

Galkacyo Conflict Assessment

December 2016 – March 2017



Interpeace Regional Office for Eastern and Central Africa (ECA)

P.O. Box 14520 – 00800

Nairobi, Kenya

Tel: +254 202 655 228

Email: eca@interpeace.org

Web: www.interpeace.org

Peace and Development Research Center (PDRC), Garowe, Puntland

Tel: +252 584 4480

Email: pdrsomalia@gmail.com

Web: www.pdrsomalia.org

Supported by UNDP Somalia/ UNSOM



As part of the StEFS Project, in partnership with:



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Acronyms

ASWJ	Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamacah
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IPT	Interpeace Peacebuilding Team
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Committee
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDRC	Peace and Development Research Center
SNA	Somali National Army
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
StEFS	Support to Emerging Federal States Project
SYL	Somali Youth League
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress

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Executive Summary

Following the most recent outbreak of violent conflict between north and south Galkacyo in November 2016, the Somali region and the international community's attention turned once more to the city of Galkacyo. In this context, on the request of and with support from UNDP and UNSOM, Interpeace brought together a multidimensional team and launched engagement in Galkacyo. This engagement aimed firstly to respond to the recent outbreak in violence by supporting the Joint Ceasefire Committee (JCC), and secondly to consider long-term peacebuilding needs in the city. This conflict assessment study addresses this second goal: to contribute to the development of informed, sustained and meaningful engagement and solutions for peace and stability in Galkacyo.

The Galkacyo conflict has long roots and connections with numerous traditional conflicts. Reflecting the border between the Hawiye and Darood communities it represents competition for political ascendancy between these clans on the national level. Similarly, it reflects historical grievances and the wounds from the civil war, including killings and issues related to property rights violations. It is against this backdrop that finding a solution to the Galkacyo conflict is so significant, not only from a local perspective, but for the entire Somali region. A durable solution to the Galkacyo conflict will by default also have a huge bearing on reconciliation at the national level and in turn peacebuilding work carried out in Galkacyo could serve as a model for similar interventions in similar existing or emerging border conflicts relating to the creation of the federal states.

Key Findings

- **Long-standing historical grievances and a lack of redress or reconciliation of these underpins the current conflict in Galkacyo.** These grievances contribute to instability, tension and mistrust between communities, lower the threshold for igniting armed conflict, and undermine peace and reconciliation efforts, while they are not properly addressed.
- **Federalism and perceived deficiencies in the functioning of the current federal system are seen as primary conflict drivers by communities in both north and south Galkacyo.** The lack of a strong federal government, completed federal constitution or harmonized state constitutions leaves states to compete over control of territory, and natural and man-made resources with no trusted higher authority to arbitrate between them. The relationships and linkages between the various levels of government (as well as their citizens) in the new federal system needs to be strengthened if these tensions are to be resolved – in Galkacyo and other comparable conflicts in the Somali region.
- **The conflict has been politicised, reflecting a new, more complex dynamic.** Historic tensions and sporadic armed conflict between the Hawiye and Darood communities in Galkacyo have been transformed by the introduction of the federal system. Former clan-dominated areas are seen to have evolved into clan-based states who now compete, no longer just for access to pasture, water and other local resources, but also for claims to territory, political legitimacy, and the control of national assets.
- **Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms have been undermined, without a viable alternative to replace them.** The introduction of the federal system, state governments, and regional and local authorities, took away the primary responsibility of maintaining the rule of law from clans, elders and customary law, while the escalating scale of destruction undermined the capacity of traditional mechanisms and clans to provide compensation. At the same time, the new authorities have yet to install effective governance and the rule of law, leaving grievances unaddressed and allowing a culture

of impunity to thrive. Traditional dispute resolution and reconciliation mechanisms represent a resilience factor and should be explored as a component of new political structures as they develop.

- **Peacebuilding in Galkacyo must be inclusive and participatory, including stakeholders from not only federal or state government but also local communities.** The current conflict exists not in isolation between two state governments, but between two communities who have experienced armed hostilities for generations and enjoyed little reconciliation. As such, peace processes, peacebuilding efforts, and longer-term democratisation processes must include stakeholders at all levels, from the federal and state governments, to regional and district authorities, clan elders, civil society, and citizens, particularly youth and women. Only with this level of participation, and indeed local ownership, will legitimate and sustainable peace and development be achieved.
- **The media are perceived as a key aggravating actor in north and south Galkacyo, igniting tensions and fuelling conflict, yet present huge potential for resilience and positive impact.** Owned, controlled or heavily influenced by the state or clans, media outlets often provide a platform for warmongers, and present biased views of the situation and stereotypes of the other side of the conflict. This has a strong negative impact on the discourse in Galkacyo and on the divide between the communities, despite the media holding significant positive resilience potential. As such, engagement with the media is one key entry point to focus on immediately.
- **Resilience factors, particularly through youth, women and the business community, must be recognized and more regularly engaged.** These groups already play a positive role in connecting communities and promoting discourses of peace and social cohesion through factors, such as trade and inter-clan marriage. They should be engaged in inclusive peace processes and supported in their existing efforts by local, state, and federal authorities, as well as the international community.
- **The international community must be aware of the potential to contribute to perceptions of bias and privileging through their interventions, which can promote divisions and mistrust.** Development support to security forces, governance, and local infrastructure and services are perceived as primarily directed towards and benefiting Puntland. This can strengthen perceptions of injustice and grievance, the division between north and south, and potentially limits trust and entry points for engagement by the international community and other peacebuilding actors.
- **All engagement in Galkacyo needs to be undertaken with a peace-building lens, to ensure that support contributes to sustainable peace.** Humanitarian, development, security, governance, and any other forms of intervention in Galkacyo should adopt a peacebuilding lens, to ensure that actors are aware of the impact that their work has on peace and conflict dynamics in the city and its surrounding areas. Programming must ensure that it does not inadvertently or indirectly contribute to promoting tension between communities and instead contributes to strengthening trust, cohesion, stability and resilience in Galkacyo.
- **Parties to the conflict are now armed with heavy and modern weaponry, escalating the scale of the conflict and undermining the possibility of reconciliation.** With the introduction of federal states as parties to the conflict, as well as the proliferation of cheap weapons available to communities and clan militias, the conflict can cause greater damage and harm in a much shorter period of time. This changed nature of the conflict makes conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts more challenging.

Peacebuilding Entry Points & Opportunities

Through the analysis of community members' perspectives on the conflict, the research team identified entry points and opportunities for peacebuilding. These represent potential next steps for the international community, international and local NGOs and other actors involved in peacebuilding in Galkacyo. Building on the recommendations (see Annex 1), these entry points are specific and action-oriented, representing viable and immediate engagement opportunities based on: desire from community members to see this intervention; the relative ease with which they may be achieved; or a capitalisation on existing or potential resilience factors and groups.

1. **Validate report among key stakeholders to build consensus and strengthen local ownership of the peacebuilding process.** This research was carried out in an inclusive and participatory manner through focus group discussions and key informant interviews that included a wide segment of society in Galkacyo. However, to ensure that any peacebuilding gains are sustainable, it is essential that there is also local ownership of the process. The critical next step is therefore to once again gather the JCC, who are key stakeholders in the process, present the findings in order to validate the report, and seek to build consensus on the next steps.
2. **Support locally-led and -owned peacebuilding efforts in Galkacyo to ensure legitimate, sustainable peace.** This is important in engagements anywhere, but particularly so in a context such as Galkacyo, given the historical roots of the conflict, the increasing complexity of its dynamics, and the need to establish effective and inclusive governance for lasting change to be achieved. Entry points and opportunities only present significant potential in as much as they harness existing resilience in Galkacyo, strengthen local actors who already demonstrate the capacity to contribute to positive change, or build on the will and desire by communities for certain action. Without these underlying foundations, peacebuilding efforts will not be legitimate or sustainable. The international community thus has a significant role to play in promoting and strengthening locally-owned and -driven processes, both in their own engagements and through their support to other actors.
3. **Continue supporting the Joint Ceasefire Committee in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and engage them in consultations about peace and reconciliation.** This is an important first step in a longer-term peacebuilding strategy. This ongoing support will continue to strengthen the trusting relationships between JCC members themselves, and with local and international peacebuilders. The confidence that is built as key terms of the agreement are implemented will also serve as a strong foundation from which to explore further engagement with local government representatives and elders that make up the JCC in peace and reconciliation processes.
4. **Adopt a peacebuilding lens in all humanitarian and development work in Galkacyo, Puntland and Galmudug.** There is huge potential to transform the conflict in Galkacyo by adopting a peacebuilding lens in all engagements in the city and its surrounding area. This entails considering the positive and negative impact that actions may have on peace and adapting actions accordingly. Currently, intervention may be perceived as biased towards one side, contributing to feelings of marginalisation and intercommunal tension. Positive intentions can indirectly fuel hostility. In turn, current and future engagements, even when not directly addressing peacebuilding, may contribute to social cohesion, stability and ultimately peace, if actors commit to informed strategies of intervention that consider their potential impact on, and reinforce, peace. This approach could be achieved beginning with consultations with both sides of the conflict and care not to privilege one side over the other in programming.

5. **Tackle aggravating actor impact and harness potential peacebuilding role of the media.** The media emerged as a key aggravating actor group through their promotion of divisive and conflict-fuelling messages, yet at the same time hold huge immediate potential to promote peace and reconciliation in Galkacyo. This could be deployed with relative ease compared to other actors and would contribute to public pressure and a momentum toward conflict resolution. As such, the international community, NGOs and local peacebuilding actors should work with the media on both sides of the conflict to promote positive discourses and messages of peace. Trainings, capacity building, workshops and discussion forums should be launched to underline the importance of unbiased and accurate reporting and empower the media to champion the peace process rather than undermine it.
6. **Promote intercommunal engagement between local-level actors.** Capitalising on the perception of local-level actors (such as local authorities, businesspeople, elders, civil society, youth and women) as significant existing or potential resilience groups, the international community and government authorities should prioritise peacebuilding initiatives with these stakeholders. This could take the form of the creation of neutral platforms for dialogue between them or workshops to promote support for peacebuilding and cohesion. Focussing on these stakeholders, alongside and in connection with higher-level negotiation, will promote community-led and -owned peace processes and outcomes, and will increase the chances of creating stability and lasting peace in Galkacyo. Moreover, this represents a long-term approach to locally-owned peacebuilding in the city prioritising sustainability and impact.
7. **Capitalise on the current and potential resilience roles of women and youth as peacemakers.** Representing significant connectors across communities, active peace actors and untapped resilience potential, women and youth must be strengthened as peacebuilders by the international community and NGOs. These groups' engagement in peace processes (including in the JCC), peacebuilding efforts and governance should be prioritised and strengthened, through capacity building, mentorship and platforms for discussion with stakeholders and authorities. Youth and women groups are already eager to participate in these processes and engagement with them is relatively uncontroversial, making this a viable and significantly rewarding entry point.
8. **Support to social reconciliation within and between communities.** A lack of true reconciliation and social healing in Galkacyo has contributed to ongoing conflict over the years, with historical and more recent grievances building on each other to create persistent underlying tension. The international community should thus collaborate with local peacebuilding actors, civil society and traditional leaders to launch activities that will contribute to reconciliation, not only between the north and south of Galkacyo but also between communities in the north or south¹. Long-term attitudinal and behavioural change is needed in Galkacyo to address how communities see and act towards each other. Activities should build on existing connecting factors, for instance shared culture, poetry and dance. This approach will strengthen support for peace processes and build trust between communities for lasting peace and stability. Reconciliation efforts like this are in fact needed across the entire Somali region and efforts in Galkacyo could provide a model for other interventions.
9. **Support to the federal and state governments in finalising, strengthening and making the federal and democratisation processes inclusive and participatory.** Various aspects of the federal process emerged as primary conflict issues in the study, highlighting the urgent need to address perceived weaknesses in the system. The international community are well placed to provide technical support, guidance and capacity building to federal and state authorities on the urgent completion and

¹ In Galmudug, entry points and the need for reconciliation and integration exists between the Habar-Gidir and Marehaan, and Marehaan and Dir in Dhusamareb, Gelinsoor and Xeralle towns as well as the Sa'ad, Sheekhal and Dir in Afbarwaago town.

strengthening of processes, which will alleviate tensions surrounding the creation of states and their borders, including: legal frameworks governing inter-state trade, institutional structures and taxation systems. Crucially, to further contribute to *effective* governance, the international community and local actors should strengthen citizen inclusion and participation in democratisation processes and governance. Ensuring effective consultation takes place and authorities have the capacity to respond to these is one step towards achieving this. Only with a strong and responsive relationship between citizens and their governments will trust, effective policy and ultimately stability be established in Galkacyo, as well as other parts of Somalia.

10. **Facilitation of dialogue between state governments and support to the Federal Government to engage in mediation.** The international community has a unique role to play in facilitating negotiation between state governments, representing external actors with significant access to resources and political leverage. State governments (and their politicians) were perceived as primary actors in prolonging conflict and undermining peacebuilding efforts. As such, the international community should prioritise bringing these actors to the table to discuss ways forward. This could be achieved for instance through the creation of a neutral platform for dialogue or support to the design of peace talks taking citizen perspectives into account alongside government authorities and other stakeholders. High-level processes such as this must be inclusive and go hand-in-hand with local peacebuilding efforts if sustainable and legitimate peace is to be achieved. At the same time, respondents spoke of the need for the federal government to play a third-party mediation role, so support to them in this engagement is crucial, not only to making progress in the peace process, but also to demonstrate the impact that an effective Federal Government can have on governance across the Somali region.

1. Introduction

Following the most recent outbreak of violent conflict between north and south Galkacyo in November 2016, the Somali region and the international community's attention turned once more to the city of Galkacyo. In this context, on the request of and with support from UNDP and UNSOM, Interpeace brought together a multidimensional team and launched engagement in Galkacyo. This engagement aimed firstly to respond to the recent outbreak in violence by supporting the Joint Ceasefire Committee (JCC), and secondly to consider long-term peacebuilding needs in the city. This conflict assessment study addresses this second goal: to contribute to the development of informed, sustained and meaningful engagement and solutions for peace and stability in Galkacyo.

Situated in the heart of Somalia, Galkacyo is a major hub on the border between the state of Puntland to the north and Galmudug to the south, as well as Ethiopian Zone 5 to the west. This strategic geographical position combined with its clan composition situates the city between many actors' competing interests: Hawiye have traditionally dominated the southern part of the city and region, and Darood the north. This has contributed to inter-clan conflict in the region for decades and continues to do so, with Galkacyo having experienced more violence since the outbreak of the civil war in 1991 than many other areas in Somalia. Despite conflict having long defined the city, the Somali context is changing, as are the conflict issues and the nature of the conflict in Galkacyo. Historical clan rivalry has been transformed by the introduction of the federal state system, introducing new actors, conflict drivers and dynamics. This calls for a rethink of engagement in Galkacyo. There is a crucial need to move from "firefighting", addressing immediate violence, to long-term engagement and peacebuilding, based on analysis and deeper understanding of the current conflict.



