drawing on both data sources simultaneously.

8.2 Study Area

Bosaso	Commercial hub with strong migration normalization through economic aspiration. Useful for analyzing normalized migration and economic aspiration dynamics.
Galkayo	Context where insecurity, clan tensions, and protection concerns are more visible. Useful for understanding security-linked migration pressure.
Garowe	Administrative capital with a strong governance and educated-youth profile. Useful for analyzing institutional frustration and aspiration-capability gaps.
Badhan	Peripheral district where service weakness, unemployment, and community-level moral concern are strongly visible. Useful for understanding hardship and community perceptions.

8.3 Quantitative Component

The quantitative sample comprised 406 completed survey responses distributed across the four study districts. A quota sampling approach was used, with a target of approximately 100 respondents per district, reached through convenience sampling in accessible community locations. Respondents were approached by trained enumerators at community gathering points, educational institutions, and public spaces in urban areas of each district. The sample is not statistically representative of the broader Puntland population and should not be interpreted as such. Findings from the survey describe patterns within the sample and are reported as descriptive evidence, not population-level estimates.

The survey questionnaire covered socio-demographic characteristics, migration experience and intention, push factors (economic, governance, security), pull factors (economic, welfare, political), frequency of migration-related thinking, and social norms and aspirations. Questionnaires were administered in both English and Somali, and all responses were standardized to English prior to analysis.

8.4 Qualitative Component

The qualitative component comprised 16 Key Informant Interviews and 8 Focus Group Discussions. KIIs were distributed equally across the four districts, with four interviews per district. FGDs were also distributed equally, with two group discussions per district. A total of 90 participants contributed to the qualitative data across six stakeholder categories: youth (33), parents (22), local officials (14), teachers (10), headteachers (5), and community leaders (6).

Qualitative participants were selected through purposive sampling. Inclusion criteria emphasized relevance, knowledge, lived experience, and stakeholder diversity rather than statistical representativeness. Officials were included to discuss governance and policy; educators to address the education-to-employment transition; parents and community leaders to explore family and social dynamics; and youth participants to provide direct experiential perspectives on migration decisions and aspirations.

Qualitative recordings were transcribed and translated from Somali into English before thematic analysis. Thematic coding was organized around five analytical pillars: economic exclusion; governance and institutional injustice; social amplification through digital media and networks; insecurity and protection failures; and education-employment mismatch.

8.5 Ethical Considerations

The study was conducted in accordance with standard research ethics principles, including voluntary and informed consent, confidentiality, and respectful handling of sensitive information. Because Tahriib is associated with family stress, financial exploitation, irregular movement, and in some cases, trauma and loss of life, the protection of respondents' identities and personal accounts was given priority throughout. The study recognizes that irregular migration is a politically and socially sensitive subject in Puntland, and Somalia in general, and care was taken to present respondent views accurately and without attribution that could expose individuals to harm or stigma.

8.6 Study Limitations

The study was conducted in four districts of Puntland, and findings cannot be generalized to other regions of Somalia, which may have distinct migration dynamics. The cross-sectional survey design cannot establish causal relationships between drivers and migration outcomes; longitudinal data would be required for causal inference. The convenience sampling approach means the quantitative sample over-represents urban populations: 96 percent of respondents are from urban settings, with only 15 respondents from IDP camps and one from a rural area. This limits what the survey data can say about migration pressures in more peripheral or displaced communities. The study also does not include systematic evidence on conditions in destination countries, limiting the assessment of whether migration ultimately improves wellbeing.

9. FINDINGS & DISCUSSION

9.1 Respondent Profile

The study combined survey data from 406 respondents with qualitative evidence from 90 KII and FGD participants across Garowe, Bosaso, Galkayo, and Badhan. The quantitative sample is near-equally distributed across the four districts, with Bosaso (104) and Badhan (102) marginally higher than Galkayo and Garowe (100 each).




Figure 1: Survey respondents by district (N = 406)

Male respondents constitute 63 percent of the sample (257), with female respondents at 37 percent (149). This gender distribution reflects wider patterns of male dominance in migration-focused studies in Somalia, though as discussed in Section 9.9, migration aspirations among women are rising rapidly.




