


XHCP
XARUNTA HOORUMARINTA
CILMIKAARISTA PUNTLAND



PDRC
PUNTLAND DEVELOPMENT
RESEARCH CENTER

WORKSHOP FINAL REPORT

ON

PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT CONCILIATION

(An Analysis of Somalia's Political Dilemma)

Implemented by PDRC

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INTRODUCTION

The international community (under the guise of UNOSOM) intervened, some say belatedly in the Somali case, in a forceful manner in 1993 but failed miserably in its peace and reconciliation efforts. However, efforts to pacify Somalia, though on lesser scale, did not stop. Between 1997 and 1999, the *War-torn Societies Project (WSP)* had started a peace building program that was intended to cover all of Somalia, albeit in a gradual fashion, and on regional basis. WSP, a Swiss based International NGO, conducted a pilot study in Participatory Action Research (PAR) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal and North Mudug of the present Puntland. The research approach not only raised public understanding of pertinent strategic policy issues, their impact on reconstruction and development but also introduced an innovative, neutral forum for discussion and debate. In a modest and reduced scale of intervention, WSP's support to, and promotion of peace and stability through dialogue and discussion in Puntland continued in cooperation with its affiliate and successor organization, Puntland Development Research Center (PDRC). This project – *Peace Building, Reconciliation and Governance* – is part of that on-going WSP support schemes.

The focus of this research is to link the present predicament of the Somalis to the impractical policies of the colonial powers that conquered the Somali peninsula in late nineteenth century. They had not only divided one single ethnic group into several parts but also failed to implant their systems of governance when they arrested the development of a homegrown Somali wide administration. The study also sheds light on the problems encountered by the Somali administrations in the post-independence years. It highlights the root causes of the Somali political conflicts and searches for where the solution lies.

The overall objectives of this research is to continue the activities of the WSPI, as a model of research instrument, and to contribute to peace, human security and development, through participatory action research, facilitating the efforts of the people, the government and their partners in the reconstruction and development of Puntland and possibly other regions of Somalia, to promote co-operation and consensus building by providing a neutral forum for dialogue between key actors (government authorities, civil society, private sector and international development actors) on peace building and reconciliation, and to study traditional conflict resolution methods and traditional sources of conflict

Chapter one: Somali politics in historical perspective

This section introduces a brief outline of the political history of Somalia during the period prior to the collapse of the First Somali Republic in Jan 1991 and the historical events that culminated in the demise of the Republic. It looks into the political background of the Somali people prior to the European colonial occupation, the political heritage of colonialism and the performance of the post-independence civilian and military governments.

1.1 Pre-colonial Times

Explorers had portrayed the Somali peninsula, in the pre-colonial times, as a territory dwelled in by a nation of clans. Despite having all the prerequisites of a typical nation-state i.e. common language, common religion, same traditions and way of life, the Somali were an assortment of clan families. A collective identity of being a Somali was little or absent, instead, the peninsula divided into clan enclaves. The Somalis had no united centralized authority that could control the Somali political scene in its wholesome. In its lieu, traditional leaders, having variously the titles of Boqor, Sultan, Garaad, Wobar, Ugaas, etc., ruled clans using their traditional *Xeer* and customs, some being more developed than others. Among these traditional sultanates were those of Boqor Osman of Majerteen, Yusuf Ali Kenediid (Mudug) Mohamud Ali Shire of Warsangeli (Sanaag region), in the North and the Sultanates of Biyomal (Merka) and Geledi (Afgooye) in the south of the country. Despite this, in each political enclave, viable modern institutions of governance did not prosper. Anthropologists describe this stage of nation development as a “non-state” society or “acephalous”.

1.2. European Penetration and Partition

Being in such a stage at the turn of the Nineteenth Century, and with the absence of united voice that could negotiate on their behalf, it was not a difficult task for the intruding colonial powers to manipulate the Somalis free-handedly at the expense of their long-term interests. As Drysdale put it, *“like a pack of cards”, the Somali-clan based entities were dealt with, one by one, as separate “mini-states”. They were compelled or at times cajoled by various European states to surrender their sovereignty and opt for the “protection” of colonial powers.*

Consequentially, the Somali inadvertently found themselves living in different colonial jurisdictions. Like the rest of Africa, the Europeans have partitioned the Somali territory into zones of influence: British, French and Italian. Moreover, the colonizing powers had later ceded some Somali lands to Ethiopia and Kenya in their own interest. These divisions and transfers of lands did not give the slightest consideration to the ethnic composition of the Somali people-the victims. An angry workshop participant had this to say: *“In Nigeria the*

colonizing forces brought together over 200 different African tribes, and in the case of Somalia they divided one nation into various mini-parts." Elsewhere in Africa, the European coerced many different tribes to forcibly coexist under the colonial rule or divided one tribe or clan by artificial borders. A legacy many tribes continue to endure till now. The Somalis, Borana, Afar and Massai are typical examples in the Horn.

The result was awful: Somalia's colonial experience was devastating and had a twin effect on the lives of many generations. By their intervention, the foreign powers have, on the one hand, interrupted the natural development of the society to produce an indigenous system of governance, and on the other, had left behind a country divided into five different parts of influence that later proved difficult for the successive Somali governments to grapple with.

1.3. Self-government and Independence

Despite decades of uninterrupted alien administrations (except a brief challenge to the British rule by the Somali freedom fighter Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan), the period of exposure of Somalis to the imposed Western legal systems and replica of governance was rather limited. In the Italian Somaliland, for instance, in the 1930's, the main focus of Fascist Italy was to conscript Somali soldiers in its military campaign to defeat Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. After the Abyssinian confrontation, Italy had to face the beginning of the Second World War and the end of her imperial possessions in East Africa. Emerging victorious in the East African operations of the Second World War, Britain became the sole ruler of the entire Somali peninsula except the small French Somaliland portion. The British ruled the Italian Somaliland under a British Military Administration (BMA) for ten years. This was followed by other ten-years of a renewed Italian Administration under the trusteeship of the United Nations. For the Southern Somalis, the foreign administrations and the frequent change of hands, for sure, became source of not only confusion and uncertainty but also of political disorientation.

The situation of British Somaliland was worse. The British, too, used the Somalis as mere soldiers and took them as faraway as Burma to fight the Japanese in the Second World War. It had not prepared these Somalis for independence and eventual self-government to keep pace with the Italian-led UN Trusteeship Administration. Britain was not in the mood of building institutions of governance. Here is the comment of (Drysdale: 2000) after 50 years elapsed:

"To colonial officials in Hargeysa, the administrative center of the Somaliland Protectorate, the ten-year period of grace before Somalia was due to become independent was also a long way off. 'No need to worry' was the prevailing attitude and if the word 'self-government' crossed their lips, there would be much shaking of heads in the government secretariat in sheer disbelief"

This means the British Somaliland Protectorate was even less prepared than their southern brothers in matters of self-government, and Britain left Somaliland Protectorate in 1960 as "one of the least developed British

dependencies in Africa", after so many years that it lived under their tutelage. With this background, The Italian Somaliland and Britain's Somaliland Protectorate fused in July 1960 under the flag of Somali Republic. The problem was that neither the Italians nor the British did seriously assist the struggling nation to build a strong and sound administration after they left the scene.

