


# XHCP

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*(An Affiliated Local Organization to War-torn Societies Project International)*

## **DRAFT**

### **REPORT ON DEMOBILIZATION AND RE- INTEGRATION WORKSHOP**

**HELD IN GAROWE:  
21 – 22 APRIL 2001**

**FUNDED BY:  
SOMALIA CIVIL PROTECTION PROGRAM (UNDP)**

**IMPLEMENTED BY:  
PUNTLAND DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTER  
(PDRC)**

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## 1. Introduction

The Proliferation of militia and armed groups in Puntland/Somalia is the legacy of a long-term deterioration of the Somali Society. It is associated with the gradual degradation of the cultural and social values of the Society at large. Both the colonial and the post-colonial Somali governments have contributed to these deteriorations of the attitudes and cultural value. This has resulted in the proliferation of weapons which are recognized as the basis for the emergence of today's militia and armed groups.

However, the Issue of clan militia and armed groups has reached a threshold when the Military Government of Said Barre was overthrown in January 1991. As a consequence, weapons of the Somali State have fallen into the hands of different clan militia. For almost a decade of anarchy and tribal hostilities, clans believed that the militia and armed groups were safeguarding their security and defending their interests. Other clan members believe, militia as unwanted groups responsible for the problems and crimes the Somali society is facing.

Most Somalis agree that, Since the International Community intervened into Somalia in late Dec. 1992, the ever increasing militia and armed groups became the major obstacle obstacle that hindered quest for peace and stability. However, many viewed militia and armed groups as an irreplaceable human resource of the country. Therefore, relief and rehabilitation programmes should focus on these groups. However, the unplanned and unco-ordinated attempts of demobilization and disarmament of the militia and the armed groups in different parts of Somalia have met with limited success.

The population of Puntland State of Somalia shares with the rest of the country the plight of criminalities and delinquencies that are associated with clan militia and armed groups. To overcome this problem, which hinders the social, economic and political renovations of the region, the Puntland Community, established Puntland State of Somalia.

To achieve a secure environment, the government of Puntland considers demobilization and social re-integration of militia and armed groups as one the first priorities in its policy. For this purpose, the government has established the Directorate of De-mining, Demobilization and Re-integration, specially mandated to deal with the social integration of the militia and the armed groups. In this context, the Directorate of DD&R and UNDP/SCPP approached Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) to organize and conduct research work on the issue and to set a forum of discussion among all stakeholders. This entailed gathering all ideas and available information on the past and present status of the militia and armed groups as well as to make recommendations for the way ahead towards the society's harmony. PDRC designed a workshop in this regard, in a participatory approach and applied already practised WSP Participatory Action Research (PAR) to collect first hand information and views of the different community groups. In regards to this, PDRC recruited a consultant and two resource persons to conduct a two-day workshop, which was attended by 40 participants from different community groups (elders, traditional leaders, religious leaders, local authorities, militia members, ex-combatants etc). The workshop was held at Garowe on 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 2001. A discussion paper on

Demobilization & Re-integration with guiding questions was available to participants (see annex I). The main topics that workshop participants deliberated upon were:

- Root causes for the emergence of militia and armed groups
- Definitions of militia and armed groups
- The impact of the Puntland State's formation on demobilization and re-integration of militia and armed groups
- Possible opportunities and challenges for demobilization and re-integration
  
- The different roles of the concerned parties on demobilization and re-integration.

This report incorporates the outcome of the workshop and the views of the participants, as well as the data and information that has been collected by the researcher and the resource persons

### *Structure of the Report*

This report comprises an introductory background, research objectives and methodology, the root causes of the existence of militia and armed groups. A section leads us to understand the current status of the militia and armed groups in Puntland, introduces the reader to the lessons learned from past interventions on demobilization and reintegration by the local and international communities. The last section introduces us to the possible opportunities/strategies of demobilization and reintegration and the different roles of concerned actors, and the critical challenges to be faced in the Puntland State of Somalia.

## **2. Research Objectives and Methodology**

### **2.1 Research Objectives**

- To organise a forum for dialogue and information sharing among the actors interested in demobilization and re-integration of militia and the armed groups
- To collect relevant data and information on the evolutionary process of the militia and armed groups
- To identify and recommend socially acceptable and environmentally sound opportunities and prospective on demobilization and re-integration of the militia and armed groups of Puntland State of Somalia.
- To Study the roles of the various interested actors on the implementation of demobilization and re-integration of militia and armed groups.

## **2.2 Research Methodology**

The methodology adopted in the research was a participatory driven process, where concerned actors had adequate opportunities to freely discuss, raise questions and provide answers on demobilization and re-integration issues that could practically affect their lives and the strategic interests of the population of Puntland State of Somalia.

Within the scope of this research, the following were the main activities carried out:

### *a) Formation of the Research Team*

PDRC recruited a researcher and two resource persons to conduct the research. A preliminary meeting was held with the Directorate of DD&R and funding agency, SCPP and workshop sub-themes, sequence of activities, and time schedule were formulated.

### *b) Data Collection*

The first step of the research focussed on information gathering and to review all the available literature and reference materials on demobilization and re-integration issues. In addition to this, the research team interviewed more than 10 key informants that included: militia members and armed groups, elders and local authorities. Some samples of the interviews are attached to the report as an annex. The research team prepared a preliminary discussion paper (both in English and Somali) meant to provide the necessary information and feedback to workshop participants.

### *c) Identification and Selection of Workshop Participants*

Workshop participants were selected from the various armed groups, business community, traditional leaders, women, parliamentarians, and religious leaders. The funding agency UNDP/SCPP and the Directorate of De-mining, Demobilization and Re-integration have also participated in the workshop (Refer to the attached participant's list for further information).

### *d) Workshop Sessions*

The methodology employed in workshop sessions was a plenary one. Participants had ample time to give answers and to feel free to express their ideas and experience on each sub-theme. Those participants who did not have the opportunity to voice their opinion submitted their suggestions in writing. At the end of each session, the resource persons summarised the main points agreed on. In the concluding session, The Zimbabwean UNDP/SCPP officer shared experience of his country on demobilization and reintegration of militia with participants.