Map Sources: ESRI, UNCS, UNDP, UNHCR.
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Map created in Apr 2012.

Map 1: Courtesy OCHA

Responding immediately to the escalation of violence in Galkacyo at the end of 2016 as well as laying the foundation for longer-term peacebuilding efforts, Interpeace provided support to the Joint Ceasefire Committee (JCC). This joint body aims to bring the most recent outbreak of violence to an end, lay the foundation for initial discussion between both sides, and establish a degree of stability to allow for long-term peacebuilding initiatives to be jointly developed and implemented. Interpeace, and PDRC provided both logistical and substantive support to the JCC in organising, facilitating and mediating meetings between the two sides of the conflict.

While this work with the JCC addresses the urgent work in Galkacyo of preventing the immediate risk of further violence and creating stability, Interpeace and its partners launched this conflict assessment in December 2016 to more deeply examine the conflict and develop recommendations for future action to establish lasting peace. The assessment draws on work of the JCC as well as findings of key informant interviews and focus group discussions in north and south Galkacyo. The perspectives of authorities, clan elders, women, youth, businesspeople and civil society, among other groups, are reflected in the study.

This conflict assessment is particularly significant in that it was conducted by a research team representing and with strong links to both sides of the conflict: IPT based in Mogadishu and PDRC based in Garowe. This promoted a balanced, representative study, enhanced engagement opportunities on both sides of the conflict, and a greater capacity for analysis and understanding.

2. Background

The city of Galkacyo and its surrounding region have historically experienced frequent violent conflict. Traditionally, sporadic clashes between pastoralist communities arose over resources, such as pasture and water. At the same time, the region has been defined by historical animosity between Hawiye, traditionally dominant in the south, and Darood clans, traditionally dominant in the north: a dynamic that continues to exert strong influence in the region today. Responding to these tensions, the Italian colonial administration demarcated a boundary between communities in the north and the south named the Tomaselli Line. A semblance of unity emerged between communities towards the end of the 1950s with the emergence of popular nationalistic agendas, led by the Somali Youth League (SYL), and the region enjoyed a modest reintegration of communities in the north and the south, with strong messages about Somali unity that transcended clan boundaries². A period of relative calm was thus established by the democratic regimes throughout the 1960s into the 1970s, prioritising a fair clan composition of administrations. Minor, localised instances of conflict were largely restricted to rural areas.

Conflict re-emerged in the 1980s in the build-up to the civil war. Siad Barre's regime contributed to reigniting conflict between clans to divide and weaken them, and strengthen his own position, and prompted a mobilisation of armed political opposition through clan-based militias, such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the United Somali Congress (USC), against him³. Communities that had not traditionally been implicated in recurrent conflict in the region were drawn into fighting, such as the Sheekhal, Mohamed Caagane and Samatar Caagaane sub-clans, and many communities fled the city of Galkacyo and surrounding areas. The regime's efforts to divide the clans, as well as the fact that the fighting adopted a heavily clan-based approach, exposed the Hawiye-Darood competition for political ascendancy. Violent attacks during this time led to heavy casualties and consequent revenge attacks.

Following the collapse of the central government in 1991, the country descended further into conflict. The USC, who had played a key role in the victory over Barre's regime in Mogadishu, attacked Galkacyo and sparked a deadly clan war in the region, between the Hawiye (Sa'ad/Habar Gedir) and Darood (Majerten and Lelkase). The armed opposition groups that had fought during the conflict aligned themselves (SSDF with Majerten, USC with Sa'ad and SNDU with Lelkase), in competition for power in the region. The warring clans established separate administrations in the contested and divided city of Galkacyo, cementing the division between them⁴. The violence and atrocities that were committed during this period were never addressed and their impact on communities continues in the form of historical grievances that exacerbate tension and conflict today.

In June 1993, a peace agreement was signed in Mogadishu between the leaders of the SSDF (Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed), the Somali National Democratic Union (Ali Ismail Abdi-Giir) and the USC (General Mohamed Farah Aidid), representing an unprecedented breakthrough in ending the bloodshed in the region⁵. Significantly, elders and key civil society actors played a large role in the negotiations leading to the signing of the agreement. A ceasefire was established, IDPs returned to their towns and cities, and a committee of elders was formed to work on inter-clan disputes and conflict resolution. The 1993 Peace Agreement restrained clan competition and limited conflict until very recently. The cohesion and stability that it created even allowed for a unified front militarily against the Islamic Courts Union in 2006-07⁶.

² Njoku, Raphael Chijioke, *The History of Somalia* (2013), pp71-94

³ *Ibid*, pp115-136.

⁴ Adam, Hussein Mohamed, *Mending Rips in the Sky* (1997), p328

⁵ See Interpeace-PDRC, *Dialogue for Peace* (2005) p32 for an English translation of the 1993 Mudug Peace Agreement

⁶ Adar, Korwa Gombe and Yoh, John Gay, *Somalia Peace Process* (2006), p107

The war in the south and especially in Mogadishu had led to the ousting of most “non-native” clans and the creation of clan-dominated areas across Somalia, such as Somaliland and North Eastern Somalia (that became Puntland), with the remaining area referred to as south central Somalia. The creation of these new clan-defined zones and different political agendas saw new government structures develop with different identities and visions. Somaliland was formed, claiming unity and independence from Somalia, by the region’s dominant Isaaq clan, following which Puntland established its own administration to remain within the Republic of Somalia. With the introduction of the federal state system, Puntland was joined by South West, Jubaland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The way in which the present-day federal states evolved from conflictual clan-based entities largely determined the composition of state administrations (often perceived as clan-administrations) and the relationships between them; the current conflict in Galkacyo should be understood with this in mind. As such, the creation of these federal states (as well as Somaliland) and the demarcation of boundaries between them has exacerbated, if not created, tensions between different communities. This is the situation in Sool and Sanaag, now claimed by Somaliland, Puntland and the Khatumo state, in Mudug between Puntland and Galmudug states, and in Lower Shabelle between Southwest State and Benadir Regional Administration. As federalism is deepened across Somalia, closer attention will need to be paid to these existing and emerging border conflicts. Galkacyo represents an important opportunity to develop the necessary peace and reconciliation processes that may serve as a model across the region.

Following tensions during consultations on the 2016 elections, in which the President of Puntland walked out to protest Galmudug’s legitimacy, and in the context of dispute over landing rights for aircraft in the recently constructed south Galkacyo airstrip, in November 2015 conflict broke out between Puntland and Galmudug in Galkacyo. Catalysed by anger over the construction of a road by Puntland, the conflict left 20 dead, 120 injured and over 90,000 displaced⁷. A peace agreement was signed on 2 December 2015 between the two state administrations, in the presence of the Federal Government of Somalia, leaders from Jubaland and South West States, local elders, the UN, EU and IGAD.

Less than a year later, in October 2016, violent conflict broke out once more, following dispute over Galmudug’s construction of a police station and Puntland’s construction of a livestock market in a contested part of western Galkacyo. In early November, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Abu Dhabi, however fighting did not cease until a second ceasefire agreement was signed by leaders in Galkacyo later that month. The agreement established a 2km buffer zone between troops and significantly nominated a Joint Ceasefire Committee, composed of 18 individuals from Puntland and Galmudug, with the objective of ensuring the implementation of the Agreement. The Ceasefire Agreement contained three key aims: to disengage forces from both sides and return them to where they were before the recent outbreak of violence; to remove roadblocks to allow movement of transport, goods, and people; and to organize the training and deployment of joint police units. A subsequent press conference and peace communique that was issued in January 2017 by President Abdiwali Gass and former President Abdikarin Guled reiterated the need for a joint police force trained by the UN to maintain security in Galkacyo and also called for a meeting in February 2017 to find solutions to the Galkacyo conflict, which did not subsequently take place. The Joint Ceasefire Committee faced some struggles in meeting, partly as a result of the security challenges, however following Interpeace, IPT and PDRC engagement with both sides several meetings were achieved at the beginning of 2017. Despite this, the progress of the Ceasefire Agreement is still yet to be seen.⁸

⁷ OCHA, *Somalia Flash Update: Humanitarian Impact of Fighting in Galkacyo*, 8 December 2015 [<http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-flash-update-humanitarian-impact-fighting-galkacyo-8-december-2015>]

⁸ Recent updates indicate that the joint police force training is underway and Puntland moved to open roadblocks on smaller roads at the end of March 2017.

3. Methodology

3.1 Research team

The conflict analysis study was conducted by Interpeace in collaboration with the Interpeace Peacebuilding Team, based in Mogadishu, and the Peace and Development Research Center, based in Garowe. While the Interpeace Somali Programme team provided guidance, support and facilitation throughout, IPT and PDRC participated in and led the planning of the study, data collection and analysis. Working through these local partners ensured the greatest contextual knowledge, understanding and sensitivity throughout the research, as well as contributing to building their own capacities in these areas.

Crucially, these two partners represent the two sides of the conflict⁹. In turn, the local partners' ownership of the study ensured firstly that it originated from and was rooted in communities implicated in the current Galkacyo conflict. Secondly, it ensured that grievances from both sides of the conflict were collected and analysed in a balanced manner and that both north and south Galkacyo communities were fairly represented in the collective research team. Finally, the consolidation of the findings through collective discussion provided a forum for open dialogue and discussion between two actors coming from both sides of the conflict, who at the same time as being peacebuilders are themselves a part of that same context. The research revealed many differing perspectives, however the consolidation of these into the final report and the creation of recommendations demonstrated agreement on the necessary steps to move forward. This process itself reflected a consensus building exercise between actors from the north and the south. Taking the research, it is crucial that all peacebuilding engagement in Galkacyo is locally driven, locally-led, and locally-owned, to ensure appropriate, context sensitive and sustainable processes that are accepted by communities.

3.2 Data collection

The research methodology was developed through participatory discussion between Interpeace, IPT and PDRC in November and December 2016, identifying key research questions and target respondents. Interpeace worked with IPT and PDRC to develop a qualitative research tool – a questionnaire – to be employed in structured key informant interviews and to guide moderated focus group discussions (see Annex 4). The tool served to address and uncover communities' perceptions on key issues including: causes of the conflict in Galkacyo and conflict drivers; aggravating factors; resilience factors; relevant actors and their impact; and possible means of addressing the conflict.

Data collection took place throughout January and February 2017 by IPT and PDRC, in south and north Galkacyo respectively. A total of 25 semi-structured interviews (12 in north and 13 in south Galkacyo) were conducted with key stakeholders who had a good understanding of the context or dynamics of the conflict or who were implicated in the conflict themselves. Interview respondents across the north and south included: government officials; military commanders; members of the JCC; individuals who had taken part in the 1993 peace agreement; elders; business people; women; youth; academics; peace activists and other civil society representatives; and minorities and communities not directly involved in the conflict.

Building on the data collected through the key informant interviews, focus group discussions were launched in north and south Galkacyo by the research team. Interpeace also participated in some of the

⁹ The field team included researchers from communities in both Puntland, Galmudug, and Galkacyo itself and from both Hawiye and Darood clans. The teams have previously engaged in Galkacyo, enjoying significant connections and integration through their satellite offices, and field and liaison officers based in the city.

focus groups to provide support to the teams and gain a deeper understanding of the issues raised. In the north, 5 focus group discussions were launched, including a total of 44 participants who represented government, traditional and religious leaders, youth, women, the media, minority groups and business people. In the south, 6 focus groups were launched, including 61 participants representing local authorities, elders, women, youth, academics and business people. Often, discussion groups were organised to include one type of respondent, for instance elders, youth or women, to gain greater insight into their particular understanding and promote free uninhibited communication and exchange of ideas.

Alongside the data collection that was conducted by the research team, Interpeace's work in the Galkacyo context with the Joint Ceasefire Committee (JCC) contributed heavily to the conflict analysis study. Since November 2016, Interpeace has been facilitating meetings of the JCC, to encourage peaceful resolution of the conflict and implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement. To this end, Interpeace has worked closely with members of the JCC from both north and south Galkacyo and spent time on the ground discussing perceived conflict issues, grievances and positive steps to move forward. These interactions contributed greatly to the access enjoyed by the teams to relevant stakeholders as well as the knowledge and understanding utilised in the conflict analysis.



Photo 1: The Joint Ceasefire Committee meets at the Galkacyo market place.

3.3 Analysis and consensus building

Following completion of data collection at the end of February 2017, the research team compiled their findings and own independent analysis in research briefs that were shared with Interpeace.

To facilitate participatory consolidation of these findings and jointly identify and build consensus on steps to move forward, Interpeace held a week-long conflict analysis workshop in Hargeisa (1 to 7 March 2017). Several members of the research team participated, alongside Interpeace staff. The research team was given the opportunity to present their findings, following which Interpeace facilitated discussion to jointly

identify points of divergence and of consensus in relation to: key conflict issues; aggravating factors; resilience factors; key actors in the conflict; the background and timeline of the conflict; and recommendations. While many differing perspectives were presented in this exercise, it also contributed to building consensus among the team on necessary steps to move forward with conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconciliation in Galkacyo.

The team's independent research briefs and the findings from the workshop were consolidated into this final report by Interpeace in consultation with the field team, to ensure accuracy and continuing participation of the study by the communities affected by the conflict.

3.4 Challenges

Given the context of insecurity and sensitivity in which the study was conducted, certain challenges arose in the data collection and analysis. In particular, given that dozens of individuals involved in peacebuilding are seen to have been killed in Galkacyo over the past decade for their work, individuals and groups were sometimes reluctant to meet or discuss the conflict openly. This fear manifested itself in north Galkacyo in an aversion to the use of audio-visual equipment in interviews and focus group discussions, as some participants feared reprisals for participating in any activities that may be perceived as peacebuilding. Similarly, the research teams themselves were initially reluctant to cross to the other side of the city in the context of ongoing tensions between the two communities. This presented certain limitations in the team's capacity to document the research process and record findings.

Secondly, accurately and fairly collecting, analysing and presenting issues relating to an ongoing sensitive conflict represented a challenge. The establishment of a broad, representative research team from both sides of the conflict addressed this yet at the same time presented new difficulties in ensuring cohesion and consensus within the team in the final analysis and presentation of the research. Interpeace's facilitation of the process, in particular through the conflict analysis workshop, mitigated this challenge and ensured that this representative team reflected an opportunity to understand the conflict and possible solutions, taking both sides' views into account equally. Indeed, while the creation of consensus on some issues was important, for instance on the recommendations, the fact that the two teams were able to provide oftentimes diverging perspectives from both sides of the conflict in itself represented a strength; the study endeavoured to uncover the different attitudes in the conflict to provide a multifaceted and nuanced understanding, alongside areas of consensus.