In the first nine years of post-independence, the Somalis, unable to develop a sustained democratic system of governance, turned to clan politics. In this brief period of "democratic experience", though inefficient, the new nation produced two presidents and three prime ministers in what can be described as a "peaceful, but rudimentary democratic political development". In the elections of 1969, over 70 clan-based political parties contested the elections for 123 parliamentary seats in which the Somali Youth League (SYL), headed by the Prime Minister Mohamed Egal won the election with dubious election ethics. When the electioneering ended, all the winning members of the "opposition" parties, with the exception of one deputy (Abdirizak Haji Hussein-former prime minister), joined the government party, which they often accused of corruption and mismanagement in their outdoor politics, to gain ministerial positions. With one party, the SYL having secured an absolute majority in the house, its leader ignored the dissident voice of the people and glided even higher in corruption and mismanagement of the meager resources, painstakingly generated from custom duty and impoverished farmers' production in the southern Somalia.

The West was uninterested in these developments and failed to assist Somalia in democracy building. Rather, they opted for a close cooperation with Ethiopia. Ethiopia, though its political system was dictatorial and feudalistic, especially under Emperor Haile Selassie, was nevertheless the preferred client of the European powers in the region. The Western powers had a soft spot for Ethiopia, because Ethiopia was *"an island of Christianity in a sea of pagans [Omar: 1996] as Emperor Menelik said a century ago"*.

The disastrous political and security development that followed would attest to the consequences of the western's erroneous policies in the Horn.

1.4. The Military Take over of 1969

On October 15, 1969, the President of the Republic, Mr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, was assassinated in the town of Laas Laanood, while on a tour in the northern regions of the country. On October 21, 1969, after nine years of a multi-party system and parliamentary democratic experience, a military junta led by the armed forces commander Gen. Mohamed Siyad Barre took over power in what the coup makers termed as *"a bloodless revolution"*.

The new regime imported socialist ideologies, joined the Eastern Socialist bloc, accused the Western system of governance of all malice and promised social justice and rejuvenation of the ailing national economy. At the beginning, the public welcomed the change of government, irrespective of ideological leanings. Initial

leadership energy combined with popular enthusiasm led many observers and analysts to describe the first five years of Mohamed Siyad Barre's rule as a modest success. Assisted and advised by civilian ministers, the military had taken bold moves. These included creating jobs for the rural unemployed in public work crush programs, imposition of death sentence and abolition of the blood compensation traditional norm, and writing of the Somali script in 1972. Soon, however, it, too, lapsed into the usual clan politicking, though in a low profile fashion, when the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) changed itself into a socialist political party by the name: Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) in the year 1976. But disenchantment and the devastating clan factor in Somali politics became clearer when the socialist government lost two key elements: the Somalo- Ethiopian War over the Ogaden Region, and the main political, military and economic backing of the Soviet Union in 1977/78.

As the political and economic crisis deepened, armed opposition movements gradually sprung up, one after the other. Other than fighting for the liberation of the Somali territories under conquest, now the Somalis in the Republic turned guns against one another. With a yawning gap left by the Soviet Union support unfilled and coupled with a military defeat and Siyad Barre's determination to cling onto power, the final outcome could be predictable. In his bid to remain in power, the President relied more and more on his clan and coalition of clans that supported him, understandably, to counter other clan-based opposition movements fighting against him, i.e. the Majerteen driven Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Isaac-based Somali National Movement (SNM), and subsequently the Hawiye dominated United Somali Congress (USC). During the 1980's, the government endlessly armed and allied itself with particular clans and bitterly fought others in a last bid to stay in power longer. However, the end neared day after day and the tide became stronger and stronger.

1.5. The Demise of the Somali State – 1991

With assistance from Ethiopia, The opposition movements gradually weakened the power base of Siyad Barre's regime, once and again occupied some of the peripheral regions, outside the capital city. Finally, The USC, the most recent opposition political movement that represented the Hawiye clans, with the public support of other Somali clan families, ousted Siyad Barre from the capital, Mogadishu, while the SNM conquered northwest regions with out resistance in 1991. Many people believed that any incoming government would be better than Siyad Barre's authoritarian regime¹. Those who held that line of thought were proven wrong by the events that followed and the performance of those who inherited Siyad Barre's tattered mantle. Despite repeated calls for unity in purpose both by the Somalis and by the international community, the opposition movements could not agree on a common political platform. They were bitterly divided along clan lines. No one knows whether it was spontaneous action or a long-drawn-out-secretly hatched plan that the USC forces turned its guns against the Daarood clan family, whom they associated with the outgoing president. Massive "ethnic cleansing" operations got underway and, as a result, hundreds of thousands of Daarood people had to, in search of

¹ Siyad Barre once retorted: *" If I go, there will only be land and not people."* (Omar: 1996)

safety, flee to Jubba regions in deep south and to the north and, their ancestral lands where they came from centuries ago. As if this was not enough, the victorious USC supporters fought each other with catastrophic results from 1992 onwards.

Amid this, the Somali State ceased to exist. The collapse of the State was, therefore, total and unprecedented in recent history. Relatively well-developed security forces have melted away with the warring factions. Civil services, i.e. education, health, communications, and law enforcement bodies have evaporated. All public and private properties were looted or ransacked. Many believe that the Somali disastrous experience could be akin to Rwanda, Liberia, and Bosnia tragedies. The number of deaths and injuries sustained in the name of power was incalculable and staggering. Julian Ozanne, of the Financial Times, reports:

"...In the earlier days, the conflicts were for livestock or water or for grazing lands. But now the conflict is for power, it is a power struggle. When a clan leader fails to gain power through national consensus he involves his own clan, which blindly follows him" (Omar: 1996).

The clan infighting, though with less devastation, was not limited to USC but has become, in the absence of law and order, a familiar feature in the whole of the country. The country wide senseless violence fought in the South fueled the Great Famine of 1992, which killed hundreds of thousands of lives.

CHAPTER TWO: ROOTS OF SOMALI POLITICAL CONFLICTS

The research participants dwelt on analyzing the root causes of the Somali political conflicts. In identifying the causes that lie behind the present Somali political conflict, they focused the following areas: implications of the Western model of governance in the political practice of the Somalis, the role of poverty and ignorance played in the issue, the scope of external intervention and the capacity of the traditional institutions in substituting the western model.