Figure 2: Gender distribution of survey respondents

The age structure is strongly youth centred. Ninety percent of respondents (365) fall within the 15-to-34 bracket, with the largest concentration in the 20-to-24 age group (160 respondents, 39 percent).

This is consistent with the study's focus on youth as the primary population experiencing migration pressure. Forty-one respondents fall below the age of 20, and 41 fall above 34, the latter group captured through convenience sampling without a strict age cutoff.




Figure 3: Age distribution of survey respondents

Educational attainment is relatively high overall, with 53 percent of respondents holding university-level qualifications (216) and a further 24 percent having completed secondary school (96). This concentration of higher-educated respondents reflects the urban and institutional settings in which convenience sampling was conducted and has significant implications for the education-migration findings discussed in Section 9.4.




Figure 4: Education level of survey respondents

In terms of employment, the four largest categories are self-employed (116, 29 percent), students (102, 25 percent), formal job (100, 25 percent), and jobless (88, 22 percent). Income is predominantly low to moderate: 48 percent report moderate income, 25 percent low income, and 23 percent no income. Only 14 respondents (3 percent) report high income.




Figure 5: Employment status of survey respondents

9.2 Migration Intentions and Psychological Detachment

Migration intention in the sample is significant but not overwhelming. Thirty-two percent of respondents (131) stated they plan to migrate within the next five years. A further 21 percent (84) indicated uncertainty but remained open to migration. Forty-seven percent (191) said they do not intend to migrate. The combined "considering or uncertain" group, 53 percent, signals that migration remains a live aspiration for a substantial share of urban Puntland youth, even while a near-majority have not reached the point of intention.




Figure 6: Migration intention within the next five years (N = 406)

Migration intention varies by district. Badhan and Bosaso show the highest "Yes" rates (35 and 34 percent respectively), while Galkayo has the lowest (26 percent). Garowe is notable for the highest proportion of undecided respondents (34 percent), which is consistent with its profile as an administrative center where educated youth may weigh institutional frustration against relative stability more carefully than in peripheral or commercially active districts.




Figure 7: Migration intention by district

Thirty-one percent of survey respondents (126) reported having already attempted migration at some point. This figure suggests that for a significant minority, Tahriib is not merely aspirational but has been actively attempted, a finding that underscores the operational significance of smuggling networks and enabling systems discussed in Section 9.8.

"In our society, we are now divided into three groups: those who have already migrated, those currently on the journey, and those who remain at home, but whose minds have already left." —

FGD participant, Bosaso

Qualitative data from all four districts consistently describe what can be characterized as psychological detachment: a condition in which physical presence in Puntland no longer corresponds to emotional or aspirational investment in a future there. Young people describe loss of confidence in the possibility of building a meaningful local future, frustration with qualifications that produce no employment, and a sense that departure, however dangerous, represents the only credible form of advancement. Drawing on Carling's (2002) concept of involuntary immobility, many youths in this study clearly aspire to migrate but face practical barriers; the psychological costs of this frustration are substantial and visible in the qualitative data across all districts.

"If I had the opportunity to leave, I would go, because I do not see hope for my future here. I feel as though I am sentenced to death without committing any crime." —

Teacher, FGD, Galkayo

9.3 Economic Drivers of Migration

Economic pressure emerges as a consistent driver of migration across all four districts, but the nature of that pressure is more nuanced than simple unemployment. The survey data show that 81 percent of respondents agree or strongly agree that institutional mismanagement encourages migration, the highest-rated push factor in the study, followed by poverty (78 percent), social insecurity (78 percent), and terrorism and instability (78 percent). Unemployment ranks fifth at 75 percent, and low wages at 73 percent.