### 3. Historical Context of the Issue

#### a) *Proliferation of Arms*

The discussion on “Militia and Armed Groups” generated an interesting debate and workshop participants begun by tracing back the introduction of the firearms into the Somali Society. In addition to this, the origins of militia and armed groups directly relates to the core of the Somali conflict. An easy answer cannot be given as to how and when Somalis acquired modern weapons. However, some informed-participants (elders) explained that the possession of guns by Somalis dates back to over 120 years, when European Colonialists first set foot on Somali soil. These colonialists were: the British, who occupied that part of Somali territory known as “Somaliland” in 1886, the French took over the Somali territory of “Djibouti” in 1881, the Italians annexed Southern Somalia in 1890. While the Ethiopian Empire refused to be a ‘neutral spectator’ in the words of King Menelik, and made use of this rare opportunity to take a lion’s share of spoil by incorporated a large part of the Somali territory into its domain in 1897. The gun was the superior weapon at that time had enabled colonialists to annex the Somali territory and its people, whose most valued weapon was the spear. To consolidate their power over the Somalis, colonialists recruited Somalis as soldiers, and provided them with weapons.

As a result of territorial warfare in Africa by the colonialists, before and during the Second World War more guns fell into the hands of Somalis. Due to a dire need for military personnel, opposing parties conscripted a large number of Somalis to win the war, again weapons were provided by the Italians, British, and Ethiopians. Each time, one party is defeated; the Somali soldiers on the its side fled into the bush with their guns trekking back to their territory of origin.

After attaining independence in 1960, subsequent Somali governments followed militaristic policies and gradually built a strong army with a large arsenal modern weapons and of ammunition. At one time or another, these Somali governments supplied arms to Somali liberation fronts: a) the 1960-69 civilian governments armed Somali liberation fronts: Northern Frontier District (NFD), and the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), for the cause of liberating Somali territories held by Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. In reaction, Ethiopia herself armed disenchanting Somalis to destabilize central regions of the Somali Republic during mid 1960s. These groups were known as “Koofiyad Dhuub”-literally: pointed hat, b) the Somali Military Government of 1969-1991 increased support for the WSLF, by supplying large volumes of arms. This campaign culminated in an outright war between Somalia and Ethiopia in July, 1977. The Military government mobilized the whole country to win the war, unleashing a campaign of forced conscription of a large segment of the civilian population and civil servants. The government distributed large catches of arms and provided military training, which enable these people to familirize with warfare tactics military science and use of weapons.

As the Somali government lost the war against Ethiopia (due to the intervention and military of Soviet Union her allies military support to the Ethiopian government) and failed


to achieve the objective of liberating the Somali territory of Ogaden. Siad Barre's regime lost credibility in the eyes of the citizens and internal opposition gained momentum, openly challenging the military government. In the subsequent years, four armed opposition fronts- Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)- were formed taking bases in Ethiopia. To counter these fronts and keep them at bay, the military government distributed more arms to loyal clans. In January 1991, the fighting culminated in the fall of the military government and opened the way for the notorious civil war ensued the weapons of the defeated government fell into the hands of feuding clans or clan factions. 10 years have elapsed since the fall of the military government and agreed Somali state is not visible in the horizon. Clan fronts still jostle for access to central power of a perceived Somali State and have ever since been vying for more arms by either purchasing from the international markets or receiving as grants from neighbouring friendly governments, which alternately supply arms to opposing Somali clans to secure both their short- and long-terms interests.

*b) Root Causes of the Proliferation of Arms*

In the preceding pages, the historical background of arms proliferation into Somalia is outlined as expressed by the workshop participants. Nevertheless, upon analysing the causes of militia and armed groups formation in Somalia, Puntland being part and parcel of it, participants identified, that the issue of "militia and armed groups", poses a chronic ailment, in fact, each problem leads to another (see chart overleaf) by using the "problem tree" approach, participants concluded that the root causes as the following:

- **Colonialism:** Before the arrival of colonialists, Somalis led a simple nomadic life moving freely their stock in search of pasture and water in the Horn. Although they did not have a so called national government, nevertheless, they had their socio-political structures and adhered strongly to Islamic values. European colonialism and Ethiopian expansionism had interrupted the Somalis development process and pastoral way of life. As they divided Somalia among themselves irrespective of the consequences and imposed arbitrary borders. In 1960, two parts of the Somali Nation attained independence and merged to form the Somali Republic. Three parts of the Somali people and territory were still under colonialism (N.F.D), Ogaden, and Djibouti). The new republic found itself confronted with the task of liberating these territories and thus chose the adoption of militaristic policies.
- **Scarcity of Resources:** Many participants viewed that the problem of militia and armed groups is due to the scarcity of easily exploitable resources in most parts of the country, particularly northern and central, where 80% of the population live. This caused: a) clan rivalry for local and central power for the access of national treasury, b) injustice, nepotism and misappropriation of public funds. If more resources were available, there would have been no major practice of injustice, nepotism or misuse of public funds, or at least would have been to manageable levels, and c) influx of nomads into the urban centres seeking better economic opportunities. Participants argued one of the major causes of the collapse of the Somali state is simply nothing more than invasion of nomads to the better-living urban dwellers.

## ***Problem Tree***



## **. Constituents of Militia and Armed Groups**

### *a) Definition of Militia and Armed Groups*

The participants at the workshop on Demobilization and Re-integration of Militia had different views and feelings in defining whom the militia and the armed groups are.

This difference in the participant's views is mainly due to the fact that so many people in Somalia possess arms that belong to individuals, groups or clans. With respect to this, participants proposed to replace the phrase of "armed youth" with "armed groups". The difficulty faced by the various participants to reach a consensus on the issue was the perception of militia and related activities. During the discussion, some of the participants viewed Militia and armed groups as socially harmful undesirable members or groups who are always involved in unpopular, illegal and criminal acts against the rest of the community. Others viewed the Militia and armed groups as people who are greatly constrained by lack of accessibility to income, education facilities and employment opportunities. This latter group has defined the militia as people affected by adverse circumstances: the upheaval of the war, mass displacement as well as the absence of law and order.

Other participants who included militia and armed group representatives, were of the opinion that the militia and armed groups as being valuable members of the society; particularly, during the periods of war. This group argued that the issue of reconciliation has yet to materialize, and there still exists a necessity for militia and armed groups. However, the problem is that the politicians, traditional leaders and the clan-elders who had mobilized and armed these fighters during the war, after which they had abandoned and ignored them. This group argued that discontent and struggle for survival due to the lack of access to basic needs cause the activities of the militia and armed groups.

In any case, participants defined militia and armed groups as individuals or groups that are armed and un-organized, who are prone to violent and illegal acts. In different parts of Somalia, militia and armed groups are known as one and the same, but they bear different local names that imply the same meaning. For example, a bad militiaman or armed person is called "Jirri" in Puntland, "Dayday" in the North West and "Mooryaan" in the South. All these words have almost the same meaning in Somali Language. They described militia as any individual or a group of people that are either armed or can be armed to perform unlawful, unpopular and illegal endeavours.