2.1. Misconception about State

Participants have identified that the concepts of statehood and citizenship are relatively new phenomena to the average Somali. Given that the Somali people are predominantly nomadic pastoralists, they do certainly not entertain the virtues of state and have little respect for discipline. The nomad can visualize loyalty to his Diyah group or eventually to the clan he affiliates to, but not to any higher institution or grouping. He can understand obligations to the family and kin; however, he cannot perceive obligations to a state. In the urban settings, those who hold public offices, instead of discharging their responsibilities towards the public, they would strive enhancing their individual interest or the interest of their respective clans. Public servants and political leaders seldom keep public promises, despite developing beautiful legal documents, i.e. charters, constitutions, or other legal provisions, describing and depicting all the rights and duties of citizens. The documents are largely intended for external consumption. Political leaders believe that government ought to be authoritarian. Show of force must be a characteristic feature in dealing with the people. The belief is that Somalis reason only through sheer fear and subjugation. Sayid Maxamed Abdille Xasan was quoted saying: "*Car yaa Somali xukuma oo aan dilin*", meaning to rule the Somalis, one is compelled to kill them.

The participants in this research have argued that accountability and transparency in management of public funds is not an honored pledge or a priority in state policies. The unrestrained political ambition that politicians often demonstrate is geared towards unbridled theft of public money and possession of unearned fortunes. Besides, they often mix up business and politics. Public participation in the real political life and decision-making process is often restricted to a handful of individuals from a particular clan or coalition of clans, who ally in holding central power. Within the Majeerteen clan, the sub-clan of Mohamud Saleman had historically held the higher political positions and the system continues to prevail even after the collapse of Somalia State. Official and formally established consultative bodies are mere rubber stamps.

On the other hand, participants asserted that in electing a political representative, the Somali electorate often chooses the closest kin, irrespective of his credibility and integrity. They do this in the hope of getting reciprocal benefit such as employment through his connections when he assumes office. They are poised to take from state but are usually reluctant to pay to the treasury. For them, the state often means unwanted rules, regulations, restrictions, but most importantly, a source of fear and undue force. Somalis lobby

enhancing clan interest and individual gains. As a result, receptions in government offices, often, mean recommendations, extracting patronage, contract etc. Political maturity is low and "Politics" itself is popularly held as nothing but a mixture of empty talk and deceit.

Not exempt from criticism in their employment and financial resource management procedures. The international aid agencies have become a source of wealth as providers of social service, sources of employment, contracts, rent of private premises and vehicles, etc. Though underscoring the importance of the humanitarian assistance that the international aid agencies offers, workshop participants, nonetheless, accuse them of selectivity in their dealings within the host community.

2.2. Poverty and Ignorance

Workshop participants have unanimously agreed that poverty and ignorance are the underlying factors of social tension in Somalia. The two go hand in hand and both are pervasive, all crippling to the natural development process of the society. Poverty manifests itself in the form of scarcity and shortages of basic human needs. In their long and turbulent history, Somalis cut their throats simply because everything was in short supply. The nature and substance of their literary works, the poems, axioms and wisdoms bears this out. Nomads often condemned each other to survive in an unforgiving environment. At the state level, poverty weakens or works against the independence of the elector during election time, strengthens the principle that compels the elector to support the candidate from his clan or fight for him to stay in or gain power. Poverty is also a factor that promotes nepotism in the conduct of state affairs. Ignorance, in addition to facilitating the impact of poverty on the conduct of state, as mentioned above, also reveals in absence of citizenry civic education and lack of managerial skills of public institutions.

2.3 External Intervention

The Somali political arena is not free from external intervention. Participants regretted that the colonial occupation of the Somali peninsula had left behind the Somali people divided into five parts ruled by non-Somali Africans and Europeans; British, French, Italians, Ethiopians, and later on Kenyans. The legacy still influences and affects considerably the internal and external policies of Somalis in the Republic. Moreover, the participant said Somalia represented a permanent operation's theater for the Cold War or the rivalry between the West and East, and subsequently a testing ground for emergent mini powers in the region for influence. Regional organizations to which Somalia was a member state have also taken their share, since the collapse of Somalia, in mingling and perhaps fishing in the Somali crisis. These foreign mini powers have not only remotely controlled the Somali situation from outside, but have rather allied themselves with local actors often tipping off the internal political balance to impose their political strategy. Hence, constitute a major dimension and root cause of the local political conflicts.

Division of the Somali nation into five colonies has cost immeasurable price. Knowledgeable participants in the research pointed out that of major significance is the persistent Ethiopian interference in the local politics of Somalia, revealing in various forms at different times: on the one hand, Ethiopia, since independence, covertly or overtly, has played Somalis one against the other. For example, in the civilian governments, Ethiopia offered political and financial backing to one or the other of the competing political parties as well as armed dissent groups in Somalia to fight government such as the armed insurgents, known as *Koofiyad-dhuub*, which fought in the central regions in the 1960s. On the other hand, Ethiopia persistently offered refuge and supplied arms to the dissident groups from Somalia during the 1970s, '80s and 90s to topple the Military government of Somalia. The opposition movements of SSDF, SNM, and USC could never have effectively operated without the strong backing of the Ethiopia. The support of Ethiopia to the various opposition movements and groups or clans is surely not motivated by a philanthropic sentiment, but to make the Somali conflict perennial.

The Cold War has, in addition, taken its toll in Somalia. In the wake of the fierce race between the West and East for world supremacy, Somalia was a suffering victim. As Somalia lied in a strategic oil routes to western nations, each bloc fought to win Somalia to its side to utilize its territory as military bases or monitoring centers. In this strenuous race, the East-Western forces have repeatedly meddled in the Somali internal politics to have their way. Each bloc succeeded one time or the other. The West had driven the wheels of the Somali political machine during the post independence civilian governments of 1960-69, while the East had managed to takeover its control from 1969 till the end of the 1970s. In the latter period, the Western countries, who lost Somalia to the Eastern bloc, sustained combined efforts to reclaim Somalia to their sphere. The Somalo-Ethiopian War of 1977, emergence of numerous armed opposition movements to the then Somali military government and the subsequent collapse of the Somali State are good examples of the Cold War ramifications in Somalia.

With the fall of the Soviet Union and the dismantling of the Eastern bloc, the United States of America remained the sole superpower in the world. The US, with its western allies, formulated new policies termed "New World Order" meant to guide and regulate the world nations' behavior. This new approach reproduces in complex economic, cultural and political perspectives. These include such terms as "Globalization", "World policing" and "Peacemaking" and fighting terrorism. For the last 12 years of statelessness and under the sponsorship of the UN and International Agencies, who deployed 37,000 US and UN troops known as UNITAF could not bring peace to Somalia. Such new intellectual exercises such as bottom-up approach, right-oriented programs, change of traditional spouse roles, civil society empowerment, etc, have been and still being well coined slogans widely used by international actors.

The regional and international level competitions for influence are another constraint to the political reconciliation in Somalia, participants commented. As the Somalis tore their state to pieces and unfortunately

could not mend it again, they looked for assistance from a wide range of “sympathizers” to “salvage Somalia”. Despite the allegation, each interested party came to boost its agenda. They often organized reconciliation conferences, provided humanitarian assistance and some times arms to attain their objectives. The race proceeded to the determination of the type of institutional structure that Somalia should take if at all it (the state) were reconstructed. Some proposed a federal system of states, others supported secessionist ideals, while a third group advocated for a unitary, centralized system; each group, however, supported the version that served its end best further allying with Somali interest groups, which fervently promotes for the particular notion within the Somali and international circles.