Figure 8: Push factors — percentage of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing (N = 406)

These figures challenge a common narrative in policy discussions about Tahriib that unemployment is the primary driver. Unemployment is clearly significant, but respondents identify governance failure most strongly as a mechanism of exclusion. This distinction has direct implications for intervention design: programs that focus solely on employment generation, without addressing the institutional context in which jobs are allocated, may have limited impact on migration intentions

The findings describe a structural mismatch between education and labor market demand. Each year, graduates emerge from Puntland's universities with qualifications that do not correspond to available positions. Respondents describe this repeatedly as a "graduation crisis" in which education no longer guarantees advancement. A local council member in Garowe explained: "Our higher education should be aligned with labor market needs, ensuring that young people gain practical and relevant skills that match available job opportunities." Private-sector employment remains narrow, while the public sector is perceived as inaccessible without the right family/clan connections or political networks.

Even among employed respondents, economic dissatisfaction is high. Many describe wages as insufficient for sustainable living, with limited prospects for career advancement. The data confirm that migration pressure is not confined to the unemployed: 29 percent of formally employed respondents and 25 percent of self-employed respondents expressed intentions to migrate within five years.

Destination countries are strongly associated with higher wages, professional development, welfare systems, housing, healthcare, and security; conditions that Puntland's economy currently cannot provide at equivalent scale. However, qualitative evidence reveals a significant disagreement among respondents about whether economic improvements alone would substantially reduce migration. Several participants argued that status aspirations, the desire for foreign passports, and social prestige associated with life abroad mean that economic reforms are necessary but not sufficient.

9.4 Migration Intention by Education and Employment

Two cross-tabulations from the survey are particularly analytically important. First, migration intention increases with education level, peaking among diploma holders at 46 percent, followed by secondary school graduates (34 percent) and university graduates (33 percent). Respondents with no formal education show the lowest intention rate at 14 percent. This pattern directly supports the education-aspiration trap argument: higher education raises aspirations without always providing the employment outcomes needed to fulfil them, generating frustration that translates into stronger migration desire.




Figure 9: Migration intention by education level

Second, while jobless respondents show the highest migration intention rate (42 percent), the differences across employment categories are instructive: students at 34 percent, formal employees at 29 percent, and the self-employed at 25 percent. These figures confirm that economic precarity drives stronger intentions, but that employment alone does not eliminate migration aspiration. A significant share of those with stable incomes still plan to migrate.




Figure 10: Migration intention by employment status

9.5 Governance and Institutional Breakdown

Governance weakness is the most consistently cited structural driver in both the quantitative and qualitative data. With 81 percent of respondents agreeing that mismanagement in public institutions encourages migration, this is the strongest finding in the push-factor analysis and the one that most directly implicates the Puntland state as a contributor to this crisis.

Respondents describe corruption not merely as misconduct but as a system that determines access to employment, justice, and public resources. A local councilor in Badhan stated plainly: *"Corruption contributes to Tahriib completely, 100 percent."* Favoritism and nepotism are identified as the specific mechanisms through which corruption operates in the labor market: public recruitment is widely perceived to favor political and clan affiliation and personal networks over qualified applicants, eroding any incentive to invest in education or professional development.

The clan-based, political power-sharing arrangement is consistently criticized as institutionalizing inequality. Respondents across all districts describe it as a system where clan identity supersedes competence, resulting in systematic exclusion of qualified youth from public employment, scholarships, and services. A senior official from the criminal investigations department stated: *"The clan-based power-sharing system has resulted in discrimination and inequality in access to opportunities within Somalia."*

Many individuals have missed opportunities because of their clan identity and lack of representation in government, which ultimately leads to hopelessness and pushes them toward migration."

A particularly corrosive finding from the qualitative data is what respondents describe as the "foreign passport paradox": senior officials who hold foreign passports or internationally recognized qualifications while publicly discouraging youth from migrating. Respondents repeatedly cite this contradiction as evidence that power and legitimacy are associated with having left Somalia, reinforcing rather than countering the logic of Tahriib. The widely repeated phrase among youth, *"The migrant today, the diaspora tomorrow, the leader the day after,"* captures this dynamic precisely.

"The allocation of jobs is influenced by favoritism and nepotism. Many qualified individuals do not get the positions they deserve, while relatives of officials are often favored." —

Survey respondent

A significant source of frustration noted in qualitative sessions is the gap between the rhetoric and reality of institutional reform. Anti-corruption laws and youth employment policies are described by multiple respondents as existing on "office shelves" without effective implementation. One participant likened ineffective governance to "drawing water with a broken container."