3.5 Next steps

Local ownership of the peacebuilding process is essential to ensure local buy-in and more sustainable peacebuilding gains. The research team will therefore return to the field to convene the JCC as key stakeholders in the process and present the findings to them to validate this analysis and its key findings. In addition, the stakeholder meeting will seek to further prioritize the recommendations identified through the field work and build consensus on the next steps in the peacebuilding process. Following validation by the JCC, the team would then seek to convene a broader stakeholder meeting to gain wider validation and further prioritize the recommendations.

4. Main Findings

4.1 Historical grievances

Unlike other conflicts in Somalia, the Galkacyo conflict predates the colonial era. Recurrent clashes between pastoral communities or clans defined the social fabric of the region (see the Conflict Timeline in Annex 2). The legacy of these dynamics continues in the current conflict: both sides are restricted in their capacity to move forward by historical grievances that they have experienced, the associated trauma and mistrust, and the lack of acknowledgement, compensation or reconciliation in relation to these.

“The fighting occurs again and again, because there is a bereaved party who is not satisfied for what he feels is missing from him”

Clan elder, FGD South Galkacyo, 23 January 2017

Particular historical grievances that were raised in interviews and focus group discussions in north Galkacyo include:

- The alleged killing of a peace mission from the north Galkacyo community (primarily Darood) by the south (Sa’ad community) in 1943;
- The expansion of the south to the northeast and northwest towards Galdogob in the 1980s, prompted by government policy that aimed to provoke clan hostility and mobilize the Sa’ad community against the Majeerten (a group who opposed Barre and supported the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, the first armed opposition group established in 1978 and based in Ethiopia);
- The killing of a large number of people in 1991 by the United Somali Congress, who were seen to be supported by the US and Ethiopia, as part of a campaign of revenge against Siad Barre and civilians in north Galkacyo generally;
- South Galkacyo’s failure to honour a 2007 inter-communal peace agreement between the Lelkase and Sa’ad, under which Sa’ad nomadic pastoralists would have access to grazing land and water points but were prohibited from building settlements or water points in Saax-gurun, Teer-rage and Laan-waley villages in Galdogob district.

Particular historical grievances that were raised in interviews and focus group discussions in south Galkacyo include:

- Inter-clan wars in the 1940s and 1950s, such as Golol-Buuxshe and Hoobaaq, led to large numbers of Hawiye killed by Darood communities;
- The Hawiye community in Galkacyo perceived themselves as excluded and marginalised from governance for decades (1960-90), as the north and Darood communities traditionally held the positions of power and decision making, such as Governor, District Commissioner, Police, Security and Military Chief, judges, etc.;
- People in southern communities experienced violent attacks on numerous occasions between 1960 and 1990, in particular in 1989 when a large number of members of the Hawiye community were killed (led to the revenge attack on the Darood in 1991)¹⁰;

¹⁰ Other examples of large numbers of deaths took place during this period in Docol, Wargalo, Hilmo, Bandijradley and Dhuumoodle.

- In the 1980s, Siad Barre requested that the Sa'ad communities in the south support him in his war against the Majerteen in the north; the Sa'ad refused and when in turn Siad Barre attacked the Sa'ad communities, many Majerteen defected from the SSDF and joined him, causing an exodus of Hawiye clans from Galkacyo and establishing a sense of betrayal and increased mistrust.

4.2 Conflict issues

Through the focus group discussions and individual interviews that were conducted in north and south Galkacyo, four issues emerged as primary causes and drivers of the current conflict:

- Federalism;
- Economic opportunities and gains;
- Definition and use of public property;
- Territorial claims.

These broad conflict issues were highlighted by communities across both north and south Galkacyo. Many specific points of contention within these conflict issues were similarly raised by both communities. Where specific points were highlighted by only one community, respondents from the other were generally aware of this perception and counter-claims on the issue were offered.



Photo 2: Soldiers on the disputed border, at a point where it is possible to cross between north and south Galkacyo.

i. Federalism

Various processes and issues related to federalism were highlighted by community members in both north and south Galkacyo as drivers of tension and conflict. While federalism is generally seen positively and as a remedy to the previously highly centralized government of the Somali Republic, it has brought in new dimensions and scale to the Galkacyo conflict. Puntland was formed in 1998 and more than a decade later Galmudug was created. This time difference in their development as states, **the lack of detailed legislation and coordination from the Federal Government**, leaves many questions unanswered. Specific issues

highlighted by respondents related to federalism included: *the deficiency of state constitutions, the deficiency of the provisional federal constitution, misconceptions and misapplication of the federalisation process, and mistrust of the federal government*. Overall, federalism (sometimes expressed more broadly as “politics”) was perceived as one of the most substantial conflict issues by participants in both the north and south of Galkacyo, partly for its role in transforming the nature of the conflict by politicising it.

State constitutions

Both north and south communities see the current state constitutions as contributing factors to the conflict in Galkacyo. Specifically, two main challenges were perceived by both sides. Firstly, participants highlighted that the state constitutions of Puntland and Galmudug **overlap in relation to their claims to the territory of the Mudug region**. For instance, Puntland’s constitution states that Puntland consists of 8 regions, including Mudug, which the district of Galkacyo falls under¹¹. Linked to this, Puntland and Galmudug’s constitutions **do not specify their state jurisdiction**. This overlap in claims and lack of clarity over the jurisdiction allows for disagreement between the state authorities and their respective citizens, and fuels tension. These issues must be addressed in the ongoing federalisation process to ensure coherent and harmonized state constitutions that contribute to effective governance and stability in the Somali region.¹²

Federal constitution

The focus group discussions and interviews revealed perceived deficiencies in the federal constitution and associated structures and processes as contributing to conflict in Galkacyo. Communities in both the north and south pointed firstly to the fact that the **constitution is incomplete and does not contain clear provisions to define federal-state and inter-state relations**, including in relation to the demarcation of territorial borders (linked to deficiencies in state constitutions above), revenue and resource sharing, and inter-state dispute resolution mechanisms, all of which affect relations between the north and south of Galkacyo.

Perhaps arising from the absence of resolution of these issues in the federal constitution, communities in the north and south perceive a **lack of federal-level regulatory frameworks** – to manage public infrastructure, inter-state and federal relations, resource sharing or trade policies and laws – to be contributing to conflict in Galkacyo. Specific impacts of this lack of regulation that were highlighted included: a lack of distinction between state-owned public property and that which falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government (airports, seaports, inter-state highways, etc.), and revenue sharing either between states or between the state and federal government.

“Each administration is taking advantage of the messy situation of the central government, who is supposed to intervene in conflicts and transcend the mandate of the regional states”

Clan elder, FGD, South Galkacyo, 23 January 2017

Similarly, **federal commissions** that are mandated to deal with issues surrounding border demarcation, social reconciliation and the federal court are **perceived as ineffective if they exist at all**. The challenge that these commissions face in establishing themselves and developing their legitimacy is evident in the fact that the Puntland government does not officially recognise them, as a result of not being consulted during their formation.

¹¹ See Puntland Constitution Article 7, paragraph 1 and 2. Previously, the region of Mudug consisted of 5 districts, namely Jerriban, Galgodob, Hobyo, Haradhera and Galkacyo.

¹² Puntland’s constitution states that it is open to harmonisation once the federal constitution is in place, which it now is, demonstrating potential to review conflicts within and launch efforts to harmonise the two states’ **constitutions**.

The federalisation process

Further than perceived deficiencies in state and federal constitutions, respondents in both the north and the south of Galkacyo highlighted issues related to the actual process of federalisation as contributors to the conflict.

The **federal process itself emerged as one factor perceived to have contributed to the escalation and changing dynamic of conflict**, which having existing for many years between clans, has now adopted a new, uniquely political nature. In the south, women respondents in particular highlighted the way in which traditional hostilities have been transformed into even more extreme conflict with the introduction of politics. They perceived this new dynamic to complicate power relations further, encourage the arrival of actors who have objectives beyond local interests, and contribute to prolonged conflict as each side vies for “official” power and authority.

“The current conflict is politicized... it is aggravated by the involvement of two administrations vying for power and intent on dominating the situation”

Women’s FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

Similarly, participants in north Galkacyo highlighted the change to a politicised conflict through the federal process. Respondents argued that, prior to the recent establishment of the state of Galmudug, Puntland had not attempted to take territory from or subjugate communities in the south. Indeed, community members stated that there had been close cooperation between the two sides during the previous Galmudug administration (2005-2014) in terms of administration, security and political issues. Thus they point to the political federalisation process and the creation of the new state of Galmudug as a driver of tension and violent conflict.

Respondents in the **north perceived the very formation of the state of Galmudug as a manipulation and misapplication of the federal process**. This stems from the federal constitution’s provision that federal states should consist of 2 or more regions¹³, as Galmudug currently contains one and a half regions. The former government, led by Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud, is seen to have promoted and encouraged the formation of Galmudug as a state, despite its lack of validity according to the federal constitution.

From the perspective of communities in the south, the federal process itself is not the conflict issue but rather the reaction of the north to the process of establishing the South Mudug and then Galmudug state. Focus group participants and interviewees in the **south perceived Puntland to be actively attempting to sabotage the establishment of Galmudug**, by acting as the primary interpreter of the constitution and the authority for the recognition of other administrations in the region. Puntland’s denial of Galmudug’s qualification for independent administration was perceived as a cause of recurrent violence.

“I was among the first group to establish the south Mudug administration in 2001. We announced it in the afternoon and the next morning Puntland launched a military attack against us... This is a question of existential denial”

Elder, interview, South Galkacyo, 12 February 2017

The issue of recognition was spoken about with high emotions by focus group participants in the south who highlighted the sense of inferiority and inequality that Puntland’s assertions created. One youth focus group participant stated, “Puntland wants to put us under its feet” (FGD, South Galkacyo, 6 February 2017).

¹³ See Somali Federal Constitution, Article 48, paragraph 2

Mistrust of federal government

Connected to the above perceptions of the federal constitution and federal process as conflict issues, respondents in the north also pointed to the federal government themselves as having played a role in the escalation of conflict in Galkacyo. Residents in **the north presented a perceived bias against their communities in favour of Galmudug by the former federal government**, contributing to general mistrust of the federal government. Participants in focus groups believed that the government played a direct role in the conflict, supporting the south with weapons, logistical support and manpower. This belief was also voiced by Puntland officials who claimed that the Somali National Army (SNA) fought alongside Galmudug, which they had reportedly been able to confirm following defectors arriving on their side with army hardware belonging to the SNA.

Respondents in the south did not acknowledge that any such federal government bias existed in their favour now or in the past, highlighting instead the way in which issues such as this are instrumentalised as propaganda against the south in the media (see below on the role of the media as an aggravating factor). Regardless of the accuracy of the claims regarding the federal government, the fact that these perceptions exist reflects the need for the new federal government to show that it is ready to adopt a role in the mediation and peacebuilding process, as an independent and impartial authority. The new federal government has already underlined its commitment to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, highlighting Galkacyo as one of its priorities.

ii. Economic Opportunities and Gains

A second overarching conflict issue that was raised by focus group participants and interviewees in both north and south Galkacyo was access to economic opportunity and gains. Each federal state government must raise their own income and revenue to be able to provide security and services to their inhabitants and to remain legitimate. In a harsh economic climate, with scarce resources available, the competition for economic opportunity becomes a driver of tension and potential conflict. Contributing to this, income derived from national assets, such as airports and ports has not yet been regulated between the state governments and the Somali Federal government. Specific conflict drivers within this broad issue included *state access to economic opportunity, revenue collection, and private property ownership*.

State access to economic opportunity

Respondents in the south highlighted their state's access to economic opportunities as a key conflict issue, highlighting various harmful restrictions and potential losses faced by Galmudug. For example, respondents in **south Galkacyo perceived Puntland to be imposing restrictions and what they argue may amount to economic embargo on the south** by banning the transport of goods from south central Somalia into Puntland and stopping goods from Bosaso from passing through the state of Galmudug to the south. In particular, a Puntland Presidential decree from August 2016 was referenced, which ordered a ban on trucks and goods coming from south central Somalia to enter Puntland. Road blocks imposed by the north were also perceived to be limiting the south's potential economic gains through trade.

Focus group participants in **south Galkacyo also pointed to Puntland's opposition to the rehabilitation of Hobyo seaport and connected road construction** as undermining Galmudug's economic opportunities. Puntland's opposition was perceived to stem from their own fear that a functioning and well connected Hobyo port will divert the export of livestock away from Puntland.

Similar to those in the south, focus group discussions and interviews in **north Galkacyo** raised the issue of **road blocks as an impediment to the state's economic opportunities**. Specifically, respondents claimed that Galmudug's blockage of the main corridor that connects Bosaso to the central regions was disrupting business and trade. While there was less focus on this as a conflict issue in the north, respondents did raise counter-claims regarding the restrictions on the transport of goods, perceiving these measures as important additional security checks to counter the threat posed by Al Shabaab, rather than for any economic reasons.



Photo 4: Roadblocks feature prominently in the current conflict and are erected by north and south Galkacyo.

Secondly, somewhat mirroring the south's perception of Puntland undermining the rehabilitation of Hobyo and the connecting road, respondents in **north Galkacyo** made claims that **the community in the south are impeding public infrastructure development**, and thus undermining associated development and economic opportunity. Projects seen to have been undermined by the south included the development of roads and a livestock market.

Finally, local authority representatives in focus group discussions in **south Galkacyo** also perceived **aid agencies as playing a role in indirectly undermining Galmudug's opportunities and development through their privileging of the north**. These respondents perceived a bias by development organisations, which effectively represent a form of economic opportunity, towards Puntland. Puntland was seen to have benefited from most of the international development assistance and security capacity building, with little sharing of these experiences and associated opportunities across the border with their neighbours in the south. The resources were in fact seen to be diverted towards negative purposes undermining peace.

“Puntland has received partial international assistance, development projects, governance capacity building and security force build-up over the last 18 years, from which it was expected to help its neighbours with peace and sharing of positive experiences. Instead it unconstructively chose to oppose and destabilise other emerging administrations, like the consecutive onslaught on South Mudug, Galkacyo”

Youth FGD, South Galkacyo, 13 February 2017

The impact that this perception may have on both the dynamic of the conflict through encouraging feelings of marginalisation and on the international community’s role, local relationships and available peacebuilding entry points and opportunities is significant and should be borne in mind in the planning and implementation of programmatic engagement in Galkacyo.