However, the Somali conflict is by definition a Somali generated conflict and with Somali actors. All other actors (external) are tributary to the main flood course.

2.4. Incompatibility of Western Models of Governance with Traditional Norms of Governance

As described earlier, in this discussion in section 2.1, Democracy and the Western-imported secular political system and institutions of governance have not fully taken root into the perception and political life of the Somalis. In their reflection, the participants of this workshop affirmed that the Somali Constitution was a mere paperwork kept in offices, while the law enforcing bodies served either the ends of politicians in power, their respective clans or their individual gains. Political organizations and public associations that constitute the backbone of the democratic system were not better either. In Somalia in the brief 9-year post-independence democratic rule, the political parties were no effective national institutions, but rather a power house for politicians and their clientele. Neither were they principled secular political parties that had purposeful political programs, nor heterogeneous representations to reflect the ethnic composition of the country. In its lieu, there were a combination of incompatible secular party “ideologies” and traditional clan exclusiveness.

The clan based Political parties produced imported party structures and flamboyant, ambitious political programs to canvass votes in election, in contrast to the Western parties that build solid and realistic political programs, which they are committed to implement when they win power. The electorate of Western countries accounts those they elect to govern them for the commitments they have pledged during the election i.e. enforcement of promised programs. However, the Somali strange political vehicle firmly fuses the interest of those in power and that of their clans, some being more powerful than others, to pave way for establishment of a ruling coalition of the major clans. Participants have warned that when such party wins power and happens to be endowed with a strong leader from a major clan, the consequences could be, all the more, disastrous.

The workshop participants had further summarized that the Somali national political experiment resulted in a myriad of "clan parties" fighting for the central power, for regional or for district level supremacy. The devastation or disaster that the USC movement wreaked on the Somalia is a case in point.

2.3. Ineptitude of Traditional Institutions in Nation-State-Building

An overwhelming number of the workshop participants were convinced that the traditional political institution couldn't handle political issues or in other words is not appropriate in management of modern system of governance. This traditional system operated well in simple nomadic way of life in a rudimentary social context / stage, where few resources are shared.

First, the traditional leaders have no knowledge of nation state building; they simply manage the clans' political affairs and cannot match the educated political elite. Their vision is confined to representation of their respective clans, where they have to defend against or draw benefit to it, when deliberating common matters. The picture that emerged after the fall of the Somali state verifies this argument clearly. Due to the civil war, as the country disintegrated into pockets of clan territories the traditional leadership seized the direction of state affairs. This task covered both administrative and political spheres. However, the traditional leaders proved unequipped for such mission and could effectively not lead these entities. For instance, Somaliland has witnessed two large-scale inter-clan wars in 1992 and 1994-5 respectively. In other regions of Somalia (south) the traditional leadership could not install or maintain local administrations, and as a consequence the anarchy engulfs these areas. Puntland, the last to hold, fell into political crisis in mid 2001 with its renowned traditional leaders, who often boasted of surviving their regions out of inter-clan conflict, attested their ineffectiveness in the face of the constitutional crisis. Each entity relapsed to the pre-colonial situation. Lewis finds Somalia, after the collapse of the state, as below:

"The political geography of the Somali hinterland in 1992...closely resembled that reported by European explorers in the 19th century...the clan areas could only be entered or traversed by outsiders, i.e. people of other clans and foreigners, with the consent of the locals and, usually, the payment of appropriate fees for 'protection'" (Lewis: 1981, 1993).

Second, the participants had indicated that the legal system of the traditional institution (Xeer) could not help either. Even though the Somali boast of a high quality indigenous legal system, it proved ineffective in managing diverse public dealings and resolution of modern political intricacies. However, while Xeer failed in the urban settings and modern systems of governance, yet, in the rural areas, it continues to play, to an extent, a positive role in the general maintenance of peace and stability and resolving traditional conflicts.

CHAPTER THREE: POLITICAL CONFLICT IN PUNTLAND

Having explored the primary causes of the political conflict that have led to the downfall of the Somali State, it is important to look into the performance of the multiple ensuing clan political entities that inherited the State. These include such entities that named themselves as Somaliland, Puntland, Rahanwey Resistance Army as well as Warlords enclaves in many parts of southern Somalia. The fundamental issue in focus is whether the new bodies have managed to conduct good governance and resolution of inter-related political conflicts to prove that the national Somali state was the villain actor in the scene as many argued. This research takes events in Puntland, The most stable of the above-named clan based entities, as a case study.

3.1. Al-Itihad vs. SSDF, June 1992

The workshop participants observed that the twenty-one year old myriad of General Mohamed Siyad Barre regime that ruled Somalia had bred a myriad of opposition insurgent groups, expressing their feelings in different forms. Some opposition movements like SSDF, SNM and USC did this by resorting to the gun, while others like Al-Itihad Al-Islami built in ideological postures to fight the regime. Al-Itihad Al-Islami is an off-shoot of Wahabiyah sect that operated in the country since the Seventies and carried a puritan Islamic perspective, advocating for strict implementation of Islamic principles that guide humankind to a civilized moralistic way of life. However, its political and military weight did not materialize until the collapse of the Somali State in Jan 1991. Informed participants noted that, in a hasty move and oblivious of Al-Itihad's motives while under the euphoria of the collapse of the Somali State, the elders of the Bosaso Community, who mostly were businessmen, authorized, in February 1991, a small group of religious individuals to manage the Bosaso Seaport and administer the security of the town. It so happened that the group was a contingent of Al-Itihad. Some argue that the prime movers of the initiative were literally covert members of Al-Itihad, who had a private agenda; though all agree that the elders were innocent and unaware of the scheme and the consequence of their decision.

The small religious group, effectively securing management of the port and town policing, immediately went into action, making use of the Port funds. Soon they networked with their ideological colleagues in different parts of the country and within few months armed Al Itihad contingents arrived from Dhoobley, a small village on the borderline between Lower Jubba and Kenya. Others came from Mogadishu, Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and to a smaller extent from Burao. In the turn of the year, the Al Itihad built a strong base, with a military wing, establishing its own military training centers in the three regions of the Northeast (Bari, Nugaal and North Mudug), and challenging the weak political authority in the region- the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).

As confrontation developed between the SSDF and Al Itihad group, the leadership of the SSDF in conjunction with the traditional leaders of the Northeast fervently tried to create understanding and collaboration with Al Itihad peacefully. This was so because the resources of the region were fully devoted to defense against the USC attacks at Galkayo front and could not divide into two fronts. Mediations and negotiation efforts continued for six months but produced no result. The traditional institutions became unable to bring a solution to the dispute, while each of the opposing sides stuck to its ground, propounding that two administrations cannot operate side by side in one locality; hence one of them should go.