9.6 Security, Insecurity, and Human Vulnerability

Security concerns are tightly interwoven with migration decisions in all four districts. Seventy-eight percent of respondents agree that terrorism and insecurity increase migration intentions; the joint-second highest-rated push factor alongside poverty and social insecurity. Respondents consistently argue that without basic physical safety and functioning justice, no level of economic opportunity can persuade people to remain.

Insecurity is experienced both physically, through exposure to clan violence, revenge killings, displacement, and the threat of extremist actors, and psychologically, through a pervasive sense of uncertainty about the future. Participants in Galkayo, where security challenges are more visible than in Garowe or Badhan, were particularly emphatic about insecurity as a migration trigger: *"When a child's father is killed, or a brother is killed, it deeply affects them and can push them to leave the country."*

The relationship between insecurity and risk perception is especially significant. For some respondents, remaining in Puntland feels no safer than undertaking a dangerous migration journey. When the baseline conditions at home are already marked by fear, uncertainty about the future, or displacement, the comparative risk of migration diminishes. This dynamic partially explains why awareness of the very real dangers of Tahriib, drowning, trafficking, exploitation, and detention does not function as an effective deterrent. As one participant in Galkayo explained: *"They know this because their friends have gone before them. Some have lost friends and classmates who died at sea. Despite knowing the risks, they continue to put their lives in danger because they see no place for themselves in their own country."*

"The most important thing a country needs first is security and justice. When people feel safe and believe that justice exists, they are more willing to stay and build their future in their country."

FGD participant, Garowe

9.7 Social Influence, Digital Media, and Cultural Change

Social influence is central to how Tahriib is reproduced across generations and communities. The survey documents high social migration exposure: 74 percent of respondents reported having family members or friends who migrated in the past five years, with Bosaso the highest (78 percent) and Garowe the lowest (69 percent). Europe is overwhelmingly the dominant destination reported (78 percent of cases), followed by North America (13 percent) and Australia (3 percent).




Figure 11: Social migration exposure by district - % with migrant family or friends




Figure 12: Reported destinations of migrant family and friends

Digital media, particularly TikTok and Facebook, are identified by respondents as among the most powerful drivers of migration aspiration. These platforms consistently amplify success narratives from migrants abroad, displaying photographs beside luxury buildings, expensive cars, and desirable settings, while systematically under-representing hardship, exploitation, and failure. One official in Bosaso estimated that social media accounts for "90 percent of the influence" on youth migration decisions. A respondent captured the dynamic directly: "My friend always posts pictures on Facebook and says to me, 'Why are you still in the dustland?'"

The survey documents significant frequency of migration-related thinking among respondents. Fifty-six percent report thinking often or always about searching for job prospects abroad, and 55 percent think often or always about pursuing overseas education. Thinking about permanent immigration is somewhat less frequent, with 41 percent in the often or always categories, suggesting that for many respondents, migration aspiration is tied more to work and education than to permanent resettlement.





Figure 13: Frequency of migration-related thinking

Social norms data reveal a more nuanced picture than the qualitative evidence might suggest. Sixty-six percent of respondents agree that permanent residency abroad is a popular trend among Somali youth, and 54 percent believe emigrants enjoy higher social status than those who remain. However, only 37 percent agreed that the ability to emigrate is an indication of success or competence, suggesting that while migration is normalized and associated with upward mobility, it is not uniformly regarded as a marker of personal achievement. Sixty-five percent agreed that migration is primarily for the benefit of one's family, reflecting a collective rather than purely individualistic motivation.