Following categories were identified as Puntland's Militia and armed groups:

- ⇒ Former soldiers of the overthrown regime,
- ⇒ Ex-S.S.D.F Combatants,

- ⇒ Clan-based Militia created by Siad Barre’s government in 1978 to counter anti-government armed factions.
- ⇒ Bandits and Groups that erect road blocks (freelance militia)
- ⇒ Private armies (security guards for personal purposes or interests, clan militia).
- ⇒ Those earning their livelihood “by the gun”.
- ⇒ Armed members of religious groups such as the Itihad Fundamentalists and Qadiria (Timoweyn)
- ⇒ Free lance armed groups on hire,
- ⇒ Those keeping arms for self-defence and property in the absence or weakness of a national state “the gun is the judge”.
- ⇒ Armed militia who defended the North-eastern Regions USC aggressions around Galkayo and Al-Itihad

c) *Criteria for Selection of Militia and Armed Groups*

According to the views of the majority of participants, a large segment of the population have arms in their possession for different purposes. There are many members of the society, who possess arms to defend their property and their lives. But this latter group is not expected to commit crimes with these weapons. For this reason, the research study concentrated only on those, who earn their living with the gun or who are likely to commit crimes. Participants have therefore, proposed development of criteria for selection of the target militia and armed groups. They suggested this to be developed by the Directorate of DD&R and UNDP/SCPP before launching the programme.

d) *Assessment of Actual Number of Militia and Armed Groups*

Participants of the workshop noted that it would be difficult to establish an integrated strategy for demobilization and re-integration of the militia and armed groups, unless an assessment is carried out on the exact number of militia and armed groups. Before launching any demobilization and re-integration programme in Puntland, the total number of militia and armed groups and their localities of residence should be determined.

## **5. Major Sources of Conflicts in Puntland that contribute to Militia Crimes**

Despite the pronounceable progress achieved by the Puntland Government in re-establishing law and order, nevertheless, there exists endemic conflicts that encourage criminality and the outlaw offences by militia and armed groups in Puntland. Major common sources of conflict that contribute to the militia and armed group crimes include:

1 *“Qaat” Consumption*

Qaat business is widely spread in the Puntland State of Somalia and is currently traded and used in the most remote and inaccessible rural areas. Unemployment and loss hope forces militia groups to excessive use of chewing Qaat and the use other illicit drugs. These groups try to get their daily quota of this mild narcotic leaves through by any

means. In many cases, resistance to payment of Qaat to these groups results in bigger conflicts that often cause loss of human life. On the other hand, the hallucination effect of prolonged Qaat chewing creates trauma sickness, that induces trauma victims to be easily involved in violent clashes and criminal acts.

#### *II) Land Tenure*

The scale of influxes and out migrated pastoralists and the IDPs overtax in an already strained environment. The marginalized groups who have either lost their property or are fresh from the rural areas, need land for permanent shelter, creates an atmosphere of continuous arguments and claims on Land Tenure. These arguments and land grabbing might grow into bigger conflicts that could involve militia and armed groups with dire consequences.

#### *III) Enclosures*

Although the issue of land enclosure for fodder is not common in the Puntland regions, yet many IDP and refugee returnees practice crop production on most favourable pastoral areas, along the wadi banks, where ground water is relatively shallow. Due to the ideal environ, conflict between the pastoralists who used to graze their stock in the area and the new squatters always occur.

#### *IV) Looted Trucks*

Traditionally camels were the most precious commodities that was looted in the past, however, since the outbreak of the civil war intensive looting of trucks has been registered. People, who are claiming past grievances of either blood compensations or other similar cases, always substantiate the looting of trucks. The worst thing of it is that looters always abduct trucks belonging to innocent civilians, who belong to the clan or sub-clan of the accused. The result of such acts might cause death and start wars among clans. The truck looters may hire weapons or militia and armed groups who are in one way or another related to them. This means that truck looters can be from different clans and in many cases a single incident of a looted truck may involve members of several clans.

#### *V) Illegal Business*

An illegal business is any unethical business that is environmentally unsound and socially unaccepted. Among these are enterprises that are based on the exhaustion of natural resources of the society i.e. charcoal exportation, illegal fishing and sea piracy. In this regard, the rangeland and marine resources of the Puntland regions are subjected to extreme depletion.

In order to halt the exhaustion of natural resources, elders use clan militia and armed groups of the area to prevent these acts. Those involved in these illegal ventures often resist and react violently, thus occasionally flaring incidents of violence may occur. At

other times militia and armed groups organized themselves voluntarily for extortion purposes, which creates conflicts. These types of businesses and related conflicts have been reduced in the last year. Nevertheless, it is common cause of conflict that can spontaneously erupt at any instant in the Puntland regions.

#### *VI. Conflicts Associated with Rape*

Rape is one of the main causes of conflicts, but rarely occurs in urban centres of Puntland. However, incidents of rape take place in rural areas. For the time being, only few cases of rape are reported to have taken place in the Puntland regions. Clan chiefs and religious leaders resolve conflicts associated with rape by provisions of the Customary Law and other methods of conflict resolution.

#### *VII) Conflicts associated with Fishing zones*

The regions, which encompass the Regional State of Puntland of Somalia, has a coastline 1330kms long, extending from Lasa-Surad, (Las Qoray) to Gara'ad. Due to its potentiality of marine resources, many businessmen have initiated fishing activities at different points of this coastline, which provides employment and income to many IDP's, refugee returnees and out migrated ex-pastoralists. Excessive over-fishing necessitated the shifting of fishing activities from one zone to another. Consequently resulting in conflicts as those living in the vicinity of the new fishing zone claim ownership and demand the payment of 'Arliyo'-royalty. Other objectives of this claim include the securing of employment in the fishing industry.

#### *VIII) Resistance to Law enforcement Agencies*

The clan militia and armed groups who have committed crimes resist the enforcement of law and cause conflicts. There are also some influential business groups who are against the enforcement of law and order, particularly when their personal interests are at stake. Sometimes, this group mobilizes clan militia to fight the local authority for their own ends.

#### *IX) Injustices from Law enforcement bodies and Government Administration*

The participants have clearly stated that injustice by law enforcement bodies of the government administration, greatly contributes to the creation of conflicts. In particular, the Police Force and the Courts are said to abuse their mandate in many ways. They often free imprisoned criminals or declare controversially unjust verdicts in cases brought before them. Likewise, due to the high rate of unemployment, some participants raised concern over government policies in recruitment of civil servants and police cadets, which, they pointed out, was not conducted on merit. This negates equal opportunities for employment. And in turn creates mistrust and conflicts with the government.