Revenue collection

Respondents in north Galkacyo focused more heavily on the impact that challenges to revenue collection had on economic opportunities for communities in the north. Firstly, respondents argued that **revenue collection from the central market was being undermined** by businessmen from the south occupying space that is owned by citizens of Puntland and not paying taxes to their local authorities. Secondly, the **import of and revenue associated with the sale of khat** was seen to be undermining economic opportunities and contributing to conflict. Khat sellers in the south are perceived to be importing their goods from Nairobi, smuggling it into Somalia and then selling it on for very cheap prices in the north of Galkacyo on the black market. This amounts to khat being an untaxed import and causes losses in potential revenue for Puntland. Respondents perceived this to be a cause of frequent violent conflict between khat sellers and tax police in north and south Galkacyo.

In the south, focus group respondents and interviewees pointed to the **south Galkacyo’s loss of revenue from previously commonly owned buildings and infrastructure as a conflict driver**. Presented first among these losses is the revenue from the airport. Respondents claim that Galkacyo’s airport, which is currently under Puntland’s control, was built on an area of farmland that previously belonged to southern communities and through cooperation between north and south Galkacyo. One respondent mentioned that the airport was built through *iskaa-wax-u-qabso* – a self-help, community project – during Siyad Barre’s time and that his family had worked on the construction of the airport, of which now only Puntland benefits. Controlled by Puntland, the revenue generated by the airport is taken by them, promoting continuing grievances between the two sides. As well as the airport, Puntland is perceived to be benefiting from the revenue generated by renting out former government buildings¹⁴ that had previously been commonly owned in the government area of Galkacyo city.

Private property ownership

Finally, the issue of private property ownership was presented as undermining economic opportunity in the north of Galkacyo and fuelling tensions between the two communities. Respondents claimed that **property owned by citizens in the north is being taken away by people from the south** who initially lease property and then drive the original owners away by threatening them. This was claimed to have taken place in parts of Harumar and Xaafatul-carab precincts.

Linked to this, is the **anger and continuing sense of injustice felt by Puntland citizens over their loss of property in Mogadishu**. Respondents stated that private property owned by Puntlanders in Mogadishu had been looted and then claimed by the Hawiye community, contributing to tensions between the two

¹⁴ These buildings include: schools such as Omar Samanter Boarding School; military barracks and bases, such as Dayah military base; police garrisons; regional and district administration headquarters; banks; buildings belonging to the national court.

communities, including in Galkacyo. The mention of this grievance raises the significance and interconnectivity of conflict issues in the Somali region as well as the impact of clan identity in transmitting perceived harms across communities. Galkacyo reflects a clear example of the clash between Hawiye and Darood, which is why resolution of the conflict in the city has the capacity to transform conflict on a large scale and promote peace in more areas across Somalia.

iii. Public Property and National Assets

A third conflict issue raised by respondents in both the north and south of Galkacyo relates to the distribution and use of public property. During the civil war, public property was often taken as living quarters by displaced persons or for other private use. As regional administrations and states developed, gradually the occupied public properties were taken by the newly formed regional governments and states. In Galkacyo most of the public property from the former government of Somalia is located on the northern side of the city.

From the perspective of respondents from the south, **Galmudug has lost access to the associated benefits of public property, infrastructure and services** that exist in the former government area in the north west of the city of Galkacyo. Public buildings, including hospitals, ministries and education institutes, are seen to be concentrated in this area, currently under the control of Puntland, thus depriving citizens in the south of the city of their right to access these services. This similarly reflects the grievance over the loss of access to national assets, such as Galkacyo International Airport and its related services, and revenue that these produce (see above). This feeling of injustice is further exacerbated by the claim by southern communities that they had themselves established many of these buildings and services or in other cases contributed heavily to their development. Puntland is thus perceived to have forcibly taken land and public property to which it had no claim, contributing to ongoing tension and conflict in between north and south Galkacyo.

This particular conflict issue is linked to the historical grievance that respondents from the south reported of their perceived consistent exclusion from governance and positions of power in the city. Having perceived discrimination and marginalisation by various clan regimes, citizens in the south more acutely experience this recent exclusion from and inability to participate in, utilise and benefit from public property, services and institutions in the Puntland-controlled area of the city.

“Puntland was always attached to the government while we were kept away from it” ... “We can no longer accept that.”

Women’s FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

While the issue was not addressed as substantially by focus group participants and interviewees **in the north, the claim was raised that they themselves are losing the benefit of access to some public property** and facilities in the south. In addition, the argument was made that whilst the south claims a huge loss of access to public property that they helped establish, in fact these facilities, including the airport, were burnt down by the USC in 1991 and therefore what exists now was not only rebuilt by Puntland, but has also been maintained since then by Puntland.

iv. Territorial Claims

Finally, territorial claims were raised as a conflict issue in both south and north Galkacyo, contributing to long-standing and ongoing mistrust and tension between the communities. The territory of the newly

established federal states has not been clearly demarcated and largely follows clan borders between the various communities. These borders have historically been less rigid and changed over time. With the federal states now laying claim to territories inhabited by their communities, the competition for land has become politicised, as the established borders are intended to become permanent. This dynamic makes these claims to territory a significant driver of conflict in the current context and one that is likely to define many other conflicts across Somalia, as the federalisation and decentralisation processes make the definition of fixed borders across the country an issue. Within the issue of territorial claims highlighted by respondents, three sub-issues can be identified: *territorial expansion*; *historical claims*; and *land disputes*.

Territorial expansion

The majority of respondents in north Galkacyo saw **Galmudug's claim to Puntland territories and their perceived drive to expand into the north** as the main driver of the current conflict. In particular, these communities perceived multiple claims to the north of Mudug, up to the Burtinle district in the Nugaal region as evidence of an expansionist policy and aggression by Galmudug against Puntland. The language used by respondents to describe the conflict is also indicative of the perceived importance of territorial expansion as a primary cause and feature. Somali words such as *dal-durugsi*, *dal-qaadasho* and *dhul-goosasho* were used to describe the conflict, explicitly referring to the conflict as “moving onto other land” or “taking land”. One elder in a focus group discussion in north Galkacyo stated “dagaal degaan baa taagan”, meaning a war regarding territory is at hand.

On the south side, focus group participants, **particularly young people, similarly perceived the north as attempting to expand its territorial space**. Specific reference was made to the recent formation of two districts – Towfiq in Afbarwaago and Saaxo in Gelinsoor zones – as well as recent attempts by the north to move further into south Galkacyo in November 2015 and 2016. These last perceived attempts at territorial expansion by Puntland in Galkacyo were presented as the catalyst for the current conflict. In one focus group discussion in south Galkacyo, elders and businesspeople described the conflict with the words *dhuul-riix* and *dhulbalaarsi*, meaning territorial or land expansion. They asserted that both states were vying for territory in the new federal system and that this represented a changing dynamic in the conflict.

Historical claims

Respondents in the north referenced certain historical claims to justify their position and undermine claims by the south that they are looking to expand into territory that Puntland does not have a right to. Firstly, reference was made to the Tomaselli line, which was created in the 1930s by the Italian colonial authorities to delineate the ongoing contentious border between clans. It was asserted during focus group discussions that this line passed through Wargala village, which lies 80km south of Galkacyo, thus placing the boundary further south than is currently accepted. Respondents similarly pointed to the location of the burial site of the prominent figure from the Omar Momaoud sub-clan, Islan Adan, 80km south of Galkacyo as an indicator that historically the dominant Darood clan in the north's territory extended to this area.

Disagreement between the north and south in relation to historical territorial claims also emerges in **understandings of the establishment of Galkacyo city itself**. Respondents in the north claimed that Galkacyo city itself was established by Ali Yusuf Kenadid, a Majeerten ruler who had founded his own sultanate in Hobyo district, a Habar-gidir stronghold from 1890 to 1925, implying the city traditionally belonged to northern communities. Undermining this narrative, an interviewee in the south explained how communities in the south did not perceive Ali Yusuf as a credible actor. According to this understanding, Ali Yusuf had fled the north-eastern region of Alula following defeat and had been offered

asylum in Hobyo. He declared himself a sultan without grounds to do so and ended up in conflict with the Hawiye community who had taken him in. Initially enjoying Italian protection, the colonial authorities ultimately realised that his claim to power was unfounded and shifted their support to the local communities of the south. This narrative from south Galkacyo refutes Ali Yusuf's legitimacy and role in the establishment of the city, and thus the north's historical claim to it on this basis.

Land dispute

Focus group discussions and interviews in the south raised the issue of land dispute as a contributing factor to clashes over territory and widespread conflict. Women respondents highlighted that conflict over land was long-standing in Galkacyo, however it had previously focused on access to specific resources, such as water, wells, pasture and livestock. According to these women, the conflict has expanded and become more complex and political with groups trying to invade and occupy whole areas of land to gain access to large swathes of territory and resources.

“While the traditional conflict was about water wells, pasture, looting camels and land in a simpler degree, the current conflict is about grabbing and occupying a whole area, a town, and monopolizing resources”

Women's FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

Other respondents in the south highlighted a new form of land dispute that is complicating the conflict dynamic. These respondents claimed that when one group moves from one area to another in search of pastures and water, another group moves onto the original land and builds permanent shelters and water reservoirs. This results in conflict when the first group attempts to move back to the original land. These recent and more **permanent claims to land are perceived to be exacerbating tensions**. At the same time, the new politicised context entails that state and local **authorities back their own clans and communities, fuelling these initially localised conflicts to spill into cities**, such as Galkacyo.

In the north, participants also pointed to land dispute and its role in promoting conflict. In discussion, the perception emerged that **southern communities are migrating northwards into territory that has not traditionally been theirs to escape insecurities** arising from conflict and the threat of actors, such as Al Shabaab, as well as the impact of climate change on their lands. For instance, people from communities in Hobyo and Harardheero in the south are seen to be moving northwards to escape environmental degradation in these areas and scarcity of resources. The respondents from the north admitted that, as Somalis, the south Galkacyo community have the right to share pasture and water in the north during times of drought, however they must abide by existing rules to ensure peaceful and responsible utilisation of the natural resources and commit to return to their own land once the rains come, which they apparently are not doing.

“The south Galkacyo community is escaping at times from insecurity and harsh climatic and environmental conditions in south Mudug... Puntland should respond consciously to this imminent migration northwards”

Politician, interview, North Galkacyo, 25 January 2017

Adding to this, respondents in the north claimed that continuous abuse and transgression was occurring at the hands of nomadic communities from the south. According to these participants, the **communities are seizing grazing land from northern communities, camel rustling and looting livestock**. This in turn is seen to contribute to conflict between nomadic communities in the north and south, which can prompt revenge killings for decades and spill into other communities. The lasting impact that rural conflict can have on other communities in Galkacyo which is highlighted here, mirrors a similar dynamic identified by communities in the south.

4.3 Aggravating factors

Contributing to the impact that these conflict issues have on driving instability, various aggravating factors were identified through focus group discussions and interviews in north and south Galkacyo. These factors deepen and prolong tensions, ultimately aggravating conflict. The factors identified include: the absence of effective government; armed communities; a culture of impunity; public mistrust; unemployed youth; and the media. Significantly, the factors identified can be seen as linked and building on each other, amplifying the negative impact that they have on the conflict collectively.

i. Absence of Effective Government

Respondents in the north and south pointed to the absence of effective government as a central aggravating factor. This is strongly linked to the perceptions of federalism and the deficiencies of the state and federal government as key conflict issues.

Community members on both sides of the conflict pointed to the fact that, in the increasingly politicised conflict, the state governments reflect little more than clans and in turn their ineffective and unrepresentative governance is contributing to the continuation of long-standing tension and conflict between communities. In the north, respondents claimed that the political leadership of both Puntland and Galmudug lacked the minimum capacity and willingness to resolve the conflict, as political leaders take advantage of the instability and unrest for their own clan and personal interest, and short-term political gains. In the south a respondent mirrored this by stating that multiple clan identities had been replaced by multiple clan administrative bodies. Therefore, state and local administrations are seen to be focused on the interests of different sides of the conflict, rather than on achieving effective governance and peace. This lack of effective governance translates into an absence of the rule of law leading to unchecked violence that can contribute to conflict (see Culture of Impunity below).

“If someone kills another person and there are no security forces to capture and arrest the suspect and bring him to court, this means there is no rule of law or law enforcement institution in the city”

Women’s FDG, South Galkacyo, 2 February 2017

Given the perceived nature of state governments as clan-based and directly implicated in the conflict, respondents in the north and the south pointed to the need for the federal government to play its proper role and yet its inability and previous unwillingness to do so. The absence of the federal government has a huge impact on Galkacyo’s inability to resolve questions over inter-state trade and territorial boundaries. The lack of their engagement as an arbitrator, whether legally or in mediation efforts, is seen to be missing by both sides of the conflict. This sentiment was strongly mirrored in requests from communities in the south that the federal government accept and act on their proper role and responsibility in relation to the Galkacyo conflict, if progress towards peace is going to be achieved.

“Only a strong central government can solve the problem of Galkacyo, since the two sides are not able to come, sit together and look for peaceful solutions for the city and its surrounding environment”

Elder, FGD South Galkacyo, 13 February 2017

ii. Armed Communities

Whilst conflict has historically existed between rival clans and communities in Galkacyo city and the surrounding areas, the intensity of conflict has escalated in recent years. Respondents in both north and south Galkacyo stated that existing tensions and flare ups of conflict are being aggravated by the fact that

the actors involved are armed with modern weapons. This change reflects firstly advances in and increased access to heavier weaponry with greater destructive capacity and secondly the introduction of state authorities and their respective paramilitary forces as key actors in the conflict. These state forces have greater fire power at their disposal than the smaller clan militias that had previously dominated conflict in Galkacyo had in the past. The presence of these arms has transformed the conflict into one with a far greater capacity for destruction and mass violence than previously.

“Previously fighting was less intense... The wars in the old days employed light weapons like horses, spears, swords, daggers, shields, sticks, and the highest level was primitive rifles with limited casualties”

Women’s FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

In turn, this increase in potential destruction and violence undermines peace and reconciliation efforts. When a minor flare up of conflict between two communities has the potential to injure or kill tens or even hundreds of people, possibilities for resolution of the conflict, justice, compensation to injured parties and long-term stability is undermined. One result of this is that traditional conflict resolution mechanisms or processes are rendered less capable of addressing grievances, undermining processes that had controlled conflict in the Somali region for centuries.

“Presently, modern weapons are used during clan fighting, which do not spare life and property... and who can give compensation in a place where 100 people are murdered in a few days?”

Clan Elder FGD, South Galkacyo, 23 January 2017

iii. Culture of Impunity

Respondents in north and south Galkacyo argued that a culture of impunity has emerged, through the undermining of traditional mechanisms and a lack of the new decentralised political system to address crimes, and is contributing to the conflict. Justice and compensation in Galkacyo have historically been served and conflict mitigated by clan elders and traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding mechanisms. Elders would meet under a tree to discuss a crime and the application of the appropriate *xeer* (customary law). For instance blood money would be paid (*dia*), peace wives would be exchanged (*godob-tir*) or amends paid (*xaal*). This system is seen to have been rendered less effective and in some cases obsolete, leading to a culture of impunity for three reasons.