Response	PR a popular	Migrate for family	Higher social	Friends want to	Capable of migrating	Sign of success
Strongly Agree	27.80%	23.90%	21.20%	25.10%	15.30%	13.50%
Agree	39.20%	41.10%	33.70%	31.80%	29.60%	24.40%
Neutral	18.50%	18.50%	18.50%	16.50%	18.50%	17.00%
Disagree	11.10%	12.80%	19.70%	20.40%	26.40%	32.00%
Strongly Disagree	3.40%	3.70%	6.90%	6.20%	10.30%	13.10%

Table 1: Social Norms and Aspirations related to Migration

Qualitative evidence also documents broader cultural change. Traditional guidance structures (community mentorship, parental engagement, and civic platforms that once promoted local patriotism) are described as weakened by respondents across all districts. Several participants contrasted the present digital environment with earlier periods when poets, artists, and community organizations played stronger roles in shaping youth values and social orientation.

9.8 Enabling Systems and Smuggling Networks

Migration in Puntland is sustained by organized systems that reduce practical barriers and normalize irregular movement. Respondents across all four districts describe well-known smuggling routes linking Puntland to Ethiopia, Sudan, Libya, and onward to Europe. These routes are widely understood socially, and route knowledge is shared informally through peer networks and digital platforms.

The "leave now, pay later" financing model documented by Ali (2016) appears to remain operational in the form described: traffickers transport migrants without upfront payment, then demand large sums once migrants reach transit countries such as Libya or Algeria, exposing families to severe financial pressure and creating conditions for exploitation and debt bondage. Families sometimes sell major assets, homes, and livestock to meet ransom demands.

Digital platforms serve dual operational functions within these systems: they shape aspirations broadly, and they facilitate connections between prospective migrants, intermediaries, and route information.

Social media groups and informal online channels allow route and logistics information to circulate widely. One respondent noted: "Youth exchange practical information regarding destinations, transit points, and migration procedures through informal online networks."

Respondents also describe government weakness in its capacity to properly and fully counter irregular migration. In some cases, security personnel are reported to release apprehended migrants in exchange for payment, weakening enforcement and contributing to a system in which irregular departure is effectively available to those with sufficient resources.

9.9 Gender Dimensions of Migration

Migration in Puntland has historically been male-dominated, and the survey sample reflects this: male respondents (257) outnumber female respondents (149). However, the most analytically significant gender finding is the convergence in migration intentions: both male and female respondents show a migration intention rate of exactly 32 percent. This near-identical rate, despite the historical and cultural dominance of male migration, suggests that aspirations are moving toward gender parity considerably faster than actual migration flows.




Figure 15: Migration Intention by Gender

Qualitative evidence reinforces this trend. Female respondents across all districts describe growing migration aspirations driven by social media, peer influence from other women who have migrated, and growing aspirations for independent access to education, employment, and economic stability. The Coordinator from the Puntland Ministry of Women, Development, and Family Affairs stated: *"The main cause and problem is social media, because girls who have migrated inspire other girls."*

Migration intention	Female	Male	Total
Yes	48	83	131
No	74	117	191
Not Sure	27	57	84
Total	149	257	406

Table 2: Migration Intent by Gender

At the same time, female migrants face heightened risks during irregular journeys, including exploitation, trafficking, sexual violence, and extortion within smuggling systems. Respondents describe women and girls as particularly vulnerable along transit routes, and in some cases report serious intra-family conflict over daughters' migration decisions, including situations where mothers facilitate migration without the father's knowledge.

These findings suggest that gender differences in Tahriib are no longer primarily about participation rates, but increasingly about differential exposure to risk, exploitation, and forms of social pressure. Gender-responsive programming is therefore not a supplementary concern but a central requirement of any serious policy response.

9.10 Risk Perception and the Deterrence Gap

One of the clearest and most policy-relevant findings across the quantitative and qualitative data is the gap between awareness of migration risks and willingness to be deterred by them. Respondents consistently acknowledge the dangers of Tahriib: death at sea, detention in transit countries, trafficking, ransom demands, and psychological trauma. References to specific tragedies are common in the qualitative data - *"Five boys from the same neighborhood died at sea"* and many participants have personal experience of family members who were harmed or killed during migration attempts.

Despite this awareness, migration aspirations and intentions remain high. The qualitative evidence points clearly to why:

Risk awareness does not function as a deterrent when the perceived risks of remaining at home feel comparable or worse.