X) *Clan Competition for Prestige and Power*

Clan competition for prestige, power and access to resources is one of the major factors that caused the civil war in Somalia. Throughout the years of anarchy and civil war, clan jostling was the main obstacle to the establishment of equally shared central government. That specifically, is reason behind the disintegration of the country into clan fiefdoms. Smaller sub-clans expressed their will by establishing their own new titled elders, Militias and groups. Clan Lineage is one of the basic mores, which guides the Somali society, as such larger clans restrict the empowerment of the smaller sub-clans in terms of power, thereby creating further competition. Which results in hostilities and conflicts among the clans or sub-clans of the same lineage group.

## **6. Past Attempts of Demobilization and Re-integration**

- a) *Puntland Government: the* Demobilization and re-integration of the militia and armed groups is at the top of Puntland Government's agenda for the achievement of sustainable peace and internal stability. In this regards, the government has established the Directorate of De-mining, Demobilization and Re-integration (DD&R), which is specifically mandated with the task of Demobilization and Re-integration of militia and armed groups in Puntland Regions.

To optimise the workshop output, representatives from the above-mentioned Directorate, the parliament, government ministries and the commanders of the Police Forces were invited as participants. In his opening speech, the commander of Territorial Police (Daraawishta), stated that, despite the limitations, the government achieved substantial success in demobilization and re-integration of the militia. The commander mentioned three areas of progress. These include:

- *Establishment of a Strong Police Force*

The establishment of a strong Police Force greatly contributed in the Demobilization and Re-integration of armed groups. Former Police members formed the core of the new force and maintain security in the urban centres. As its first step of de-mobilization, the government recruited about 400 trained ex-combatants who possessed guns, adding them to the urban police force. This initiative was followed by removal of 500 Militia and armed Groups from 57 illicit roadblocks erected along the Bossaso-Galkayo tarmac road. These armed groups and militia extorted money from trucks carrying goods. The armed groups were successfully dislodged from the road and were taken with their arms to rehabilitation centres, where they have been screened for illegibility to the territorial police forces.

According to the statement of the Commander of, 83 persons from this group were disqualified. These included: 46 suffering from TB, 9 mentally unfit, 12 habitual murderers and 16 drug addicts. Those suffering from TB were sent to Bossaso T.B clinic; the 12 habitual murderers were taken to the jail for rehabilitation, while the mentally unfit group and the drug addicts were handed over to their families for treatment. Since that time onwards, recruitment of militia and armed groups, continued, until their number totalled 4140 persons, who currently constitute members of the urban and Territorial Police forces of the Puntland Government.

□ *Employment at the Administration Offices*

According to the information provided by the workshop participants, 1200 employees, of whom half were former militia and armed groups, are currently on the government's civil service. These ex-militia and armed groups perform the lower level office works i.e. watchmen, office cleaners, clerks etc. Government employment also contributed to the demobilization and re-integration of militia. Besides this, the Police evicted those militia illegally occupying government buildings. The evicted militias were given employment at government offices.

According to the views of the participants, the Puntland government has achieved 70% in restoration of law and order. However, they commented, that internal security and stability has been deteriorating in the last couple of months. In response to this, the Commander of Police explained that this is due to:

- ⇒ Decline of economy after the Somali livestock export ban,
- ⇒ High expectation of the public,
- ⇒ High rate of inflation and employment,
- ⇒ Lack of adequate training and facilities for the police force,
- ⇒ Inefficiency of law enforcement bodies in carrying out their tasks
- ⇒ A large number of militia and armed groups that are not yet demobilized or re-integrated.

b) *Private Sector*

The private sector has tremendously contributed in the demobilization and re-integration process by providing employment opportunities. The private sector employed a large number of militia and armed groups. Private initiatives that increased employment opportunities include:

- ⇒ Telecommunication networks,
- ⇒ Galkayo Slaughter house Project
- ⇒ Lobster and shark fins industry,
- ⇒ Water distilling plants,
- ⇒ Bossaso water project.
- ⇒ Frankincense industry

b) *International Organizations*

The complexity of the nature of the demobilization and re-integration process, that involves the lack of information, lack of adequate financial inputs and volatile security situation, seems to have framed past attitudes of the International Agencies who were often sceptical and hesitant to include these programmes in their priority areas of intervention. Participants informed that, despite the prevalence of this trend, an International NGO named World Concern initiated a pilot project on demobilization and re-integration during 1995-1996 in Garowe. This project focussed on 100 youth from clan militia and armed groups, who received functional literacy and vocational training that included vocational training in: masonry/carpenter, tailoring, electricity and home management as well as classes on attitudinal change, including regular religious orientation and preaching sessions. A weekly Journal that disseminated occurrences of crimes associated with militia and armed groups was produced and availed to the trainees. The project has successfully achieved its objectives because 80% of the target groups were reintegrated into the community and lead a normal life. Only 20% of the trained group failed and returned to militia activities.

d) *Individual Voluntary Demobilization*

Voluntary demobilization and re-integration has taken place at both individual and at community levels. This indicates that the issue of demobilization and re-integration is a major public concern relating to internal security and stability. Steps taken in this regard include:

*Tara'asso Project*

Tarra'asso is a village located 15 km east of Ba'adweyn, Mudug region. In Tara'asso Project, 50 members of militia men and armed groups sold their guns and invested the capital in an agricultural irrigation project. They cleared 5 hectares of land and cultivated vegetables, such as onions, Tomato, lettuce, etc. In the first three years the cash crop production was good enough to cover the running costs of the project. These former militia members then started planting and irrigating fruit trees that include guava, Paw-paw and lemon. Though the project is still running on the meagre initial input it is successful and the fifty militia are sustainable integrated in the community.