Finally, the strong Al Itihad organization, intolerant of the raging political tug of war with the SSDF coupled with its sympathetic traditional institutions, decided to strike first, especially after learning that the entire SSDF leadership gathered in Garowe where some influential members (Abdullahi Yussuf, Mohamed Abshir and company) might be planning to attack the Al Itihad. Unexpectedly, on 19 June 1992, Al Itihad organization seized power from the SSDF. At the initial stages of the attempt, Al Itihad takeover was partially successful as it managed to detain the SSDF top leadership in custody and occupied two of the three regional towns, i.e. Bari and Nugaal. Despite this, the Northeast public, seeing the Al-Itihad seizure of power as a sabotage act and backing to the enemy, USC, reacted fiercely to the Al Itihad challenge and brutally crushed the uprising within a short time.

From the Al Itihad- SSDF confrontation two conclusions can be inferred. One, that the traditional institution of *Isimo* failed to work out the political conflict and hence, tradition (traditional leaders and their customary law) can resolve simple traditional pastoral conflicts but is incapable of affecting on intricate modern political complexities. The Somali culture adopts either win or lose logic in political confrontations, though, surprisingly, in non-political matters, they demonstrate highly developed mediation and compromising skills and positive attitudes.

3.2. The Mudug Peace Agreement of June 1993

The USC/SNA headed by Gen. Aidiid had several times attacked Galkayo from February 1991 to early 1993 with the aim of consolidating its power over south of Somalia, and with the view that if it overran the Northeast regions, USC political dominance would be complete. Nevertheless, participants confirmed that the Galkayo fighting proved the contrary. Gen. Aidiid had repeatedly failed in his campaign to occupy Galkayo or the Northeast, and this failure led him to abandon the scheme in mid 1993, as his forces had been defeated in several occasions. It was clear that neither side could win a permanent victory over the other. While the political impasse persisted, the lucrative trade opportunity prevailing in the region attracted both sides together and eventually made the people of Mudug end the fighting. Consequently, sole economic interest did not brought the two sides together in June 1993 to conclude a peace agreement in Mogadishu, but Aidiid had more growing political and military problems with Ali Mahdi in Mogadishu and as a consequence wanted to close the

Mudug file. However, while the agreement remains effective, to the present time, ten years after, the two sides of Mudug inhabitants defiantly are, still, incapable of developing a political deal, least be it a common regional administration. This again demonstrates that the Somali traditional institutions are prone to reconcile on traditional matters but are unequipped to manage political issues.

3.3. The Gardho SSDF Congress of June 1994

In the Northeast Regions, after the elimination of the Al Itihad threat, a full-fledged internal rivalry for leadership matured within the SSDF in late 1992. The two main actors in the SSDF leadership, Gen. Mohamed Abshir and Col Abdullahi Yussuf, covertly competed for the chairmanship of the organization, Gen. Abshir being the incumbent. The participants have referred that Col Abdullahi Yusuf promoted an early convention of SSDF Congress, while Gen. Abshir thought it inappropriate at the time. In the wake of intense politicking, the matter finally reached the traditional leaders-Isimo, who acted as a de facto arbitration council. Listening to the statements of both sides, the elders swayed to the view of holding a Congress, which they decided to take place at Gardho in June 1994. The elders set up a preparatory committee for the purpose, which they selected on neutrality basis. It was also agreed that delegates would come from the three regions of the Northeast, the Diaspora and the SSDF Central Committee while the traditional leaders would participate in the congress as observers.

Instantaneously each of the two contenders (Abshir and Abdullahi) vied to bring in his supporters as delegates to win the congress. As the congress opened at Gardho, a dispute over delegates emerged; each of the two wings of the SSDF submitted a list of delegates from the three respective regions claiming legitimacy. The case became complicated and the preparatory committee could not take a clear position on the issue. Instead, it took the matter to the observing traditional leaders, who posed as a high court. The elders could not strike a deal in the political confrontation and, as usual, opened a hearing jury of their own, where each faction maintained legitimacy of its list. The matter dragged on for two months and finally the elders, confused, to find a way out, opted to call off the congress and nominate a third person, Mr. Abdirizak H. Hussein, one time Prime Minister of Somalia. The nominee, who lives in U.S.A., would act as interim chairman of the SSDF for three months, after which time, he would organize a congress, where each of the contending leaders could compete.

Gen. Abshir accepted the elders' proposal, however, but Col Abdullahi Yussuf, who thought he was leading in the contest, rejected the proposal of the elders and unilaterally held a congress in his residence in Gardho with his supporters, soon proclaiming the chairmanship of SSDF. The elders' nominee, Mr. Abdirizak, who arrived from U.S.A., could not convince Abdullahi either. Mr. Abdirizak eventually withdrew from the chairmanship when he sensed the danger of the situation and went back to his exile home, while Gen. Abshir reclaimed his title. In this pattern, the political situation returned to its original state of two SSDF factions competing for

leadership. Here, again, the traditional institution proved incapable of working out a political consensus between the competing SSDF factions.

3.4. Failure of Somalia Reconciliation Conferences and Birth of Puntland Administration in 1998

In 1998, despite more than a dozen reconciliation conferences, restitution of a Somali state was still far. Among these were Sodere Reconciliation Conference of 1996 in Ethiopia and the Cairo Conference of 1998. The psychological impact of these repeated failed national reconciliation conferences, the indispensability to set up government institutions to help strengthen the fragile peace in the Northeast regions, and the disenchantment of the UN weak interventions together inspired the need to get a changed political environment in the Northeast and other Harti regions. After eight years of practically having no effective local administration in the Northeastern regions, the Harti clans and communities (Bari, Eastern Sanaag, Sool and Buhoodle District, Nugaal, and North Mudug) had, finally, come together, in mid-1998, to form an autonomous regional state, named Puntland. The aim was to set up functioning local governance till the restoration of the Somali state. Participants recalled that the process was based on inter-clan deliberations and largely on traditional leaders' initiative. The Grand Community Conference had, among other things, put in place a provisional Charter aimed at guiding the activities of the Puntland administration, establishing the organs of government, i.e. the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary branches, modeled along the Western democratic systems. The conference also chose Abdullahi Yusuf as head of the administration and gave him a three-year-mandate to manage the administration policies and oversee implementation of the adopted program.

3.5. The Puntland Constitutional Crisis and Inaptitude of the Traditional Leaders in Averting Military Confrontation

The three-year term of the first Puntland government expired on 30 June 2001. Within such mandated period, the administration had to accomplish the tasks of preparing a constitution, conducting a population census and holding a Puntland-wide referendum on the constitution for approval. The Charter wrote, also, that should the administration be unable to fulfill those tasks, it shall automatically cease to exist when its term ends. the Chief Justice would assume an interim administration for 30 days in which he would call another grand-clan conference to deliberate on the future course of action.