Hopelessness, economic stagnation, governance exclusion, insecurity, and social pressure collectively raise the subjective cost of staying. In this context, a dangerous irregular journey can appear as a rational gamble rather than an irrational choice.

This finding has direct and important implications for intervention design. Awareness campaigns that catalog the dangers of Tahriib, without simultaneously addressing the conditions that make staying feel equally hopeless, are unlikely to reduce migration intentions. The deterrence logic of such campaigns rests on an assumption that potential migrants are unaware of the risks, which this study's evidence does not support. What is needed, instead, are credible alternatives and a restoration of genuine opportunity within Puntland.

9.11 Tahriib Risk Awareness Matrix

Through this matrix, we present how well different groups understand the specific dangers of irregular migration, based on KII and FGD transcripts, Bosaso, Garowe, Galkacyo, and Badhan, February 2026

9.12 Awareness heatmap

Scores reflect depth of knowledge demonstrated in responses; not whether respondents used the word "dangerous," but whether they understood the mechanism, probability, and consequence of each specific risk.

Respondent group/Risk →	Death at sea/desert	Detention & arrest	Torture by smugglers	Sexual exploitation	Debt bondage & extortion	Family financial ruin	Psychological trauma	Social media manipulation
Youth/community (FGDs)	3	2	2	1	3	2	1	2
Parents	4	3	3	4	5	5	3	3
Educators	3	2	2	2	2	3	2	3
Local govt / civil society	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	4

Respondent group/Risk →	Death at sea/desert	Detention & arrest	Torture by smugglers	Sexual exploitation	Debt bondage & extortion	Family financial ruin	Psychological trauma	Social media manipulation
Security & immigration	5	5	4	4	4	3	2	5
UN / expert	5	4	4	5	4	4	3	4

Score key:

1	Unaware
2	Generic only ("it's dangerous")
3	Partial awareness
4	Aware of mechanisms
5	Operational/full

9.13 The Central Awareness Paradox

Generic awareness of Tahriib risks is uniformly high across all respondent groups and all four locations. Nearly every respondent knows that Tahriib kills people. Yet that knowledge is not translating into behavior change. The critical question is not whether people know risk exists in the abstract, but whether they understand it concretely enough to override the weight of economic desperation.

One FGD participant in Bosaso put it plainly: "No family sends their child into migration while being unaware of the dangers that may cost him his life. The chance of survival is less than 30%." A returnee participating in the Badhan FGD reinforced the same point: "They look only at the benefits and not at the losses that can result from Tahriib."

This gap between knowing and acting is not uniform. It varies significantly by risk type and by respondent group, and those variations reveal where awareness efforts have fallen short most severely.

Community youth score lowest on the risks that are most likely to directly harm them. Sexual exploitation received the lowest awareness score among this group and is almost entirely absent from community FGD discussions. Psychological trauma received an equally low score and was absent from youth responses across all four locations. These are not peripheral concerns. They are central to what happens on the Libya route, particularly for women and girls. The people most exposed to these risks are the least informed about how they actually operate.

Parents, by contrast, hold a more grounded and specific understanding. They score highest on debt bondage and family financial ruin, not because they sought out this knowledge, but because they have lived through it. They are the ones who receive ransom calls, liquidate family assets, and sometimes sell their homes to secure a child's release. This knowledge is real and operationally precise. It is largely absent from the responses of educators and local government officials, who tend to address these risks in broad and general terms rather than with the specificity that comes from direct experience.

A parent interviewed in Bosaso described it directly: "The home where the child was raised is sometimes sold to finance their migration. Families are left homeless, forced to live in temporary shelters or return to rural areas."

Security and immigration officials demonstrate the most comprehensive understanding across risk categories, yet that knowledge rarely reaches the communities that need it. CID Galkacyo identified active TikTok recruitment accounts operating openly and offering free passage to Libya. The Bosaso Mayor's office was familiar with the mechanics of the deferred payment model used by smugglers. The Garowe immigration officer drew on direct field experience. What is missing is a mechanism for translating this institutional knowledge into accessible, community-level information. At present, it does not flow to households, schools, or local government in any systematic way.