*Collection of Frankincense*

Many ex-pastarolists, who migrated to the urban centres, have returned to their rural communities. Many of these started harvesting frankincense resin which is an expensive commodity in the local market of Bossaso. There are also some other militia and armed groups who are involved in private business related to frankincense processing, storing and selling. According to the views of participants, the frankincense resin business absorbed a large number of militia and armed groups, which contributed greatly to the demobilization and re-integration of militia and armed groups.

e) *Family and Community levels*

Participants have commonly viewed the issue of demobilization and re-integration as “family and community-based”. However, the role of the family and community in this process has not yet appeared as it should have. Nevertheless, certain initiatives taken by some of the militia families and communities can be cited. In general families and communities are the main source of subsistence income for the largest group of militia, and those who are potential militia recruits (the school dropouts and the newly arrived migrants from the pastoral areas). Initiatives taken include:

a) In every urban/rural community of Puntland, families’ assisted, in the form of provision cash or in-kind grants or interest free loans to some of their armed group kin to establish usually small businesses. These small-scale businesses include: Stalls for running kiosks, dry ration retailing, nomadic commodities, goods sold on streets, hawkers etc. This has contributed to the demobilization and re-integration of the militia and the armed groups. However, it has remained a small-scale endeavours that was mainly hindered by household financial constraints, b) Some families encouraged their sons to join Computers and English language private schools, c) certain families took their delinquent militia members to court and requested imprisonment for disciplinary purposes. According to an interview held with commander of the Puntland Government corrective Institutions prisoners kept for disciplinary purposes constitute 8% of the total numbers of prisoners during the months of March and April 2001. They are usually kept in the prison 3 – 6 month’s period and normally parents pay their food rations. Religious orientation courses are awarded to prisoners during their stay in custody.

The most severe action that families have taken against their relative militia and armed groups who committed serious crimes is capital punishment or execution. This is conducted on habitual murderers as well as recidive criminals, whom the family or the sub-clan feel are of no value. This is done into two ways: a) when the habitual killer commits murder, parents or relatives catch him and hand him over to the aggrieved party to execute capital punishment (Qisaas), in accordance to the Islamic sharia, b) The other aspect is when a militia man commits many grave crimes and his family gets tired of paying the price of blood compensation or cannot to pay altogether, and the lives of innocent relatives get endangered due to possible revenge, the father or relatives catch the culprit and physically eliminate him through direct execution. Five such cases are recorded in the Puntland regions where fathers have killed their sons to save the lives and reputation (good name) of the rest of the family.

An example of this was carried out as follows: A father has paid blood compensations to the families of three victims intentionally murdered by his son and experienced with great problems in the process. After sometime, the father was informed that his son was planning to murder someone. The father requested his other sons to catch him and tie him on a pole. When this was done, the father took a pistol went to him and executed him on the spot. On hand, participants pointed out, while some of the families and sub-clans are responding to anti social activities as such, others are doing the reverse. Though this happen very rarely some fathers do arm their sons to earn a living for the family or support them when they commit

crimes. A case, participants, cited is this: A father sent a message to his son at an illicit checkpoint that lies between Garowe and Las-anood. In this message the father said, “ tell my son at the checkpoint that if he cannot provide the expenses of their nomadic family, let him bring back his (father’s) gun”. This shows that the pastoral father had handed the gun to the son to earn a living for the family.

Another case that participants reported was: once, elders of a sub-clan complained to a father on the criminal acts of his son who was a habitual murderer and known to have committed several murders, including a recent one. They requested him to bring the son before the court. The father replied: ” “Xiniinyo ayaa Wiilkayga Gubaya”, which means ‘ my son is doing this due to excessive traits of manhood”. Some time later, when the brother of one of those previously murdered by the culprit, killed him. The father sought support from the clan elders,who replied with the following response: “Xiniinyihii Gubayey Ha soo Nooleeyeen”, which means “let the excessive traits of manhood bring him back to life”.

## **7. Demobilization and Re-integration Opportunities and Strategies**

### **Opportunities**

#### *1) Opportunities in Productive Sectors*

Having studied and analysed past demobilization and re-integration attempts, and despite certain bottlenecks, opportunities for demobilization and re-integration exist. However, participants emphasized that strengthening peace and stability in Puntland State and with its neighbouring regions is a paramount precondition for a successful implementation of demobilization and re-integration programmes. They recommended the following main areas of intervention for demobilization and re-integration of the militia and armed groups. These are:

1.1 Integration of militia and armed groups in the productive economic sectors, which include:

#### *a) Fisheries*

The Puntland state is endowed with a coastline of about 1330km that extends from Las-korey at the Red Sea to Gara'ad at the Indian Ocean. Due to up welling currents many parts of the coast are characterized by substantial marine products that include different fish species, lobster and sharks, which are highly marketable at both local and external markets. Although these seashores have experienced extreme depletion by both foreign fishing fleets and local entrepreneurs, still there is high economic potential of marine resources and absorbed a large number of militia and armed groups of Puntland state. Participants recommended the fishery sector as a major option for demobilization and re-integration. Access to fishery facilities, provision of training and skills are the major viable interventions.

b) *Livestock*

Since 70% of the Puntland population depends on livestock production, which is a productive primary source of income for employment and foreign exchange earnings of Puntland regions, which has a high economic potential as far as demobilization and reintegration of militia and armed groups are concerned. In accordance to the views of workshop participants, the livestock sector's potential for demobilization and re-integration is due to the following factors:-

- a) A large number of militia and armed groups had previously migrated from the rural areas and were mainly pastoralists who sought alternate livelihood that can replace the difficult living conditions of the rural areas. These out migrated pastoralists who turned to militia and armed groups have skills associated with livestock production. However, some participants observed, these former pastorals not likely to be willing to go back to the harsh nomadic life.
- b) Livestock is the main foreign export item, and earner of hard currency. This industry provides employment to a large number of militia and Armed Group

Overall economic development increases employment opportunities for militia and armed groups. Therefore, participants noted that, the currently existing Livestock Export Ban by Arab Gulf Countries is the cause of the high inflation in the region and promotion of Livestock trade is an appropriately recommended strategy.

c) *Agriculture*

Agricultural crop production was not practised in a large scale until the collapse of government when influxes of displaced people and refugee returnees started these activities in the regions of Puntland. Since that time, agricultural initiatives of frankincense resin collection, cash crop production and bee-keeping continued to be appropriate income generation schemes. Currently they support many IDP's, militia and armed groups. The Goles Range Mountain slopes and wadi banks, have high potentiality for agriculture.

d) *Provision of basic social services:*

The rural communities from which most of the militia and armed groups have migrated due to lack the basic social services that include education, health, potable water and improved infra-structure. Establishment of such basic services could improve livelihood for the rural communities and integrated militia and armed .

1.2 *Private Sector*

According to the views of participants, integration of militia and armed groups into the private sector is an appropriate opportunity. The private sector can be promoted by Puntland state through the creation of more accessibility to international markets, modern

Information systems and advocacy will in turn create more employment opportunities and marketable skills for clan Militia and armed groups.