Firstly, the continuing long-standing conflict and the associated demonization of each side by the other was argued to have contributed to a disregard for human life, particularly for those on the other side. In turn, this disregard and the long-standing historical grievances that exist between the north and the south have led to a lack of interest from many to seek justice and compensation. This leads to an increase in vengeance killings as communities take matters into their own hands and contributes to an overall culture of impunity.

“In Galkacyo, human lives do not matter, specifically when the victim belongs to the other side of the fault-line. Communities on both sides refrain from paying blood money if the victim hails from the other side”

Civil Society Activist, interview, North Galkacyo, 26 January 2017

Secondly, a culture of impunity has been encouraged by the presence of heavily armed communities, as traditional mechanisms to address crimes are often not seen as sufficient to deal with mass killings that may occur in short periods of time. (See sub-section ii on Armed Communities above.)

Finally, a culture of impunity is perceived to have been strengthened by the federalisation process and its associated limitations. Traditional mechanisms and customary law are seen to be undermined by the establishment of the federal and local administrations, as their associated institutions are expected to play a greater role in maintaining law and order and dispense justice. In reality however, as mentioned above, they are lacking in effective governance and in their capacity to implement the rule of law. Given that these administrations are seen as little more than bodies representing particular clan interests and their associated militias, it is unsurprising that they may be unwilling to hold their own members to account. In the north, focus group respondents argued that political leaders were side-lining local leaders and traditional methods of resolving conflict in the pursuit of their own short-term political gains.

This culture ensures that perpetrators of violence both within and outside of the conflict go unpunished, potential perpetrators are undeterred, and victims enjoy no form of justice, satisfaction or compensation, ultimately contributing to tensions and conflict across and between communities. Strengthening traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as well as addressing the authorities' capacity to establish the rule of law must take place to stop this culture of impunity from taking root any further.

"In response to the political actors, interests and the new nature of war, we have become unfamiliar with the Somali traditional jury and its customary law that is necessary to develop new methods to fully address these burning issues and to come up with a fresh vision to curb the struggle between opposing sides"

Women's FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

iv. Misinformation and the Media

The spread of misinformation, particularly by the media, was highlighted by respondents as a key aggravating factor in the continuation of the conflict. Respondents in both the north and south spoke of how the other side is using the media to distribute propaganda against them and inflame tensions, alongside an awareness that their own media is contributing to conflict.

Youth in south Galkacyo strongly denounced the way in which the media in Puntland was fabricating materials to use in a propaganda war to undermine Galmudug's reputation, for instance by depicting southern communities and authorities as colluding with Al Shabaab. The respondents said that Puntland had fabricated claims that the US bombardment of Jeexdin military base was a response to the fact that Al Shabaab combatants were controlling it. Some key respondents in north Galkacyo similarly underlined the negative impact that this presentation of alleged collusion between Al Shabaab and Galmudug forces had on catalysing conflict at the end of 2016.

The current role of the media as an aggravating actor and key player in aggravating the conflict must be urgently addressed, particularly given the potential positive impact that they could have in advocating for peace.

v. Public Mistrust

Undermining all actors' capacities to accept or contribute to lasting peace in Galkacyo are their attitudes towards the other side and even their own community members, such is the public mistrust that exists. This lack of trust is evident in the increasing difficulty that was experienced in bringing together the Joint Ceasefire Committee and other community members from each side of the city. The choice of meeting place – in the business center for its neutrality and quick escape routes – reflects the fear and mistrust that each side has of the other. Aggravating actors, such as the media or politicians, are able to play upon this sentiment to mobilise the communities against each other, contributing to tensions and conflict. This

is not a difficult task, in light of recent conflict as well as historical grievances that prevent progress towards reconciliation. Furthermore, even within communities themselves, the long-standing conflict and the prevailing sense of impunity is seen to have led to public mistrust.

To move forward with even short-term conflict resolution through the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and certainly to build longer-term peace and stability, this mistrust must be addressed through dialogue and reconciliation efforts on both sides of the conflict. Traditional leaders and mechanisms for peacebuilding and reconciliation may have a particularly significant role in this, to enhance the communities' strength and cohesion, and their ownership of these processes.

4.4 Resilience factors

In addition to the identification and analysis of conflict issues and aggravating factors, focus group participants and interviewees were asked to identify existing and potential resilience factors within their communities. Focussing on resilience has the potential to contribute a positive, forward-looking analysis of conflict by identifying assets and attributes of communities that already do and could have a powerful convening effect and in turn contribute to conflict resolution and peacebuilding. As such, together with the resilience actors highlighted below (see Actor Analysis), these factors present entry points and opportunities for engagement by both Somali stakeholders and the international community in peacebuilding. Further analysis of resilience factors in Galkacyo, and indeed across Somalia, would contribute significantly to capacities to effectively engage in peacebuilding efforts, building interventions from the bottom-up and in turn harnessing existing strengths in communities for sustainable peace.



Photo 5: Ilhan Omar, an MP from Minnesota, with her husband who originally hail from opposite sides of Galkacyo.

- **Inter-marriage between communities:** This dynamic has existed for centuries between the competing clans in Galkacyo and continues now between the citizens of Puntland and Galmudug. Inter-marriage highlights the changing nature of identities, even in a strong and conflictual clan structure. Women in particular may act as a bridge between their original community and the one they have married into, tackling misconceptions and promoting peace and reconciliation. This fluid role within clan structures gives women a huge potential role to play in peacebuilding.¹⁵
- **Business relationships:** While business interests have the potential to become conflict issues, cross-border business relationships also serve as resilience factors. Business has taken place across the border and among communities from north and south Galkacyo for years. Where tensions are high and cross-border transactions prove challenging, women in particular may still be able to cross borders (as they are seen as less of a threat and may identify with both sides as a result of inter-marriage). Working with those who are capable of and have an interest in promoting stability and open borders for their own business opportunities reflects one important entry point.
- **Shared culture, religion and language:** Respondents referred to the commonalities that north and south Galkacyo shared, such as culture, Islam and the Somali language, as significant in combating the perceptions of difference between them. The two sides share common poetry (*gabay*), traditional dances (*ciyaaraha hiddaha*), ballads (*buraanhur*) and handicrafts (*far-shaxan*). These represent similarities and unity in Galkacyo and could be used to encourage social cohesion between them, capitalising on festivals for instance to bring communities together.

“Oodi ab ka dhaw – proximity is to be valued more than belonging to the same clan. Darood sub-clans in Galkacyo should firstly strive to co-exist and cooperate with the Hawiye sub-clan of Sa’ad prior to cooperating with the clansmen in Kismayo or elsewhere”

Elder, interview, North Galkacyo, 28 January 2017

- **Nationality identity:** Again, highlighting a form of shared identity, respondents pointed to their citizenship and their Somali identity as a potential resilience factor. The potential significance that this identity could have in the Galkacyo context was emphasised by the repeated call from both north and south Galkacyo for the federal government to play a bigger role in promoting peace and stability. This is something that will need to be addressed, not only in areas of heightened conflict such as Galkacyo, but across the country, as the new federal government establishes itself and completes the decentralisation process. The positive reaction to the election of the new President, Farmaajo, and the jubilant crossing of the dividing line by citizens from south and north Galkacyo, reflects the potential that Somali national identity has to bring communities together.
- **Pasture and water sharing:** Despite reflecting a potential point of contention, the peaceful coexistence that pastoral communities from different clans enjoyed for centuries was highlighted by respondents as a resilience factor. In times of drought and difficulty, communities that may have experienced conflict with each other at times would cooperate and share resources for the benefit of their communities. This loss of historic cooperation between pastoral communities over resources implies the impact that the politicisation of the conflict, the availability of cheap modern weapons, and the impact of more extreme environmental conditions, have had in transforming positive relations. At the same time, the current drought has underlined the potential that communities and local, regional and state authorities have for cooperation. The need to prioritise citizens’ basic needs

¹⁵ The significance that this resilience factor may have on peacebuilding in Galkacyo was demonstrated in the visit to the city by Ilhan Omar, an MP from Minnesota in the United States, with her husband in December 2016. Hailing from opposite sides of the city, the couple’s visit represented a symbol of cohesion by both communities and aimed to discourage hostilities, strengthen support for the Ceasefire Agreement and for peacebuilding.

and social cohesion in pursuit of these has been perceived by some as a buffer against escalating conflict, which may have been much more serious if not for the drought.

- **Traditional mechanisms for settling conflict:** Customary law, traditional conflict resolution and compensation mechanisms were underlined as strong resilience factors. These mechanisms include: the return of animals and properties, *diya* (blood money) and *xaal* (compensation). The effectiveness of these has been undermined in recent years by the proliferation of modern weaponry and the creation of state and local authorities with the mandate to establish the rule of law (see Section 4.3 on Culture of Impunity for further explanation). However, these mechanisms reflect a positive and tested process to inclusively address long-standing conflict issues at the grassroots level and attribute ownership of peacebuilding to local communities. As such, the role of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms should be drawn on to complement the establishment of new institutions dealing with justice.




Photo 6: Residents of both south and north Galkacyo took to the streets to celebrate the election of President Farmaajo.

4.5 Actor analysis and mapping

Focus group participants and interviewees were asked who they thought the primary actors were in Galkacyo and what impact they had on the conflict. These actors were broken down into those reflecting mainly resilience and an existing contribution to peacebuilding, and those who primarily had an aggravating actor effect in catalysing or prolonging the current conflict. Some actors have multiple roles that fall into each category. Looking to the future, Interpeace facilitated participatory discussion with the research team to identify which actors and behaviours might be transformed or had the potential to contribute to peace and lasting stability in Galkacyo.

Actors currently playing a primarily aggravating actor or resilience role, as perceived by study participants:



i. Resilience Actors

While state governments are currently seen as important aggravating actors and the federal government is perceived to be largely absent from its responsibilities in Galkacyo, **local authorities**, (district and regional administrations) are understood as primarily promoting resilience and peace. Local authorities are currently heavily represented in the Joint Ceasefire Committee, reflecting this commitment to peace. Their primary role in maintaining administrative, security and social services is largely reliant on peace and stability in their communities and as such they retain an interest in contributing to peacebuilding. Similarly, **the police** are seen in positive terms across north and south Galkacyo, as having a strong interest in maintaining stability and security in their communities, not least for their own security.

Often involved as an aggravating actor in the conflict through their implication in clan dynamics, **traditional elders** also play a role in promoting resilience. Representing a strong authority within communities, on citizens, civil society and clan militias, some elders are contributing to the promotion of peace and advocating for greater support for and engagement in peace processes. This is evident in their heavy involvement and efforts within the Joint Ceasefire Committee.

Often identified as aggravating actors of peacebuilding efforts, **youth** in fact represent a huge marker of resilience. Respondents (including youth themselves) argued that young citizens of Galkacyo are forward-looking and intent on building a peaceful and prosperous future for themselves and their communities. This is reflected in the current peacebuilding efforts that youth networks are already engaging in. Their capacity for moving forward was explained by the fact that they had experienced less trauma than older generations and held on to less historical grievances than their elders.

“We don’t want to live in the shadows of the horrific past, we want to see a peaceful and united Galkacyo that satisfies the long-term aspirations and further integration and development of youth”

Youth FGD, North Galkacyo, 6 February 2017

Perceived as one of the groups most affected by conflict, **women** in Galkacyo also provide significant resilience and opportunities for linkages between the north and south. Local women’s groups and networks currently promote peace and reconciliation in their communities and connect with each other across the border in pursuit of greater social cohesion. The role and identity of women provides them with great opportunities to build relationships across various divides in Galkacyo. Through inter-marriage, women often hold more complex and fluid identities, combining a clan affiliation and connections in multiple communities. This, as well as the fact that they are seen as less of a threat than men, means that women enjoy greater freedom of movement to cross the border than men are afforded.



Photo 7: Representatives of women’s groups welcome Minnesota, USA, MP Ilhan Omar on her visit to south Galkacyo.

The business community has generally played a neutral role in support of peace in Galkacyo. This is largely due to the fact that their businesses and investments will benefit from stability. An example of the impact that conflict can have is in the regions outside Galkacyo, such as Bari and Hiraan, where businesses are heavily affected by the roadblocks that limit the free movement of people and trade. This desire for peaceful coexistence is also compounded by the fact that many businesses operate across the border or in shared areas of Galkacyo. The neutral area of the market place in Galkacyo exemplifies this. Business owners have worked hard to maintain stability in the area and prevent outbreaks of violence.

Members of **the diaspora** are also seen as promoting peace, firstly through their roles as business owners (see above), and also for the support that they provide communities through remittance fundraising for local development and humanitarian support.

Religious groups were identified as resilience actors, reflecting the perception of religion as a strong connecting factor across communities. Religious leaders and groups are seen to preach for good behaviour in peace and conflict and promote coexistence with neighbours. They are already heavily involved in mediation and reconciliation processes in the community.

Local and international non-government organisations are seen to be promoting peace, firstly by contributing to local development (to social services, emergency aid, infrastructure development, etc.) and secondly through direct support to peace and reconciliation processes. Moreover, the jobs that they offer promote stability and economic development in themselves.

Similarly, the **international community** (primarily the UN and its agencies) are seen as positive actors within the Galkacyo context, providing technical and material support for peace processes, notably the Joint Ceasefire Committee, and acting as a pressure group in advocating for progress in conflict resolution and peace processes. More broadly, support for local development, humanitarian aid and the promotion of effective governance in Somalia has a positive impact on communities' resilience in conflict, support for stability and peace, and the capacity of the federal government to play an effective role as mediator in Galkacyo.

ii. Aggravating Actors

The **state governments and politicians** of Puntland and Galmudug were presented as primary aggravating actors. Reflecting both clan interests and personal interests of politicians, respondents highlighted the damage that each administration's ego and unwillingness of compromise their interests, territory or power is doing to the potential for peace. One example of their impact as aggravating actors is seen in the lack of progress by the Joint Ceasefire Committee, who are essentially powerless to achieve anything without the support of the state administrations. To a much lesser extent, **local authorities** are similarly implicated in these clan dynamics and in turn can sometimes block progress in peace and reconciliation processes. This relationship between clans and administrations is seen to embody the politicisation of the conflict, with most respondents arguing that governments are simply clan-administrations; the conflict between them is an extension of the clan conflict that has defined the region for centuries. However, the presence of the state governments has introduced a more complex and damaging dynamic with greater gains to be made in political authority and official territory alongside state access to heavy, modern weapons. This raises the stakes of the conflict as well as the damage that it can have on communities.