The participants in the workshop commented that, though the administration had tried its best to meet these deadlines, the administration drafted a new constitution, it could not; however, finalize the necessary process within the timeframe. At the end of the expiry of its term, in June 2001, the administration summoned a meeting of the traditional leaders, presented its achievements and blamed, among other things, scarcity of financial resources and shortage of time for lack of implementation of the unattained part of the adopted

program, such as the population census and holding a referendum on the Draft Constitution. In the mean time, the administration requested a three-year extension term to accomplish the remaining set goals. The opposition, on its part, insisted on implementation of the Charter's covenants, which plainly spells out summoning an all-clan conference lest the administration fails to fulfill the set program for whatever reason. The administration brought the time extension formula to the House of the Representatives that approved the request. As the administration and the opposition could not agree on common ground, the confrontation intensified.

Apart from the usual inter-clan rivalry for political power ascendancy, the workshop participants have asserted that two other elements added significant dimensions to the Puntland crisis: these were a) a political struggle between two popular focal religious sects and b) proliferation of traditional leaders. In Somalia, there are two major denominations of religious sects: the Qaadiriyah, who are followers of an Iraqi spiritual leader named Abdulqadir Al-Jeylani or Al-Keylani and the Wahabiyah, otherwise known in Somalia as Al Ittihad or Ikhwan, who are adherents of Sheikh Mohamed Abdel-wahab of Al-Hijaz, present Saudi Arabia. The first group enjoys a large community support and characterizes with *Xer* (traditional religious congregation) among nomadic pastoralists and settled communities in almost all Somalia regions. The second sect is relatively recent and mainly of younger generations, more educated and linked with the expanding Islamic revivalist global movement. In addition to dealing with religious dissemination and community problems, they are more organized and politicized than the Qaadiriyah followers (Lewis).

The two sects differ on practicing of religious precepts. Whereas the former thrives to preserve, *"mixed system of religion and local culture"*, the latter drives, *"to apply strict interpretation of Islam without combining it with non-Islamic tradition and culture"* (WSP International: 2001:191). On the whole, while the core dispute between the two sects occasionally flares up in open confrontation, nonetheless, their deep-seated ideological difference is often played out on the political front. The president of the administration of Puntland, Mr. Abdullahi Yussuf, had established ties with the traditional Qaadiriyah sect., which many believe are politically harmless and more tolerant to the secular trend. However, he has negative attitude toward the *Ikhwan* or Al Ittihad in view to their bloody attempt to control the region in June 1992. Due to the above, in the Puntland political crisis of 2001, the Qaadiriyah eventually supported the Puntland administration leadership, while the Al Ittihad are said to have supported Jama Ali Jama, the leader of the opposition.

The traditional leadership throughout Somalia has undergone dramatic changes since the colonial times. The participants concurred that anointment of new titled traditional leaders (i.e. Sultan, Ugaas, Garaad, etc) speeded up emergence of new leaders in disproportionate numbers. For instance, several branches of a lineage or sub-clan that had one titled elder may now form one or two new leaders of their own when they see their number grow full-size. While workshop participants admitted that the nature of the Somali clan political system helps contribute to multiplication of the traditional titled elders; however, they added that some were

merely created by politicians, perhaps, to get the support of a sub-clan or lineage, sometimes at the expense of an already existing one, who is against a particular politician.

Nevertheless, the participants strongly affirmed that the crux of the problem is about justice in resource sharing. They explained that, although Somalis themselves like fairness done to them, they seldom do it themselves. It is not because they are inherently bad but because the clan system is setup in such a way that divides people into a relative "*sokeeye*" and a remote "*shisheeye*". "*The number of generations counted apart...provides a ready-reckoner of closeness or remoteness in people's (Somali) relations to each other*" (Lewis: 1981, 1993).

This attitude is pervasive and not only affects the social relations between individuals and clans but also impacts on the state level in the allocation of jobs, projects, and other economic benefits. In order not to be left out, every group must have its own traditional leader to participate in the theater where the common resources are distributed as they say: "*Dheri ninka u dhow baa cadka kala baxa*", meaning *food is served first to those who are around the cooking pot*. The multiplication of the clan leaders is, perhaps, an indirect challenge to those who are in the political stage as well as the senior traditional leaders themselves, who are not behaving fairly towards their subjects. This phenomenon is also one of the obstacles that hamper the restoration of a viable modern system of governance at the national level.

Workshop participants have unanimously blamed the traditional leaders on the Puntland political crisis for their failure to play their role as neutral mediators between the opposing groups. In Puntland, many people think that the traditional leaders, as a body or an institution capable of resolving and adjudicating the inter-clan conflicts, should also resolve conflicts concerning political disputes. However, those who entertained such a view were utterly disappointed, as titled leaders, instead, split into two, each group aligning with one of the two political rival camps. Participants have accused the traditional titled elders of being guilty of meddling in politics, and therefore not being fair in deliberating on the circumstances. Of the two groups of traditional elders, the numerically larger one supported the extension of the Government's mandate to give it time to finish the required tasks, while, a smaller group mostly of senior traditional leaders opposed the time extension formula.

Those traditional leaders, who favored change of administration managed to win a temporary victory when they forced the administration of Abdullahi Yussuf out from the two main regions of Nugaal, where the capital was located, and Bari that generates most of the government revenue. They organized a hasty conference at Garowe, electing a new head of administration, Mr. Jama Ali Jama in November 2001. However, the problem was far from over. The replaced administration made Galkayo its temporary headquarters and accused the incoming administration of not being indigenous but installed with the support of the Transitional National Government (TNG) in Mogadishu, and Al-Itihad. Six days after the inauguration of the new head of

administration, on November 21, 2001, Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed took over Garowe, the capital, forcing Jama Ali Jama to flee to Bossaso. Some would argue that assistance in logistics from neighboring Ethiopia had enabled Abdullahi to regain control of the capital.

The opposition camp re-grouped in Bosaso, the main port city in Puntland. Obviously, the region was heading to hitherto unseen troubles. It had two rival administrations. The workshop participants stated that this was bad omen as the international aid agencies in the region temporarily withdraw, import-export trade and inland exchange of goods, vital to people's livelihoods, slowed down as the overall security situation in the region deteriorated.

3.6 Puntland Peace Mission (PPM)

To avert the situation from further deterioration, Diakonia, a Swedish NGO operating in the area to conduct humanitarian programs in Puntland, had volunteered to play a role in funding a peace proposal geared towards achieving peaceful reconciliation of the conflict. With the manifest backing of other international organizations, Diakonia-Nairobi Office prepared a project proposal named: "Peace, Reconciliation and Conflict Prevention in Puntland". The project enlisted funding and support of the international community.

As stated in the project document, *"the overall objectives of the project for Peace, Reconciliation & Conflict Prevention in Puntland are to contribute towards the development of the culture of peace and conflict resolution"*. With the supervision and coordination of Diakonia, the project enrolled a number of other civil society organizations such as Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) for its implementation, and Puntland Peace Mission (PPM), who came from within Puntland and from the Diaspora. The PPM members met separately with the two contending "presidents" in Bosaso and in Garowe. They also met with the traditional leaders of both camps to try to arrange a conference to save the traditional institution from redundancy. The Peace Mission team held also, in the course of their activities, workshops and seminars, produced communiqués and made speeches to raise the awareness of the populace vis-à-vis the impending danger.