### *1.3) Small Scale Income Generating Schemes*

Past interventions of small-scale business income-generating schemes had already been initiated by militia and armed groups, who got support from their families or earned some capital. Participants, therefore, suggested that small-scale income generating schemes that include cottage industries have a high potentiality for demobilization and re-integration of the militia and armed groups.

## *2. Creation of Non-Formal Education Programmes*

Initiation of educational systems that can provide needed knowledge, skills and attitudes to militia and armed groups is vital for demobilization and re-integration programmes. The most appropriate educational system to be designed for demobilization and re-integration is non-formal education, which encompasses both awareness-raising programmes and initiation of vocational schools. The vocational schools to be established must compose of the following sections:

- vocational schools that provide locally marketable skills that include: Carpentry, Masonry, Brick making, Electricity, Welding, Mechanics etc. Provision of basic working tools, equipment and material to the trained school graduates is necessary to enable trainees to get access to employment
- vocational schools should also provide trainees classes on: functional literacy, numeracy and basic life skills, business education materials

## *3. Establishment of Recreation and rehabilitation Centres:*

Participants expressed that militia and armed youth groups that include drug users, professional killers, war trauma victims etc, cannot be demobilization and re-integration with ease. Hence, such groups need to be kept in recreation and rehabilitation centres before proceeding to vocational schools. Such centres like the prisons can be used for both recreation and rehabilitation purposes. But in most cases the rehabilitation centres should be mainly pre-training separate centres. Extra-curricula activities like sports, religious teaching and use of audio-visual education materials are particularly effective to attitudinal change that is one of the main objectives of rehabilitation centres.

## **Strategies**

The complexity of the diverse factors, involved in the demobilization and re-integration process calls for integrated strategies. The adverse socio-economic situation needs to be always counted on when setting up and implementing a successful and sustainable demobilization and re-integration strategy. Pre-requisites for any demobilization and reintegration programme are: a) existence of secure environment, b) participation of all

stakeholders in all stages of programme design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, c) programmes should bear an holistic perspective, d) sustainability of planned programmes

## 8. Actor Roles

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Stage One</b>	<b>Stage Two</b>	<b>Stage Three</b>
1.Puntland Government	Enhance peace building and reconciliation process	Programme Design, coordination , and review	Maintain and monitor security
	Maintain peace and stability in the Puntland	Initiate public and militia disarmament.	Support private sector.
	Capacity building of law enforcement bodies (courts, police, and prison guards).	Formulate laws banning public ownership and use of weapons.	Review and evaluation of demobilization and re-integration process.
	Raise community awareness on issue and Nationalism and common interest.	Facilitate disarmament of the public	Assist Civil society organizations to participate and contribute at all stages of programmes
	Advocacy	Encourage private sectors to play its roles in the issue.	Discourage khat use, drugs, smoking

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Stage One</b>	<b>Stage Two</b>	<b>Stage Three</b>
2.Private Sector	Refrain from use of militia for personal interest.	Support demobilization and re-integration and provide contribution	Create of job opportunities.
	Facilitate militia and armed group skill development and employment	Create job opportunities	Continue supporting programme and provide financial contributions
	Pay text bills due	Participate in the monitoring & Evaluation	Assist CBOs and other programme partners to take their role in the program.
			Participate in the program evaluation initiatives.
3. Community groups (traditional leaders, Religious leaders, CBOs)	Discourage the militia and armed groups	Continue to be fully involved in all aspects of project activities	Participate in the programme activities
	Raise the awareness of the public on the importance of demobilization and re-integration process	Information dissemination and raising the awareness of the local people	
	Participate in the activities of the first stage and help other actors perform their role.	Participate in demobilization and re-integration implementation	Raise local funds for the programme and contribute in the demobilization and re-integration
		Participate in the decision making,	Continue raising awareness of the public.

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Stage One</b>	<b>Stage Two</b>	<b>Stage Three</b>
Family / Community	Proper upbringing of the child.	Stop adolescents from joining militia and armed groups and bad practices.	Create income generation for militia Group.
	Take direct action against family members who commit crimes.	Facilitate the Youth to attend schools and religious studies.	Participate in project implementation
	Awareness-raising and encouragement by use of songs .	Participate in monitoring.	Continue disarming militia and armed groups
	Advice against militia activities.	Disarm militia members and armed groups of the family.	Contribute in programmes

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Stage One</b>	<b>Stage Two</b>	<b>Stage Three</b>
International Community.	Advocate and raise funds at international levels.	Provide technical advice and expertise	Provide technical support and expertise
	Allow local participants and incorporate local knowledge and talent .	Provide financial support.	Provide financial support.
	Facilitate Data collection and pre-assessment initiatives	Conduct participatory monitoring.	Participate in evaluation progress.
	Provide technical advice at all levels.		

## 9. Major Challenges Envisaged

- Assessment of an estimated number of militia and armed groups.
- The economic resources needed for sustainable demobilization and re-integration interventions are beyond local capacity.
- Fear of the consequences of demobilization and re-integration programmes by the different actors such as donors, international organization, local authorities, traditional leaders
- Unpredictability of the Somali reconciliation
- As re-integration programmes commence, competition over access to availed opportunities within targeted militia or by new groups, can result conflict.
- Criminals might show reluctance to demobilization and re-integration initiatives.
- Lower salaries currently paid by the government to the demobilized and reintegrated militia

## Annex – I Sample Questionnaire

1. Name: “Refused registration of her name”
2. Sex: Female
3. Date of birth: 1969.
4. Occupation: Small-scale business-(Sometimes sells milk, clothes, cigarette)

*Q: Are you married?*

Ans: Yes, married with two children.

*Q: What is your educational background?*

Ans: Can write and read Somali.

*Q: Have you participated in the Civil war? Give defects if yes?*

Ans: I have participated the civil war in Kismaayo.

*Q: How did you get involved? What was the main reason that compelled you to get involved?*

Ans: What made me join the militia and armed youth was that the Hawiye people, who took all our belongings in Mogadishu, and killed many my relative were still chasing us for no reason. When two of my cousins were killed in Kismayo, I joined the armed groups.