Psychological trauma stands out as the single largest awareness gap across the entire system. No respondent group scored above a partial awareness level on this dimension. Returnees are not being debriefed in any structured way. Communities are not being informed about the psychological consequences people face after arrival in transit or destination countries. Nowhere in the study was mental health reported as a framing for Tahriib's consequences; not in the KIIIs, not in the FGDs, and not in responses from officials. This is a significant gap in both public awareness and institutional response, and one that no current program appears to be addressing.

Finally, the social media dimension requires particular attention because it is not a passive influence. Rather, it is actively shaped. Smugglers are systematically flooding platforms with success narratives and suppressing accounts of failure, injury, and exploitation. CID Bosaso noted that smugglers specifically target individuals with large social media followings to amplify recruitment reach. As one official from the Bosaso Mayor's office observed: "Most of the images and videos shared do not reflect the harsh realities of migration but instead mislead and entice young people by portraying migration as easy and successful." Any awareness campaign that does not directly engage this distorted information environment risks being drowned out before it reaches its intended audience.

10. CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

10.1 Conclusions

This study, conducted by PDRC and East Africa University across Badhan, Bosaso, Galkayo, and Garowe, provides multi-district evidence that Tahriib in Puntland has evolved from an exceptional crisis response into a deeply embedded social, economic, and psychological condition. Findings from within this study call into question several common assumptions about irregular migration in the Puntland context.

First, migration is not confined to the unemployed or economically desperate. University graduates, formally employed individuals, and students all show significant migration intentions: 33 percent, 29 percent, and 34 percent respectively. The education-aspiration trap is real: diploma holders have the highest migration intention of any education group (46 percent), suggesting that higher education raises aspirations without always providing the employment outcomes needed to realize them locally.

Second, institutional mismanagement, not unemployment, is the most strongly cited push factor, with 81 percent of respondents agreeing it encourages migration. Corruption, the clan-based power-sharing system, and favoritism in public recruitment are not background grievances; they are experienced by young people as direct mechanisms that close off legitimate pathways to advancement. The "foreign passport paradox," in which senior officials hold foreign documentation while discouraging youth migration, deepens this alienation by implying that power and legitimacy are ultimately external.

Third, social and digital influences substantially sustain and accelerate migration normalization. With 74 percent of respondents having immediate social networks that include migrants, and with social media amplifying migration success stories while minimizing risks, Tahriib is embedded in the social fabric of daily life. Attempts to address migration as an individual decision divorced from this social context will fail.

Fourth, risk awareness is not a deterrent. Respondents know the dangers of Tahriib. They continue because the conditions at home feel equally, or more, hopeless. Interventions based on the assumption that young people migrate because they do not understand the risks are not supported by this evidence.

Fifth, the gender dimension of Tahriib is changing rapidly. Migration intentions are near-equal by gender (32 percent each) despite historical male dominance in actual migration flows. Female migrants face heightened vulnerability in smuggling systems. Programming that does not specifically address women is already behind the curve.

Taken together, these findings portray Tahriib as a rational response to an interconnected set of structural failures: an economy unable to absorb educated youth; governance systems that are experienced as permanently exclusionary; insecurity that undermines the foundations of stable life; social and digital environments that glorify migration while obscuring its costs and risks; and institutional responses that remain fragmented and enforcement-focused. Sustainable change requires transformative intervention at each of these levels.

10.2 Recommendations

The following recommendations are grounded directly in the quantitative and qualitative evidence from the four study districts.

10.2.1 Reform Public Sector Recruitment to Restore Meritocracy

Given that 81 percent of respondents, the strongest finding in the push-factor analysis, identified institutional mismanagement as a driver of migration, Puntland authorities should treat the reform of public recruitment as a migration intervention, not merely an administrative one. This means establishing transparent, merit-based hiring processes in public institutions at district and regional levels, publishing recruitment criteria publicly, and creating formal accountability mechanisms for non-compliance. This is particularly urgent in the education, health, and civil administration sectors, where youth perceptions of exclusion are strongest.