"The main obstacle and total impediment to Galkacyo peace and stability is the existence of two active, parallel, uncooperative, antagonistic and rival administrations in the same city"

Women's FGD, South Galkacyo, 3 February 2017

Indeed, the **paramilitary** (Puntland and Galmudug's forces) are seen uniquely as aggravating actors by respondents, as the armed embodiments of the rival state authorities. Not only do they contribute to conflict by acting out the will of the states, they also have their own interests in the conflict. Their power stems from the need of the states to guarantee their interests and security and therefore the paramilitary have more influence in times of greater instability and conflict. In the pursuit of greater power, influence, authority and economic gain, the paramilitaries are an obstacle to peace.

Traditional elders, while a potential strong actor for peace, are currently perceived as aggravating actors because they are protecting and seeking to advance their clan and personal interests. Highly interconnected with politicians (in fact dominating the appointment process), businesses, religious leaders and civil society, they also mobilize clan militias. **Clan militias** themselves represent key actors in the conflict and an aggravating actor group, in their efforts to protect clan (and increasingly state) interests, as well

as personal gains. In as much as they may see their own, group or clan's interests undermined or compromised through peace deals and processes, they are perceived to be obstacles to peace and stability in both north and south Galkacyo.

The media is perceived as one of the most significant aggravating actors in both north and south Galkacyo (also see the media as an Aggravating Factor in 5.3.v). Respondents stated that media houses are owned by individuals representing certain political and clan interests which in turn work to advance these interests or they are available to the highest bidder, which similarly leaves them vulnerable to being instrumentalised by powerful individuals. This is perceived in both north and south Galkacyo through: the dissemination and exchange of provocative statements that fuel tension; the provision of a platform for those inciting violence; misreporting and bias; and the spreading of clan and state propaganda.

“Local media outlets, primarily FM radios, propagate hatred and host warmongering elders and politicians. A myriad of online websites, social media users and writers overseas also exacerbate the matter”

Civil society and media FGD, North Galkacyo, 7 February 2017

Despite contributing to peace and development, **local and international NGOs** were also perceived to have a strong negative impact on the current conflict. Indirectly, they contribute to tensions between communities by reinforcing perceptions of unfair distribution of resources and bias. This is felt as a particular grievance by south Galkacyo and more broadly Galmudug, contributing to their feelings of marginalisation. This perception of bias towards Puntland in terms of support, resources and presence on the ground was also highlighted in relation to the **international community** (the UN and its agencies). In addition, NGO support is seen to unintentionally weaken local and state authorities by taking away resources and undermining the authorities' role as the main actors responsible for development and service provision. Finally, some respondents highlighted the fact that NGOs and their local staff may even have a vested interest in continuing instability and under-developed communities since this presents opportunities for them and their organisation, and ensures their relevance and organisational survival.

The diaspora was perceived as currently playing a greater aggravating actor than resilience role. According to participants, members of the diaspora are engaging in the conflict, for example through social media and news outlets, to promote clan interests. Acting from afar, they are seen to be disconnected from local realities and in turn misreporting or perpetuating harmful historic stereotypes and grievances. They are understood to be financing the conflict through remittances, which benefit clan militias for instance.

While representing members of the business community, the impact of **khat sellers** was seen as purely negative by respondents. In the pursuit of their own economic interests, they are seen to be inciters of crime, instability and conflict. Various flare ups in violent conflict were highlighted as their doing.

Galmudug's competing administration of **ASWJ** was highlighted as an aggravating actor for their role in weakening state and community cohesion in some cases, and strengthening clan divisions in others. Intent on ousting and replacing the state administration, they seek to expand their territorial control and undermine the Galmudug administration's authority and their establishment of the rule of law, thus contributing to instability, tensions and conflict. Perceived as having connections to the Puntland government, they also heighten the feeling that communities in the south have of being manipulated and attacked by the north, contributing to conflict drivers.¹⁶

¹⁶ It should be noted that this dynamic between ASWJ and the Galmudug authorities may change depending on who becomes the next President of Galmudug state.

Al Shabaab are perceived exclusively as aggravating actors, widening social divides through terror attacks and assassinations, and promoting social mistrust. These actions serve to destabilise and divide communities, and undermine state and local governments and peace actors. Puntland in particular perceives south Galkacyo as a safe haven for Al Shabaab to launch attacks in their territory. However, this also points to the group's role being instrumentalised by actors: Puntland is perceived by Galmudug to be using the threat that they pose to justify road blocks and restrictions of trade, as well as portraying the Galmudug forces as colluding with them, to undermine the state's authority.

iii. Transformation

The following actors are highlighted for their potential capacity to contribute to peacebuilding and resilience. In this sense, this section outlines *entry points and opportunities for engagement* in peacebuilding in Galkacyo through specific groups. For some, this would entail a strengthening of their current impact and for others a complete reorientation of their actions.



Photo 8: Citizens walking from south, crossing road blocks, to north Galkacyo to celebrate Farmaajo's election.

The federal government currently play a positive role through their mediation and facilitation efforts of the Ceasefire Agreement between Puntland and Galmudug and at the same time play an aggravating actor role, in as much as they represent the conflict issue of federalism. The opinions expressed by respondents in both north and south Galkacyo point overwhelmingly to the federal government's current lack of presence and the need for them to take on their proper role in governance and peacebuilding in Galkacyo. Citizens expressed a need for the federal government to demonstrate neutrality in the conflict, play a direct third-party mediation role in conflict resolution, and facilitate future peacebuilding and reconciliation efforts. Regarding their own position, the federal government needs to focus on completing and strengthening the decentralisation process to ensure harmonisation between state constitutions and establish the necessary frameworks to govern cross-border relations. The strengthening of the federal

government also needs to be coupled with efforts to promote Somali national identity, which longer-term will ease conflict tensions between communities.

“A strong federal government, which can dominate the armed clans and their likeminded administrations, could bring these recurrent hostilities to an end”

Clan elder, FGD, South Galkacyo, 23 January 2017

State governments, politicians and their associated **paramilitary forces** must be engaged in this strengthening of the federal system to ensure that their powers and boundaries of authority are clearly demarcated and that the role of the federal government in adjudicating disputes between them is respected. This should similarly promote a sense of national identity, contributing to greater cohesion, and state governments’ development of policies that are in keeping with national interest. The state structures should be strengthened to ensure that personal interests do not dictate policy, and that state governments are able to effectively govern their territory and establish the rule of law. Linked to this, state paramilitary forces must display responsible and positive behaviour towards their communities in the line of duty, and demonstrated accountability.

Local authorities and **the police**, while already playing a positive role should further engage in peacebuilding. Authorities must support, prioritise and commit to the implementation of peacebuilding efforts and should play a key role in advocating for peace and reconciliation across their communities. Authorities possess a key convening power, that can be harnessed to influence elders, civil society, businesses, NGOs, and the media. Authorities and the police must cooperate across the border in Galkacyo to ensure effective administration of and security in the city, the lack of which is currently promoting impunity.

The media is a crucial actor to engage to transform them from strong aggravating actors into a key peacebuilding partner. The potential that the media presents to bridge social divides and promote reconciliation cannot be understated. Throughout initial stages of implementation of the ceasefire and continuing through long-term peacebuilding efforts, they must be engaged to promote independence, conflict sensitivity, journalistic standards and reporting with a peacebuilding lens (to understand the impact their work has on peace and conflict).

Traditional elders reflect significant resilience potential. They have a strong capacity to, when willing, promote cooperation across clans and positively influence local and state politics and clan militias. Elders should be engaged to demonstrate commitment to peacebuilding through participation in dialogue, reconciliation and the strengthening of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. **Clan militias**, as key actors in the current conflict, must be engaged in any peace process, demobilised and sensitised to peace and human rights. In an effort to not only transform their behaviour and impact on the conflict but to address the prevailing culture of impunity, command structures should be formalised.

Youth are already positively participating in peacebuilding efforts in Galkacyo, however given their number and capacity for mobilisation this could be significantly increased. Youth should be engaged based on their already positive roles and outlooks, rather than as an aggravating actor prevention strategy, focusing on their capacity for positive change and peacebuilding for their futures. Connections between youth across borders need to be established or strengthened and opportunities created for them to become agents for positive change. More broadly, they should be engaged in local governance through awareness raising, initiatives and consultations, to ensure that they contribute to democratic culture more deeply and are active members of their communities at all levels.

Already contributing to resilience and the promotion of social cohesion and peace in Galkacyo, **women** have the potential to play a much bigger role in bridging the divide between north and south. Existing

efforts of women's groups, particularly cross-border initiatives and connections, should be prioritised and they should capitalise on their positions in multiple communities to promote discourses of peace. Beyond these activities, representing a large number of citizens and different groups within society, their participation in peace processes, reconciliation and also governance should be prioritised to ensure more inclusive and in turn effective social cohesion within and between communities (something they themselves should advocate for and local, state and international actors should prioritise).

“Women, being the majority of the Galkacyo population suffer the pain of the conflict disproportionately. They lose their loved ones, flee the war to equally hostile environments... [yet currently] have less say in the reconciliation and peace-making process”

Women's FGD, North Galkacyo, 4 February 2017

The positive role that **the business community** is currently playing could be enhanced greatly. As a highly dynamic group, often transcending borders and clan divisions, and a highly-connected group – to political and traditional leaders, religious groups and clan militias – they have great potential to contribute. Businesses could launch joint initiatives to support peace as well as local development; mechanisms could be developed to influence and mitigate the impact of businesses that act as aggravating actors in their communities; and they should cooperate with the local and state governments on developing taxation frameworks and implementing them, especially in common areas such as the market place, to ensure that this does not contribute to conflict.

The diaspora is seen to possess a huge transformative potential role in the conflict. Despite being somewhat disconnected from the ground, being removed from the conflict and often having lived outside of Somalia for a long time means that members of the diaspora may also have the potential to transcend clan lines and contribute to a cohesive Somali identity. They have the capacity to mobilize funds through remittances, provide financial support to hospitals, schools and other public services, and influence their connections, such as politicians, businesspeople, elders and the media, for positive change. Diaspora groups should be engaged by local actors to promote a more comprehensive and balanced view of the conflict, act as a pressure group for peacebuilding efforts, and direct their resources to development, peace and reconciliation in Galkacyo.

To ensure that **international and local NGOs** do not inadvertently play an aggravating actor role in the conflict, they should strengthen principles of aid and service delivery, including “do no harm”, neutrality and balance in their support, to ensure conflict sensitivity. They must be aware of how their work may be perceived, and in turn how it may influence hostilities. Local NGOs also represent a key player in mobilising and engaging civil society and citizens in peace processes at the local level while international NGOs have a responsibility to ensure that the voices of local NGOs, civil society and Galkacyo citizens are heard, and that the reality on the ground is communicated with the international community. This should contribute to well-informed, responsive and relevant priorities and policies moving forward with peacebuilding.

In a similar manner, the **international community**, whilst already playing a positive role in the conflict, can contribute further to its resolution and establishment of lasting peace by promoting certain behaviour and engagement. It is crucial that impartiality and neutrality are maintained in all engagements and these should be guided by deeper and more informed understandings of the conflict and the promotion of action through a peacebuilding lens. Moreover, programming and interventions should all prioritise locally-driven and inclusive processes, both in peacebuilding as well as governance and democratisation processes that will secure sustainable peace.

4.6 Proposed solutions from community

Through the focus group discussions and interviews, the views of participants were gathered on what solutions could bring an end to the conflict in Galkacyo and establish lasting peace. These proposed solutions were used to inform discussion between Interpeace and the research team and incorporated into joint recommendations and peacebuilding entry points between them.

The respondents from **north Galkacyo** suggested the following policy and programmatic recommendations to address the conflict:

- Delinking regional, national and state political manipulations from the Galkacyo peace process and localizing peace to ensure ownership and sustainability;
- Introduction of resource-sharing mechanisms to avert potential relapse to resource-based conflicts;
- Harnessing business community, religious leadership and elites from both communities to forge peaceful linkages and inclusive platforms for dialogue and peace;
- Building robust, resilient and integrated security institutions that can ward off possible insecurities and maintain law and order in the town;
- Adoption of federal and inter-state peacebuilding policy that specifically focuses on the long-term peacebuilding in Galkacyo;
- Commissioning of truth and reconciliation committee to genuinely address the long-standing grievances and hostilities;
- Massive outreach and engagement of grassroots and widespread public awareness, sensitization and peace messaging to dispel traditional fallacies and stereotypes, restore public trust and foster social cohesion and culture of dialogue and non-violence;
- Intra-communal and cross-cultural programmes that reinforce the shared values, ensure integration of youth and establishment of public avenues for peace dialogue and reconciliation;
- Re-engaging and formalizing traditional peacebuilding structures and amplifying local capacities of women, youth and businesses to engage in grassroots dialogue, peacebuilding and reintegration programmes;
- Some respondents in the north argue that a joint administration and integrated security and social services could best work for Galkacyo, provided that it proportionately represents and reflects the will of the residents in the town;
- A considerable number of respondents believe that delineation of an internal borderline which separates the town and clearly shows revenue jurisdictions could be one of the options to ensure durable peace;
- The federal government being the biggest and most important player should expedite the reconciliation and inter-state boundary demarcation and disarmament of the armed public to ensure long-term stability and peaceful co-existence.

The respondents from **south Galkacyo** suggested the following policy and programmatic recommendations to address the conflict:

- Complete implementation of the last agreed upon Ceasefire Agreement (January 1 2017, in Mogadishu) regarding the latest flare up in violence:

- To move the forces from the battle zone (west Garsoor quarter) back to their original bases before the war;
- To remove the road blocks in the city;
- To arrange joint police forces to maintain general security in the city and its environs;
- To prepare return of the IDPs to their homes;
- Conduct dialogue between the two administrations, facilitated by the Federal Government and the international community;
- Some respondents stated that only one single administration should manage Galkacyo conflict, not different political affiliations and rival administrations;
- Existing public and national infrastructure in Galkacyo must be fairly distributed between the states;
- Joint police force from Galkacyo city should be formed and trained with commanders, chiefs and deputies selected from neutral clans who were not involved in the fighting directly;
- Federal Government forces should take over responsibility for security and oversee the process of reconciliation in Galkacyo until an appropriate solution found;
- Some respondents argued that, since Galmudug controls the majority of Mudug region's territory, people in north Galkacyo should join Galmudug state.

5. Conclusion

Resolving the Galkacyo conflict must be given priority by all stakeholders in the Somali region, including the international community, federal, state and local authorities, and local communities. Having been at the center of the divide between Hawiye and Darood communities for centuries, Galkacyo is of huge significance to Somalia. While the city is unique in its geographical, demographic and historical characteristics, the harmful dynamics that gives rise to tension and conflict in the city and its surrounding regions can be found in many other areas of Somalia, and will increasingly be, as federalism dictates the establishment and hardening of other state boundaries. Resolving the conflict in Galkacyo therefore has potential positive implications on tensions and other conflicts across the Somali region between competing clans, pastoral communities, local authorities and state governments.