*Q: What was your role?*

Ans: I used to go with the militia, as an armed woman, but mainly my role was cooking, storekeeping, taking care of the wounded. At times I used to conduct spy mission upon the enemy, pretending to be a farmer of the area

*Q: How did your people view you?*

Ans: My people viewed as the most courageous girl and they respected me very much

*Q: What support did you get from your clan/family?*

Ans: My clan used to give us ammunition, food and moral support. But there were some groups/members of our clan who came against us

*Q: Can you tell us any unforgettable event of crime associated with the civil war?*

Ans: There are many events I can't forget. Some of the events I remember visit me in dreams or when I am praying. But I still remember a day in Jamama, when I was in a spy mission and caught by USC. Fortunately I was born in Kismanyo and I knew many farmers at Jamama. I spoke in the dialect of these farmers. The USC decided to rape me and kill by firing, but by sheer luck, one of them, who was an elderly militiaman recognized the family I have identified with. He saved me by allowed me to buy some food, escorted me to the direction of the road leading to the farming zone of my claimed “family” and let me go. Another

incident I remember was when we defeated the USC and those caught from the enemy were killed.

*Q: What were the main problems that you met during the war?*

Ans: There were many. Although I was not injured, yet as an armed women with a gun and fighting, my major frustrations were to see my clan men chewing or doing business. I married one militia member, who was injured several times and I supported and treated him. Our marriage took place in 1996 and we live a decent life at the moment in Puntland. We still feel displacement from our home region, Kismanyo, and we didn't get the required support from the Puntland government.

*Q: Did you still keep arms? If yes, why do you keep it? If no, what have you done with your weapons?*

Ans: We used to keep weapons in Kismanyo, but we sold them when we were leaving Kismanyo in 1998. My husband has a gun at the moment that he borrowed from his relatives to join it with the Puntland Police, but he later changed his mind. But we keep the gun for security.

*Q: How do you view your previous militia activities?*

Ans: We were fighting for defence of ourselves and our rights. Hence what we have done was and right justified.

*Q: How does your people view you at the moment? Why?*

Ans: The people that we live with at the moment view us as a displaced poor family. But at times I disagree with other women whenever they describe me "a militia women or *Jiri*", reminding me of old days.

*Q: Provide some details about the current status of some militia members that you liked much during the war?*

Ans: I am sorry to mention that many disabled group members of our Militia are in Puntland without getting any assistance both from government and International agencies. In particular, the disabled were not taken care of. Some of our Colleagues are still armed and rely on their clans for their living. As far as I know there is one person who is a drug addict and he is in Bosaso. I have been told that he is among the house burglars.

*Q: If demobilization and re-integration programmes of militia and armed groups are carried in Puntland, will you participate? How? What sort of demobilization and re-integration initiatives will you like to participate in?*

Ans: I am a mother at the moment. However, both I and my husband will participate in education programmes and vocational schemes

*Q: What problems do you think you can face if you change your current occupation?*

Ans: Nothing.

Interview with the Chief Commander of Puntland prisons  
Mr. Ato Omer Ahmed

*Q1: How long have you been a prison security commander?*

Ans: I have been a prison security commander for about four months.

*Q2: How many prisons are effectively operating in Puntland?*

Ans: Three

*Q3: What was the average number of prisoners convicted per month for the last six months?*

Ans: Since the time I have taken command, the number of prisoners was between 230 and 255 prisoners.

*Q4: who pays for the expenses of the inmates who are jailed by their parents for rehabilitation?*

Ans: The government pays all the expenses

*Q5: Which prisons received the highest number of convicts for the last four months?*

Ans: Bosaso and Garowe prisons receive the highest number of criminals caught on banditry, drug abuse, and theft

*Q6: Can you tell us any reasons that you know which caused in the increase of the number of prisoners for the last three months?*

Ans: I am not sure. Probably because of the worsened economic situation

*Q8: What are the main problems that you meet in the areas of management and administration of both the security forces and the prisoners?*

Ans: Although some members, who were from ex-soldiers, are responsible, but imagine a militiamen who is brought by a clan to join the army without having any training and rehabilitation. He/she only works to earn money, that is one of the reasons why some times some prisoners flee from the Jail. The prisoners are also not adequately rehabilitated and have not an appropriate environment in jail.

*Q9. Aren't security guards given training?*

Ans. No training is given, due to financial constraints of Ministry of Justice and related agencies

*Q10: Do you and your guards consider the imprisonment of prisoners as punishment against crimes or a rehabilitation attempt? Why?*

Ans: We feel the prisons as rehabilitation centers, but the absence of training and rehabilitation programmes at the prisons due to financial problems, have made the prisons as places for punishment.

Q11: If you consider the prisons as rehabilitation centres? What are the main rehabilitation programmes that you currently carry in Puntland prisons?

Ans: We only provide religious orientations provided by members of different religion groups.

Q12: What role do you think judicial bodies including yours should take in demobilization and re-integration of militia and armed groups?

Ans: The law enforcement bodies are the core element for ensuring security and order in Puntland. Hence, I feel we can play a major role in the demobilization and re-integration process. If, however, the prisoners are trained in rehabilitation centers, they will attain skills to earn a living with when they leave the Jail.

Q13: What are the major constraints that hinder you from taking that role?

Ans: Our main constraint is financial and technical problems, in particular. There are no facilities in the prisons. No training facilities and funds are available. Security guards are not well trained.. Both the government, community and see prisoners as criminals that have to be punished and deserve imprisonment to refrain from their deeds, but no body thought of a way of enabling them become valuable members of the community>

Q14: What recommendations and suggestions will you like to make on improvement of the Puntland prisons and on the demobilization and re-integration process?

⇒ Ans: Improvements I suggest are:

- ⇒ Improve the building infra-structure of the prisons;
- ⇒ Making the prisons rehabilitation centres which are able to provide different skills to the prisoners;
- ⇒ Establishment of a training unit for each prison;
- ⇒ Train the prison security guards on human rights, fundamental human laws, and operating rules and regulations.

Questionnaire for Community Groups (Elders, Religious Groups etc)

Name: Said Hassan Haaji- (Elder as well as religious man from Bosaso)

Age: 65 years

*Q. Have you ever participated in mobilization of militia and armed groups and financial contributions during the Civil War? If yes, why?*

Ans. Yes, I Participated both by collecting war financial contributions and mobilizing youth to take part in defence of Galka'yo. The reason is we were defending our people and towns from the United Somali Congress(USC) militia, who killed many innocent people that included the peace loving people, women and children and looted all our clan belongings in Galka'yo during early 1990s.

*Q. Has any one of your family participated in the militia and armed groups?*

Ans. 6 youth from our family including my elder son joined the clan militia at Galka'yo. Only two became permanent militia and joined those that erect roadblocks after Galka'yo conflict.

*Q. What are the main problems/crimes affecting you that these members do?*

Ans. We have been subject for revenges and demands for blood compensations and damage by victims for crimes the militia committed . This does not happen to me only but also the clan members.