The workshop participants observed that the efforts and energies of Puntland Peace Mission (PPM) had greatly reduced the tension and produced tangible results. However, it could not ultimately avert war because the two parties refused to sit and talk to each other. Each party stuck to its position of claiming legitimacy, and rejected any compromise proposed by the PPM. The Ethiopian Government summoned the two leaders to Addis Ababa for reconciliation, but with no avail.

3.8. The Military Option

Though it cannot be fully explained, the militarily weaker side of Jama Ali Jama provoked the fighting, on May 4th, 2002, when the chief commander of Jama's militia advanced to Garowe with a small contingent of militia intending to attack Abdullahi's forces in Garowe. The residents of Garowe felt imminent danger that their town would soon turn itself into another "Mogadishu". Anxious of this dreadful eventuality, they delivered an ultimatum to the parties in conflict to immediately take their armed militias outside the town within twenty-four hours. The two confronting sides complied with the demand because each was keen to win the Nugaal community support to its side. The following three days, with little resistance, Mr. Abdullahi Yusuf at the head of a much larger force, drove away the militia of Jama and recaptured Bosaso town reclaiming political power. Jama Ali Jama (and some of his supporters) fled to Djibouti. Local observers insisted that Mr. Abdullahi Yussuf was not so much popular before capturing Bosaso; however, the weak performance of Mr. Jama Ali Jama during his 9-month administration in Bari region had shored up the popularity of Abdullahi Yussuf and facilitated his smooth return to power.

When Jama Ali Jama left Puntland, General Mohamud Musse Hersi ('Adde) has taken over the military and political leadership of the opposition, and has reorganized the remnant of the militia at Elafweyn district of western Sanaag region. Despite Abdullahi's quick military victory, the political problem that aroused the crisis in the first place did not end. Two more military confrontations had taken place, which ultimately led to the signing of a peace agreement.

The workshop participants had further listed a number of factors or ingredients that fuel the conflicts; among others they mentioned the following:

- Unequal distribution and utilization of public resources
 - Misappropriation of public funds, favoritism, nepotism, tribalism and regionalism and politicization of clan elders
 - Use of undemocratic methods in making decisions on public issues and formulation of policies that antagonize most of the stake holders (repressive security measures, unwarranted arrest of opposition groups, harassment by militia and police and government, menacing weaker sections of the population)
 - Competition of political leaders on clan lines to ascend power and privileges
 - Corruption in the justice and law enforcement organs, that makes the system inefficient and partial.
 - Proliferation of small automatic arms and uncontrolled use of these arms
 - Proliferation of armed groups and chaotic clan militias
 - Antagonistic religious congregations or sects that divide people on sect lines
 - Lack of access to adequate social services and pervasive poverty
-

3.9 Peace and Reconciliation Process in Puntland

Since August 2001, Puntland has been facing political and constitutional that several military confrontation between the two opposing camps headed by Abdullahi Yusuf and Jama Ali Jama and lately general Mohamud Musse (Adde). The crisis lasted more than 22 months, resulting in casualty of over hundred dead and many wounded. The Puntland Peace Mission (PPM) tried a peace mission initiative to mediate between the two faction did not succeed to stop the fighting, but paved the way to the present conflict resolution process, accepted by the parties and by the civil society in general. The Puntland Peace Mission initiative, conducted by PDRC and 29 volunteers during the months of March 2002 through August 2002, had encouraged the civil society to stand up against civil conflict to happen and to challenge the warring factions.

4.1 Role of Civil Society in Peace building and Conflict Resolution.

a. Addressing directly the main issue through participation and dialogue

In all towns and pastoral settlements, the population welcomed the peace process and contributed to its success by encouraging the parties in conflict to resolve their political differences in peaceful ways. Opening a dialogue on peace building and conflict resolution has become the civil society's guiding beacon. Given the disastrous consequence of Somalia's civil war, the civil society repudiates any form of political and military violence, even if the political leaderships opt for military solution of the conflict.

b. Contributing financially to peace building and conflict resolution.

It is interesting to note that many people have contributed financially to peace building and conflict resolution in Puntland, though in times of military confrontation some men and women contributed financially to the party they favored. In such circumstances, clan politics takes the leading role in war mobilization process. The irony is that sons or close relatives of these war financiers perish in the fighting without any return of benefit.

c. Mobilizing and organizing forums on Peace and Reconciliation.

PDRC has been organizing workshops and forums for discussing on peace and governance and legal systems for civil society since 2000. The result of these processes has been positive, in that now people are aware of the consequences of political violence.

d. Directly challenging the political leadership to abide by the constitution and principles of democracy and participation

The civil society is beginning to know and understand their political, social and human rights. Organizations of civil liberty and human right promotion are sprouting out in many towns. They might organizationally be weak and unarticulated, but their existence and advocacy at local level seems to be

making a positive beginning towards democracy. The constitution and the laws made by Puntland administration had never been implemented or observed. Thus the people do not generally rely on legal institutions, rather resort to customary law to resolve their disputes. It is a commonplace that people criticize the government for violating the law and mismanage the public resources. Therefore, the proliferation and functioning of the civil society organizations, though very weak and at embryonic stage, are important indicators towards future participation in a pluralistic democratic system of governance.

One of the legacies of the civil war is the changing role of women as not only house wives, but also as bread winners for the family. Single mothers, destitute groups and minority clans suffer more than other groups in times of war and anarchy. They are more amenable to advocate for peace and reconciliation.

5.1 The Bosaso Peace Conference- May 2003

As mentioned in the preceding sections, the Puntland political crisis lasted more than 20 months before resolving the conflict at the Peace Conference held in Bosaso during April and May 2003 under the mediation of two prominent traditional leaders: Boqor Osman Aw Mohamoud from Elafaweyn town (Western Sanaag region) and Sultan Saeed Sultan Abdisalam of Eastern Sanaag region. The two leaders belong to Habar Jeclo (Issac) and Warsangeli (Harti) clans respectively, while the contending political leaders belong to Majeerteen clan. It is interesting to note that all Majeerteen traditional leaders failed to bring together Abdullahi Yusuf and Jama Ali Jama or General Adde and Abdullahi Yusuf. The Majeerteen leaders were divided into various interest groups and sub-clan lines that allied either to Abdullahi Yusuf or to his opponents. The need for conflict resolution was overshadowed by individualistic and sub-clan interest. Both Abdullahi Yusuf and General Mohamoud Musse Hersi (Adde), being tired of the prolonged conflict and the consequent disastrous military operations, had no option left, but to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict. It is curious to note that they sought assistance from two traditional leaders who had never been involved in the chaotic Majeerteen politics. Surprisingly their mediation efforts have been accepted by all Harti clans in Puntland. They (the two Isim) contacted many traditional leaders in the area and got their approval. Finally they succeeded to hold a general peace conference in Bosaso at which a peace agreement was signed between Abdullahi Yusuf (Puntland President) and Mohamoud Musse Hersi (Leader of Puntland Salvation Council)) on May 15, 2003. Over one thousand local people, dignitaries from other regions such as Hilowele Imaan, the son of a distinguished Somali traditional leader from Mogadishu, Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail, prominent member of SRRRC political alliance and former diplomat and delegation headed by Mr. Max Gaylard, UNDP Rep &HC of Somalia were present to witness the signing of the peace agreement.