10.2.2 Align Education with Labor Market Demand

With diploma holders showing the highest migration intention (46 percent) of any education group, and with respondents across all districts criticizing the mismatch between university curricula and available jobs, the Puntland government and academic institutions should commission a structured labor market assessment and use its findings to reform curricula at university and vocational levels. Internship programs, career guidance services, and graduate placement schemes should be institutionalized across the four study districts as a minimum starting point.

10.2.3 Expand Vocational Training and Youth Entrepreneurship

The study shows that 42 percent of jobless respondents intend to migrate: the highest of any employment category. Targeted investment in market-relevant vocational skills and structured support for youth-led business development could reduce this figure. Programs should be co-designed with the private sector to ensure alignment with genuine market demand and should explicitly target youth aged 15 to 29 who are not in formal education or employment.

10.2.4 Address Psychosocial Dimensions of Migration Aspiration

Qualitative data from all four districts document significant psychological detachment; a loss of faith in the possibility of a dignified future in Puntland. Awareness campaigns that list migration risks will not address this. Psychosocial support programs, mentorship schemes connecting youth with successful local role models, and civic engagement initiatives that rebuild youth investment in local community development should be integrated into existing education and youth programming.

10.2.5 Invest in Security and Access to Justice at District Level

Seventy-eight percent of respondents agreed that terrorism, organized crimes, and insecurity increase migration intentions. Security is a precondition, not an afterthought. Puntland authorities and international partners should prioritize community-level security improvements, particularly in districts like Galkayo where insecurity is most visible as a migration driver. Functioning local justice mechanisms, not only police presence but accessible dispute resolution, are equally important. Effective programs, such as community policing, along with accountability and transparency within law enforcement institutions, are also seen as integral parts of a foundation on which long-term investment can be built.

10.2.6 Design Gender-Responsive Programming

With female migration intentions at 32 percent, equal to male intentions, and with female migrants facing disproportionate exploitation and violence in transit, generic youth migration programs are insufficient. Programming should specifically address the social media and peer influences shaping female migration aspirations, the safety risks female migrants face en route, and the economic exclusion that drives female migration desire in the first place.

10.2.7 Regulate Social Media Narratives Through Community-Based Counter-Messaging

Rather than attempting to restrict social media (which is an impractical approach), Puntland authorities and civil society should develop credible counter-messaging strategies that work within the same digital platforms. This means creating and amplifying authentic content from Puntland-based youth about local opportunity and success and providing digital literacy programming that equips young people to critically assess the curated migration narratives they encounter online. PDRC can play a good role through the strategic and intensive use of its Mobile Audio-Visual Unit (MAVU), which specializes in the collection of audio and video materials to produce and disseminate documentary films, and facilitate organized film-based discussions, as a means to raise public awareness. On the other hand, EAU can facilitate the engagement of youth, spread anti-Tahriib messages, and conduct rallies at target schools.

10.2.8 Regional Cooperation and Institutional Integrity to Disrupt Smuggling Networks

The study highlights internal systemic issues (government weaknesses) as a direct enabler of smuggling, with security personnel reportedly releasing apprehended migrants in exchange for payment. Internal integrity mechanisms within Puntland security institutions are therefore as important as external law enforcement cooperation. Regional coordination with Ethiopia, Sudan, and international partners on disrupting smuggling networks should also be strengthened.

10.2.9 Strengthen Community and Family Engagement

Sixty-five percent of respondents agreed that migration is primarily for the benefit of their family. Families are therefore both a target and a potential resource for migration prevention programming. Community dialogue processes involving religious leaders, women's groups, elders, and youth organizations can reframe family-level migration decisions by elevating

awareness of risks and creating community-level social support that reduces the perceived necessity of migration.

10.2.10 Establish a Sustained Migration Monitoring System for Puntland

This study is cross-sectional and cannot track changes over time. Given the pace at which migration dynamics in Puntland are evolving, particularly with respect to gender, digital influence, and emerging smuggling routes, PDRC and EAU should establish a joint migration monitoring system with regular data collection cycles, enabling trend analysis and policy-responsive research. This would also strengthen the institutional knowledge base for future evidence-based programming.

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