To effectively address the conflict and bring decades of hostilities to an end, long-term peacebuilding processes and engagement is needed. This must be prioritised over the “fire-fighting” that has characterised peace efforts to date, as these serve to settle the current flare up of tensions and little more. An approach is required that includes not only high-level negotiations between state governments, but also local communities, their authorities, civil society and citizens, particularly youth and women. Participatory and inclusive discussions must take place between state and local authorities, civil society and citizens to ensure that peace processes are community-led and -owned, and thus legitimate and durable.

The entry points for the international community are numerous, addressing the key conflict issues and aggravating actors, and capitalising on the various current and potential resilience factors and groups, namely local authorities, youth, women, civil society, and the media. International actors must engage in a collaborative and coordinated manner, with each other, with the Federal Government of Somalia, with Puntland and Galmudug states, with local authorities and importantly with local communities. Whilst the impact is yet to be seen, the election of a new Federal Government holds promise in removing the previous perception of bias and favour towards Galmudug over Puntland and in promoting renewed energy and commitment to solving the conflict.

This study provides a foundation from which to launch informed long-term engagement in Galkacyo, based on research, analysis and collaboration with local communities. Moving forward, these findings, entry points and recommendations should be reflected upon by key stakeholders, and policy and programming in the region should adopt a considered, long-term strategy for intervention if sustainable peace is to be achieved.

5.1 Peacebuilding entry points & opportunities

Through the analysis of community members' perspectives on the conflict, the research team identified entry points and opportunities for peacebuilding. These represent potential next steps for the international community, international and local NGOs and other actors involved in peacebuilding in Galkacyo. Building on the recommendations (see Annex 1), these entry points are specific and action-oriented, representing viable and immediate engagement opportunities based on: desire from community members to see this intervention; the relative ease with which they may be achieved; or a capitalisation on existing or potential resilience factors and groups.

- 1. Validate report among key stakeholders to build consensus and strengthen local ownership of the peacebuilding process.** This research was carried out in an inclusive and participatory manner through focus group discussions and key informant interviews that included a wide segment of society in Galkacyo. However, to ensure that any peacebuilding gains are sustainable, it is essential that there is also local ownership of the process. The critical next step is therefore to once again gather the JCC, who are key stakeholders in the process, present the findings in order to validate the report, and seek to build consensus on the next steps.
- 2. Support locally-led and -owned peacebuilding efforts in Galkacyo to ensure legitimate, sustainable peace.** This is important in engagements anywhere, but particularly so in a context such as Galkacyo, given the historical roots of the conflict, the increasing complexity of its dynamics, and the need to establish effective and inclusive governance for lasting change to be achieved. Entry points and opportunities only present significant potential in as much as they harness existing resilience in Galkacyo, strengthen local actors who already demonstrate the capacity to contribute to positive change, or build on the will and desire by communities for certain action. Without these underlying foundations, peacebuilding efforts will not be legitimate or sustainable. The international community thus has a significant role to play in promoting and strengthening locally-owned and -driven processes, both in their own engagements and through their support to other actors.
- 3. Continue supporting the Joint Ceasefire Committee in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and engage them in consultations about peace and reconciliation.** This is an important first step in a longer-term peacebuilding strategy. This ongoing support will continue to strengthen the trusting relationships between JCC members themselves, and with local and international peacebuilders. The confidence that is built as key terms of the agreement are implemented will also serve as a strong foundation from which to explore further engagement with local government representatives and elders that make up the JCC in peace and reconciliation processes.
- 4. Adopt a peacebuilding lens in all humanitarian and development work in Galkacyo, Puntland and Galmudug.** There is huge potential to transform the conflict in Galkacyo by adopting a peacebuilding lens in all engagements in the city and its surrounding area. This entails considering the positive and negative impact that actions may have on peace and adapting actions accordingly. Currently, intervention may be perceived as biased towards one side, contributing to feelings of marginalisation and intercommunal tension. Positive intentions can indirectly fuel hostility. In turn, current and future engagements, even when not directly addressing peacebuilding, may contribute to social cohesion, stability and ultimately peace, if actors commit to informed strategies of intervention that consider their potential impact on, and reinforce, peace. This approach could be achieved beginning with consultations with both sides of the conflict and care not to privilege one side over the other in programming.

5. **Tackle aggravating actor impact and harness potential peacebuilding role of the media.** The media emerged as a key aggravating actor group through their promotion of divisive and conflict-fuelling messages, yet at the same time hold huge immediate potential to promote peace and reconciliation in Galkacyo. This could be deployed with relative ease compared to other actors and would contribute to public pressure and a momentum toward conflict resolution. As such, the international community, NGOs and local peacebuilding actors should work with the media on both sides of the conflict to promote positive discourses and messages of peace. Trainings, capacity building, workshops and discussion forums should be launched to underline the importance of unbiased and accurate reporting and empower the media to champion the peace process rather than undermine it.
6. **Promote intercommunal engagement between local-level actors.** Capitalising on the perception of local-level actors (such as local authorities, businesspeople, elders, civil society, youth and women) as significant existing or potential resilience groups, the international community and government authorities should prioritise peacebuilding initiatives with these stakeholders. This could take the form of the creation of neutral platforms for dialogue between them or workshops to promote support for peacebuilding and cohesion. Focussing on these stakeholders, alongside and in connection with higher-level negotiation, will promote community-led and -owned peace processes and outcomes, and will increase the chances of creating stability and lasting peace in Galkacyo. Moreover, this represents a long-term approach to locally-owned peacebuilding in the city prioritising sustainability and impact.
7. **Capitalise on the current and potential resilience roles of women and youth as peacemakers.** Representing significant connectors across communities, active peace actors and untapped resilience potential, women and youth must be strengthened as peacebuilders by the international community and NGOs. These groups' engagement in peace processes (including in the JCC), peacebuilding efforts and governance should be prioritised and strengthened, through capacity building, mentorship and platforms for discussion with stakeholders and authorities. Youth and women groups are already eager to participate in these processes and engagement with them is relatively uncontroversial, making this a viable and significantly rewarding entry point.
8. **Support to social reconciliation within and between communities.** A lack of true reconciliation and social healing in Galkacyo has contributed to ongoing conflict over the years, with historical and more recent grievances building on each other to create persistent underlying tension. The international community should thus collaborate with local peacebuilding actors, civil society and traditional leaders to launch activities that will contribute to reconciliation, not only between the north and south of Galkacyo but also between communities in the north or south¹⁷. Long-term attitudinal and behavioural change is needed in Galkacyo to address how communities see and act towards each other. Activities should build on existing connecting factors, for instance shared culture, poetry and dance. This approach will strengthen support for peace processes and build trust between communities for lasting peace and stability. Reconciliation efforts like this are in fact needed across the entire Somali region and efforts in Galkacyo could provide a model for other interventions.
9. **Support to the federal and state governments in finalising, strengthening and making the federal and democratisation processes inclusive and participatory.** Various aspects of the federal process emerged as primary conflict issues in the study, highlighting the urgent need to address perceived weaknesses in the system. The international community are well placed to provide technical support, guidance and capacity building to federal and state authorities on the urgent completion and

¹⁷ In Galmudug, entry points and the need for reconciliation and integration exists between the Habar-Gidir and Marehaan, and Marehaan and Dir in Dhusamareb, Gelinsoor and Xeralle towns as well as the Sa'ad, Sheekhal and Dir in Afbarwaago town.

strengthening of processes, which will alleviate tensions surrounding the creation of states and their borders, including: legal frameworks governing inter-state trade, institutional structures and taxation systems. Crucially, to further contribute to *effective* governance, the international community and local actors should strengthen citizen inclusion and participation in democratisation processes and governance. Ensuring effective consultation takes place and authorities have the capacity to respond to these is one step towards achieving this. Only with a strong and responsive relationship between citizens and their governments will trust, effective policy and ultimately stability be established in Galkacyo, as well as other parts of Somalia.

- 10. Facilitation of dialogue between state governments and support to the Federal Government to engage in mediation.** The international community has a unique role to play in facilitating negotiation between state governments, representing external actors with significant access to resources and political leverage. State governments (and their politicians) were perceived as primary actors in prolonging conflict and undermining peacebuilding efforts. As such, the international community should prioritise bringing these actors to the table to discuss ways forward. This could be achieved for instance through the creation of a neutral platform for dialogue or support to the design of peace talks taking citizen perspectives into account alongside government authorities and other stakeholders. High-level processes such as this must be inclusive and go hand-in-hand with local peacebuilding efforts if sustainable and legitimate peace is to be achieved. At the same time, respondents spoke of the need for the federal government to play a third-party mediation role, so support to them in this engagement is crucial, not only to making progress in the peace process, but also to demonstrate the impact that an effective Federal Government can have on governance across the Somali region.

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Annexes

Annex 1: Recommendations

The following cross-cutting recommendations for moving forward with conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconciliation in Galkacyo are based on the findings from the focus groups and interviews and analysis and discussion of these by Interpeace, and PDRC. The recommendations apply to communities, civil society, local, state and federal authorities, peacebuilding organisations and the international community. They have been broken down into short term (relating to the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement), mid-term and long-term recommendations, which should be taken in this sequence, with each phase contingent on and building on the previous. It should be noted that the findings of the research and the writing of this study did not intend to find “solutions” as such for Galkacyo, for instance on the status of the city, but rather identify processes by which these solutions may emerge through inclusive and participatory processes.

Short-term (Ceasefire Agreement Implementation)

- Galmudug and Puntland state governments should commit to implementing the ceasefire agreement, revitalize the Joint Ceasefire Committee and give them the necessary mandate for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.
- The Joint Ceasefire Committee should operationalize and reinforce the implementation of the ceasefire agreement with concrete steps, clear verification, monitoring and oversight mechanisms.
- The Federal government should take a leading role in verification, monitoring and oversight of the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and subsequent reconciliation processes.
- The UN and the international community should give highest priority to Galkacyo conflict and provide assistance in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and subsequent reconciliation process.
- The Joint Ceasefire Committee, in collaboration and coordination with state governments and other peacebuilding actors, should effectively engage the media to promote positive and accurate reporting of the ceasefire agreement implementation.

Mid-term Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

- The federal and state governments, in collaboration with the UN and local communities, should engage in discussion on how to provide security in Galkacyo in the interim, addressing the issue of clan militias and security measures for the negotiation process.
- A mediation committee based on consultation and agreement between Puntland and Galmudug governments should be established, including representative and inclusive consultation teams from each community under the leadership of the Federal Government and with the support of the UN and the international community.
- A broad and inclusive peace negotiation process should be developed and launched, ensuring legitimacy through representation of different sectors of the two communities, with the initial aim to establish stability and security in the mid-term and create a conducive environment to resolve contentious issues. The negotiation should then focus on the identification of the contentious issues, lay out a process, timeline and strategy to address these, and launch efforts to resolve pressing issues that can be addressed within the short time.

- Civil society and citizens, particularly women and youth, should be engaged by their community's consultation teams, ensuring inclusion, buy-in and accountability in the mediation process.
- Activities should be launched to promote joint civil society action that contribute to an atmosphere of increased trust and openness to reconciliation, particularly among women and youth.
- The role of the media should be strengthened to contribute to peacebuilding through joint awareness raising and capacity building, the development of a media code of conduct, and an equivalent monitoring mechanism to ensure independent, accurate and conflict-sensitive reporting.
- A mechanism should be established to identify, deter and address "aggravating actors", who are contributing to the prolonging of the conflict and undermining peace processes.

Long-term Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

- Structures, mechanisms and processes (such as consultations) should be developed to deal with remaining conflict issues that require longer-term negotiation and resolution, with the involvement of local communities, state authorities as well as relevant federal government authorities (such as revenue collection, resource sharing, state boundaries, revision of constitutions, and not the least the status of Galkacyo city, etc.). These structures and mechanisms should be developed through broad-based consultation with the inclusion of relevant local, regional and national actors and expertise.
- Permanent, integrated security structures should be established with support and oversight from the Federal Government and led by Galmudug and Puntland, alongside consultations on local security issues with key stakeholders and citizens to promote legitimacy, accountability and trust in security forces.
- A city charter (or similar legal document) should be developed through a participatory process between Puntland and Galmudug to outline the creation and governance of common institutions, administrative processes and services within the city of Galkacyo.
- Demobilization, disarmament and rehabilitation of clan militias should take place to reduce the likelihood that conflict issues escalate into violent and large-scale conflict.
- Inter-communal reconciliation and social healing initiatives should be developed and implemented through collaboration between civil society and authorities, and traditional peacebuilding and reconciliation mechanisms strengthened or re-established.
- Youth and women should be engaged in governance and peacebuilding processes, by raising awareness on their positive roles and providing opportunities to communicate their needs and priorities with traditional leaders and authorities, which will build the necessary trust with government actors at various levels.
- Opportunities for youth economic empowerment should be prioritised to ensure their positive contribution and agency within their communities, and to counter their potential role as aggravating actors.
- Long-term conflict resolution mechanisms, policies or processes should be set-up, including leaders, civil society, youth, women, rural and urban inhabitants from both north and south communities to manage future conflict issues that may arise.

- Programmes and policies for improved natural resource management and rural development should be implemented to tackle long-standing conflict drivers in rural and urban areas and contribute to stability across Puntland and Galmudug.
- Peacebuilding processes, their progress, achievements, and lessons learnt should be monitored, documented and disseminated with relevant stakeholders and communities to ensure awareness of these processes, their impact on peace and stability, and ownership of them by communities.

Annex 2: Conflict Timeline

The following conflict timeline identifies key periods of time and events in the Galkacyo context. The timeline emerged through discussion and consensus-building between IPT and PDRC and therefore reflects historical events as viewed by these teams and the communities in north and south Galkacyo whom they engaged. As such, it should be noted that this timeline does not necessarily reflect the order of historical events with 100% accuracy or objectivity: further research would be required to validate this. Instead, this timeline serves to situate the opinions outlined in this report in their perceived historical context, underlines the long-standing nature of tension and armed hostility in Galkacyo, and provides a basis on which to build further consensus around the context of the Galkacyo conflict between actors in the north and the south.