This historical peace agreement is written in a very simple form without legal sophistication as it was formulated by traditional leaders and not by jurists and lawyers. The agreement, translated to English, is here below:

“THE PEACE MEDIATION OF SANAAAG ELDERS”

The Peace agreement as formulated by the two mediating traditional leaders is below:

“Whilst referring to the two letters of mediation acceptance and the trust that Puntland President Honorable Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and the Chairman of Puntland Salvation Council, Honorable General Mohamoud Musse Hersi (Adde).

Having studied the present problem and the political conflict in Puntland Regional Administration, and the necessity of seeking Puntland unity

We resolved

That today May 15, 2003 the Puntland Salvation Council receives the following share in the administration of Puntland:

A) Council of Ministers	3 members (ministers)
Vice Ministers	2
General Directors	2
Director of Departments	3

B) Armed Forces

- To have one of the commanders (Police or Para-military)
- To have one of the commanders of the forces guarding the Seaport and Airport
- To integrate the military officers of PSC into the three branches of the security forces
- To nationalize the PSC militia except those who are:
 - a) Ill
 - b) Having no gun
 - c) Physically unable
 - d) Not belonging to political organization

C) Regional Administrations:

- To have 2 regional governors

D) District Administration

- To have 2 district commissioners in the Bari region

E) To appoint the Supreme Judge (chief magistrate) from Bari region

F) To provide reasonable compensation to Puntland Salvation Council

G) To assure functioning democratic governance, the district administration should have autonomy in managing district affairs and must come in election.

H) To create a reconciliation committee to heal the social wounds and brotherhood and unity of the people of Puntland.

I) From the Puntland delegation members at Somalia Reconciliation Conference three members must be given to PSC.

J) As the conflict of the Puntland is closed, effective from today, the 15th of May 2003, the Puntland Salvation Council is hereby terminated and it is integrated into Puntland Regional administration.

K. The potential appointees from PSC must have proper qualification for the posts they will occupy.

L) This agreement enters into force when the two parties sign it, which is today, the 15th of May 2003-

President of Puntland Government

Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed

(Signature and official Seal)

Chairman of PS Council

Gen. Mohamoud Musse Hersi (Adde)

(Signature)

Witness

Boqor Osman Aw Mohamoud

(Signature and Official Seal)

Witness

Sultan Saeed Sultan Abdisalam

(Signature and Official Seal)

6.1 Conclusion.

This research illustrates that the central problem of the Somali political tradition derives from an absence of statehood concept, poverty and ignorance, external intervention, incompatibility of imposed western systems of governance, and ineptitude of the traditional organizational structures to direct a modern state system. Thus, the question that naturally rises up is, if both the western system of governance and the customary governance have failed in Somalia to sustain a democratic state, then what is the way out/solution? This is the most controversial question that awaits every Somali to answer at this historical, difficult time. Another identification/ outcome of this discussion is the fact that Somalis have no political culture of consensus or a win-win political settlement but rather believe in all-out military solution attitude of either win or lose to solve their political differences. The nearly 13-year old experience of the Somali crisis clearly demonstrates this; these include the political infightings between the camps of Ali Mahdi v Aidiid of Hawiye clan family, Egal versus Abdurahman Tuur of Issac, Shatigudud versus Habsade and Sh. Adan Madobe of Rahanwein, and lastly Abdullahi Yussuf versus Jama Ali Jama and Adde Muse of the Harti clan in Puntland. This analysis, nevertheless, does not struck on the most accurate answer to the Somali political impasse. However, it presents the issues to the open for debate. In this context, observers of Somalia's political crisis propose a number of prescriptions that range between federalism and centralism. Perhaps, the paper "Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia"² reflects the major competing views on the future structure and constitution of a Somali State.

It is sure that the majority of Somalis, irrespective of clan, detests recreation of a centralized system of government. However, it seems that the forces behind the alternative options suggested are not genuine. First, the solutions proposed are not indigenous but are externally promoted ideals that are again part and parcel of the western system of governance that failed to function in the Somali context as discussed in Chapter Two of this study. Secondly, the fact that some regional and international actors are vehemently pushing one alternative or the other creates the suspicion that the proposals are not without vested interests and some regional and international forces aim to form weak mini Somali states that cannot defend themselves and open to manipulation by external interests. The other extreme is to establish a highly centralized, rigid and monopolistic system centrifugally manipulated by a few. Thirdly, each Somali camp that supports one or the other of the proposed options depicts an image/picture of clan identity, which demonstrates of protection of, or advancement of particular clan interest. For example, Secessionists constitute the most part of Issac clan, which claims to be running away of a perceived "Southern Somali Clans" domination", but at the same time are a dominant group within the Somaliland political landscape.

² The International Crisis Group (ICG), 6 March 2003, p. 5-7

On the other hand, Hawiye clans are advocating for a centralized state for the sole purpose of, having the state capital in their territory that enables them to exert more political influence and assuming to win the future power of a reconstituted Somali state, installing an authoritarian rule once they get a hold to central power, as well as consolidating possession of the most southern fertile territories of the country, which they have seized by force³. Contrary to this expansionist policy, the majority of the Daarood and Digil and Mirifle clans adopt a protectionist posture of federalism to foil authoritarian rule of other clan families.

Thus, the various political options to the structure and constitution of a future Somali state that different Somali political groups endorse have no realistic foundation, because each option is advocated by clan or alliance of clans that promote a political motivation of clan dominance, which constituted the central spite of the previous Somali State. Regardless of the above, from another perspective, each of the three options sought - centralized system, federal system and secession of Somaliland- holds its weaknesses and strengths that are extensively explained in literature elsewhere and does not need repetition at this time (see Menu of Options, Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, etc).

The participants in this research had loudly said that for Somalia the centralized system is not politically feasible because it is a variant that has already been tested, and has proved to be the source the Somalia 's catastrophe, while, on the other hand, some Somalia watchers hold that the federal and secession options are also not economically and technically realistic. Many believe that the different Somali contending groups do recognize the above-mentioned shortcomings of each option but is, nevertheless, adamant to its position due to fear and mistrust. Hence, the rationale is that a way of treating this should be sought before getting on to selecting a most appropriate option to a future structure and constitution of a Somali State.

The Mbigathi process may beget, as hoped, a comprise formula that perhaps would attract the majority of the Somali people. The critical question is not only to share power, based on clan, but to structure a form of government that can suite to the Somali political and traditional environment. If Mbigathi fails to capture the root causes of the conflict (monopoly of power by a centralized system), then the cliché might not produce the desired outcome.

³ The Habar Gidir (a Hawiye sub-clan) exclusively builds on the latter strategy