1930-1935	The “Linea Tomaselli” is established by the Italian colonial administration to establish the boundary between pastoral communities engaged in recurrent conflict
1940-1953	Period of major inter-clan wars between Habar-gidir, Majeerten, Mareexan and Leelkase (Golol-buuxshe, Hoobaaq, Diilin-balo/Dibira/Gabal-qariye, Qorrof, Garoobaale and Dhudub)
1953-1960	Period of increasing nationalistic sentiment (SYL); integration of the Mudug people
1960-1969	Period of political completion and electoral dispute led to intra and inter-clan violence in former Mudug region
1969-1977	Period of relative calm and stability
1978-1985	Government crackdown on SSDF and its supporters in collusion with local militias
1985-1989	Clan-based conflicts evolved in this period (Barde-gool, Baloolooyin, Higlaale, Gacmo-fale and Xero-dhaban)
1989	El-midgan, Docol, Bohol, Wargalo, Saddex-higlo and Dhuumoodle: multiple attacks that claimed large number of people and was perpetrated by government forces led by Dhago-bacayr colluding with Majeerten and Leelkase militias (after the eviction of Sa’ad) [November] Sa’ad was evicted from Galkacyo - government forces, Majeerten, Leelkase and Mareexan militias versus Sa’ad
1991	[February] Haaf-qiyaame (“half doom”), a revenge war by USC (Sa’ad) that claimed large number of people from north Galkacyo
1992	Revenge attacks by Darood (led by SSDF) against Hawiye for the Wargalo conflict in 1989
1993	[January-March] Preliminary discussion between SSDF, USC and SNDU A minor counter-attack by USC - an extension of Wargalo conflict [May-June] Peace agreement between SSDF (Abdilaahi Yusuf), USC (Gen. Aideed) and SNDU (Ali Ismail Abdi Giir) signed in Mogadishu
1998-1993	Period of relative calm
1998-2013	Frequent minor skirmishes involving clan militias
2013	[November] Fighting in Godod, involving government forces and clan militias

- 2015** [November] Road construction in Garsoor by Puntland triggers conflict between Puntland and Galmudug forces; leads to the displacement of an estimated 90,000 persons¹⁸
- 2016** [October] Construction of the police post by Galmudug and livestock market by Puntland triggers further conflict between Puntland and Galmudug forces; contributed to 90,000 people remaining displaced¹⁹

¹⁸ OCHA, *Somalia Flash Update: Humanitarian Impact of Fighting in Galkacyo*, 8 December 2015 [<http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/somalia-flash-update-humanitarian-impact-fighting-gaalkacyo-8-december-2015>]

¹⁹ OCHA, *Somalia Flash Update: Humanitarian Impact of Fighting in Galkacyo*, 10 November 2016 [<http://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/ocha-somalia-flash-update-3-humanitarian-impact-fighting-gaalkacyo-10-november-2016>]

Annex 3: Actor Mapping Table

The following table reflects the main perceptions of focus group and interview participants, as well as discussion between IPT and PDRC, regarding key actors in the conflict, their primary roles, interests, relationships and potential to contribute to peace. As such the information in the table about each actor is not exhaustive or necessarily objective, but instead represents commonly held views of them by community members.

Actor	Role in Conflict	Main Interests	Key Relationships	Transformation
Federal Government	<p>[RESILIENCE] Mediate and facilitate Ceasefire Agreement between Galmudug and Puntland;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Oversee federalisation process</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Perceived as supporting Galmudug over Puntland, contributing to division.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create peace and stability in Galkacyo (and all Somalia) • Establish effective governance and rule of law in Galkacyo (and all Somalia) 	Influence on both states; linkages with community members (officials with connections); indirect with security forces (paramilitary, police).	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Demonstrate neutrality in relationships with state authorities 2. Focus on completion of decentralisation process; finalise federal constitution, processes and institutions; exercise proper role in relation to states (adjudicating boundaries, trade, etc.) 3. Prioritise Galkacyo conflict resolution and participate in mediation and peace processes (as third-party)
State Governments & Politicians	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Primary actors, instigating and prolonging conflict in pursuit of their competing interests and the upper hand;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Mobilise paramilitary forces (and clan militias) in conflict against other state;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Politicians promote conflict in pursuit of their own personal interests</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Engaged in ceasefire agreement and discussion (though limited)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect and advance state interests (territory, resources, power) • Protect and advance clan interests • Politicians protect and advance personal interests - money, position, authority 	Federal government has some authority over them; control of paramilitary and clan militias; some control over media; supported by clans and diaspora; connected to international community; politicians have many connections with religious leaders, elders, business community, civil society, the media.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consider national interest, rather than just state or clan 2. Refrain from inflammatory language and fuelling tensions/ social divide – promote positive messages on media 3. Support and engage in the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and subsequent peace processes 4. Enhance the proper exercise of control and the rule of law across their territory
Paramilitary	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Engage in fighting against other state's armed forces</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Prolong conflict by pursuing person/ state / clan interests (disobeying orders to withdraw)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect and promote state (and clan) territory and interests • Strengthen their own position (resources, power) 	Report to state governments; connected to other armed forces (police) and intelligence community; linked to traditional elders.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Promote a responsible attitude towards state and national interests 2. Promote positive behaviour towards citizens 3. Cooperate (obey orders) and engage in ceasefire and peace processes

Local Authorities	<p>[RESILIENCE] Maintain administrative processes, social services and security to their citizens, including IDPs;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Part of peace process (members of Joint Ceasefire Committee).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stability in communities to allow for service provision, security, tax collection, etc. • Some personal interests in money/ influence 	Authority over local security forces, mainly police; connected to traditional elders; managed by state governments; influence civil society, businesses, NGOs, local media and clan militias.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Prioritise the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process 2. Advocate for peace and reconciliation (including through positive media engagement) 3. Focus on national interests, not just local clan interests
Police	<p>[RESILIENCE] Maintain internal security of city, promoted rule of law and combats impunity;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Joint police force training being prepared/ launched between north and south Galkacyo.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some stability in communities to be able to perform their jobs effectively • Maintaining jobs and being paid 	Reports to, follows orders and implements policies from local and state governments; work closely with communities; connected with clans, elders, business community and other forces, such as the army and Somali Federal Police; receive training from UN	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cooperate with police on other side of the conflict to promote stability, cohesion and tackle impunity 2. Cooperate, share information and security updates with Federal Police
Traditional (Clan) Elders	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Promote clan interests;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Mobilize clan militias and resources for conflict;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Participate in peacebuilding efforts (including Joint Ceasefire Committee)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect and promote clan and personal interests • Promote traditional authority 	Subsidize and control clan militias; influence authorities at all levels; some control over business community and civil society.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Increase cooperation between other traditional elders 2. Engage in and provide further support for peacebuilding 3. Use influence to pressure authorities and clan militias for peace 4. Promote efforts to end clan impunity
Clan Militias	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Incite and promote conflict with other clans;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Engage in armed conflict.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect and promote clan interests • Personal and group gain – economically and influence/ authority • Promote militia's survival and the communities' reliance on and need for them 	Subsidized and controlled by state governments and traditional elders; supported by businesses during conflict; relies on recruitment largely from youth.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Engage in peace processes 2. Demobilization and sensitization on peace and human rights 3. Formalize or establish command structures and accountability mechanisms to combat impunity
Religious Groups	<p>[RESILIENCE] Preach for good behaviour and practices, such as peaceful coexistence with neighbours and other communities;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Participate in mediation, peace and reconciliation processes;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Charitable donations, humanitarian aid and support to the underprivileged and those in need.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote peace and cohesion among communities, in line with teachings 	Connected with general public; run certain social services; have relationships with businesses; affiliated with traditional leaders (particular Sufis)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Need to capitalise on their influence to further promote discourses of peace and cohesion in community 2. Should actively participate in peace and reconciliation processes

Youth	<p>[RESILIENCE] Youth networks are participating in peacebuilding efforts</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Participate in conflict in clan militias</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace, stability and prosperity in Galkacyo for their futures • Need for opportunities (jobs) • Personal interests - economic, influence, ego 	Youth networks and associations connecting large groups of youth; members of civil society, NGOs, academic institutions; represent members of clan militias.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish more connections between youth and across communities 2. Become more active in peacebuilding and governance in communities 3. Disengage from conflict
Women	<p>[RESILIENCE] Represent connections between the two communities for their often dual clan identity (family and marital) and as such can move between the two sides</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Women's groups and networks engaging and promoting peacebuilding and social cohesion between communities (meetings between sides and promoting peace in own communities)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peace, stability and prosperity for themselves, family and business interests • Increase role of women's groups (and civil society more broadly) for local development and peace 	Women's networks and associations connect women; some groups connected across two communities; represent business communities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strengthen connections between women's groups across the border 2. Become more active in peacebuilding and governance 3. Use their position between communities to promote discourse of peace and greater connections
Business Community	<p>[RESILIENCE] Promote stability in city for good business and investment, e.g. with peaceful shared market place;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Conduct business across conflict border and clan-lines promoting cohesion and co-dependence.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stability for good business environment, increased opportunities • Free movement of trade and people 	Political and traditional leaders; members of different clans; clan militias.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support joint initiatives for peace and development 2. Cooperate with local and state authorities to develop taxation frameworks and facilitate implementation
Media	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Disseminate heated and provocative statements that fuel tensions;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Misreport events/ opinions; report news with bias;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Provide a platform/ mouthpiece to warmongers.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gain resources (economic) • Gain influence in communities and win favour with important individuals • Promote own clan's interests 	Owned/ controlled by clan members or clan-dominated state administrations; hired by powerful community members.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Report on events with as much neutrality/ objectivity as possible 2. Conflict sensitive reporting – be aware of how they impact stability and conflict in Galkacyo 3. Promote discourse of cohesion and peace
Diaspora	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Finance conflict through remittances;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Provide financial assistance for local development and humanitarian support (remittances and fundraisers)</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Promote progress away from a clan-based society and social cohesion</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advance clan and personal interests (money, influence) • Protect business investments 	Represent members of, or close ties with, business community; own media; part of authorities, as MPs for instance; connected with traditional elder.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enhance understanding and promote accurate reporting of the conflict 2. Engage diaspora networks as pressure group for peace 3. Direct resources to local development and peacebuilding efforts
Khat Sellers	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Undermine stability and promote crime through selling khat illegally;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maximise project and business opportunities • Personal influence and power 	Connected throughout community through selling khat to citizens, clan militias, leaders, authorities; are part of business	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Refrain from fuelling tension and conflict

	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Promote armed conflict through fighting between themselves;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Profit from conflict by selling khat to fighters/ militias.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not to face punishment for criminal activities (impunity) 	community; connection across border with khat exporters.	
ASWJ	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Undermine stability in Galmudug and the authority of the state administration by competing with them;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Plays on clan divisions to weaken Galmudug state and in turn fuels tensions.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The weakening or collapse of Galmudug state • Expansion of territorial control 	Perceived connections with Puntland state authorities; relationship with federal government; linked to clans.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. End hostile relationship with Galmudug authority; reconcile with them 2. Pursue political interests within framework of existing federal state structure
Al Shabaab	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Attacks and terror promote instability in states;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Strengthen social divisions between clans and communities (including Puntland and Galmudug);</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Undermine state authority, institutions and their capacity to end conflict.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take over control of the territory • Ensure their continued survival and increase power Gain more resources and recruits 	Receive resources from foreign actors, terrorist groups, businesses, piracy, community members (through protection money); influence and control youth and communities.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. When possible, engage in dialogue 2. Refrain from fuelling tension and conflict
Local & International NGOs	<p>[RESILIENCE] Provide resources for and support local development, social service provision, and humanitarian aid;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Promote and engage in peace processes;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Create tensions between communities through perception of unbalanced distribution;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Weaken authorities' status and need to be the primary service provider for communities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gain influence and resources to ensure continued survival • Contribute to local development • Individual staff may pursue personal interests (money, authority) 	Local and international NGOs work together on ground; reliant on donors/ international community; need approval from but also support local administrations and traditional elders; work with local businesses/ local contractors	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Adopt a conflict sensitive approach to work and distribution of support/ aid 2. Support inclusive peacebuilding efforts and promote social cohesion in all work
International Community (UN, foreign states)	<p>[RESILIENCE] Puts pressure on Somali actors for conflict resolution and peace processes;</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Provide technical and material support for peace processes (such as Ceasefire Agreement and JCC);</p> <p>[RESILIENCE] Support for local development, humanitarian aid and good governance;</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Establish good relationships with all stakeholders • Create stable environment conducive to development • Foreign states pursue own interests 	Support local, regional, state and federal authorities, civil society (including local NGOs); direct support to JCC; connected with elders, clans, militias and security forces	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Maintain impartiality and neutrality in conflict 2. Encourage and adopt deeper and more informed understanding of the conflict (including a conflict-sensitive approach) 3. Prioritise strengthening of democratisation process (including establishment of federal boundaries) as

	<p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Perception of bias in distribution of resources, support to and presence in states;</p> <p>[AGGRAVATING ACTOR] Foreign states involvement can contribute to tensions.</p>			<p>well as inclusive and locally-driven peacebuilding</p>
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Annex 4: Interview & Focus Group Questionnaires

Focus Group Discussion Questions:

1. What do you think as the main impediments to peace and stability in Galkacyo/ Mudug region?
2. What do you see as the current causes/drivers of the conflict in Galkacyo/ Mudug? How do they differ from those of earlier stages?
3. What are the issues of contention between south and north Galkacyo communities/ administrations?
4. In this conflict situation, what are the connecting factors and what hinders the situation from getting worse (resilience factors that could be strengthened)?
5. Who are the main actors? What are their interests, positions, capacities and relationships?
6. What attempts have been made to solve the Galkacyo conflict? Why did they fail or did not last?
7. What were the weaknesses of previous agreements (e.g. 1993 agreement)? Could this conflict be solved by traditional mechanisms?
8. What has been the role of women in previous attempts to solve the Galkacyo conflict? What role can they play now?
9. What are the long-term solutions to the conflict in Galkacyo? Who can lead/ facilitate the implementation of these solutions? What is the role of the federal government?

Key Informant Interview Questions:

1. What do you think as the main impediments to peace and stability in Galkacyo/ Mudug region?
2. What do you see as the current causes/drivers of the conflict in Galkacyo/ Mudug? How do they differ from those of earlier stages?
3. What are the contentious land, resource and political issues that trigger conflict in Galkacyo? Why did these factors lead to violence?
4. In this conflict situation, what are the connecting factors and what hinders the situation from getting worse (resilience factors that could be strengthened)?
5. Who are the main actors? What are their interest, positions, capacities and relationships?
6. What actors can be identified as aggravating actors and why? What is their interest? How their role can be mitigated?
7. What attempts have been made to solve the Galkacyo conflict? Why did they fail or did not last?
8. What were the weaknesses of previous agreements (e.g. 1993 agreement)? Could this conflict be solved by traditional mechanisms?
9. What are the long-term solutions to the conflict in Galkacyo? Who can lead/ facilitate the implementation of these solutions? What is the role of the federal government?
10. What are the implications and the lessons learnt from the conflicts in Galkacyo? Are there any immediate measures do you suggest to consolidate peaceful relations and co-existence in Galkacyo?