*Q. How do you see the militia and armed groups of your tribe at the moment?*

Ans. I see the acts of militia as crime and unlawful against the innocent people. At the same time I feel that we were responsible, because we first mobilized them and left them in the lurk when war ended. We did not have opportunity to make them active. They also became habitual chewers of Qaat, instead of pursuing socially useful tasks such as education, vocational training, or income generating activities.

**Annex - II : List of the Participants of Demobilization Workshop on 21 – 22 April 2001**

NAME	TITLE	REGION		SAGNITURE
1. Yusuf Moalin Ibrahim	DG Inter. Min.	Puntland		
2. Abdi Saleeban Ali	Vice Governor	Nugal		
3. Abdulkadir Karshe Adur	DC of Dangoroyo	Nugal		
4. Mohamud Aynab	DG. Int. Co.	Puntland		
5. Mohamed Jama Warsame	DC of Burtinle	Nugal		
6. Ibrahim Elmi Gaab	MP	Garowe		
7. Jama Mohamud Dulane	MP	Garowe		
8. DG. Mohamed Sofe Hassan	DG. DDR	Garowe		
9. Suleyman H. Abdulle	Dimob. Directorate	Garowe		
10. Abdullahi Mohamed Rooraye	DDR	Garowe		
11. Adan Muse	DDR	Garowe		
12. Col. Abdullahi Ali Mire (Arays)	Darawish Com.	Garowe		
13. Col. Abdullahi Said Samater	Police Com.	Bosaso		
<b>Nugal Region:</b>				
14. Abdulkadir Abdi Shube	Gabyaa	Nugal		
15. Mohamed Abdulkadir	Businessman	Nugal		
16. Yusuf Mohamed Awl	Civilian	Nugal/Mudug		
17. Mohamud Abaas	Civilian	Nugal		
18. Mohamed Ismail	Malitia	Nugal		
19. Halimo Ali Biyod	Women Group	Nugal		
20. Maryan Mohamed Shido	Women Group	Nugal		
21. Said Adan Waayeel	Pressman	Nugal		
22. Muse Abdulle Bohar (Yururb)	Elder	Nugal		
23. Yasin Sanweyne	Businessman	Nugal		
<b>Bari Region:</b>				
24. Mohamud Osman Agandi	Elder- Jabhad	Bari		
25. Mohamud Ali Qood	Civilian	Bari		
26. Abdiwahid Mohamed Haji	Business/Civilian	Bari		
27. Asha Danla'an	Woment Group	Bari		
28. Ibrahim Artan (Atoosh)	Elder	Bari		
29. Hawa Jama	WAWA NGO	Bari		

<b>Mudug Region:</b>				
30. Ahmed Adan Dheere	Elder	Mudug		
31. Mohamud Aynab	Officer Civilian	Mudug		
32. Hussien Jama Yabaq	DC. of Galkayo	Mudug		
33. Dahir Artan Hassan	Civilian	Mudug		
34. Huruse Yasin Mursal	Civilian	Mudug		
35. Mohamed Abshir Yeeg	Elder	Mudug		
<b>Sool Region:</b>				
36. Farah Haji Mohamud	Elder	Las'anod		
37. Hodan Abdi Hussien	Women	Las'anod		
38. Rawi Abdi Essa	Civilian	Las'anod		
39. Jama Ali Tarabi	Civilian	Las'anod		
40. Abdirahman Mohamed Samatar	Civilian	Las'anod		
41. Abdikarin Ali Adan	Civilian	Las'anod		
42. Mohamed Warsame	Civilian	Las'anod		
43. Abdirahman Mohamed Noor	Demob. NGO	Las'anod		
<b><u>Sanaag Region</u></b>				
44. Hussien Gurxan Geedi	Elder	Baran		
45. Abdullahi Abdi Koor	Civilian	Sanag		
46. Mohamed Yusuf Aware	Civilian	Sanag		
47. Esse Mohamed Essa	Civilian	Sanag		
48. Halimo Ali Ismail	Women Group	Sanag		
<b>ORGANISATION:</b>				
49. Pat Johnson	UN Focal Point PL	Puntland		
50. Abdirahman Abdulle Shuke	PDRC	Garowe		
51. Ibrahim Aware	PDRC	Garowe		
52. Abdulkadir Sh. Mohamud	PDRC	Garowe		
53. Ahmed Jama Biriye	SRCS	Galkayo		
54. Gen. Abdinor Yusuf Ahmed	Diakonia	Garowe		
55. Ponga Senesi	UNDP/SCPP	Garowe		
56. Masiwa Nyasha	UNDP/SCPP	Garowe		
57. Bashir Jama	UNESCO	Garowe		
58. Faisal M. Mohammed	UN/Security Officer PL			
59. Abdikafi Bawda Kus	UNDP/SCPP	Garowe		
60. Ali Omar Ugas	UNDP Mine Action	Garowe		

## **Annex –III Discussion Paper for the Demobilization and Re-integration Workshop-**

### **Background**

One of the major reasons of establishing the Puntland Regional Government was to maintain peace and stability in the Regions that constitute today the Puntland State. In doing so, the Puntland government's stated policy was to demobilize and re-integrate the ex-combatants and militia forces who were a potential source of extortion and violence. Among these policies were: a) Disarmament of the militias and collection of unlawful weapons, b) Establishment of Security forces capable of maintaining security, c) Creation of job opportunities for the demobilized militia, soldiers and armed youth. For this purpose, the Puntland Government established the Directorate of De-mining, Demobilization and Reintegration, specifically mandated to deal with the social integration of ex-combatants and armed youth. In this context, UNDP/SCPP approached the PDRC to submit a project proposal to hold a workshop on Demobilization of Militia in Puntland. PDRC will adopt a participatory-driven process where the concerned actors will have the opportunity to discuss, raise questions, and provide answers on demobilization and reintegration issues

### **Workshop Objectives**

- To provide more information on the current state of former militia and armed youth in Puntland Regional State of Somalia
- To organize a forum for dialogue between the different actors interested in the issue of demobilization of the armed youth and ex-combatants
- To record participants' recommendations and produce a final report

### **Introduction**

Since the dawning of peace and stability in some parts of Somalia, including Puntland state, the issue of demobilization and disarmament of militia and armed youth remained a critically outstanding challenge. This is due to the realization that the armed youth and militia are the country's irreplaceable human resource that needs to be protected and promoted in such a way that they become productive members of the society. However, most of the studies and proposals for creating an alternative option of improved livelihood, have mainly shown limited success.

During 1995-1996, the international Agency named World Concern, conducted a pilot project on demobilization of one hundred militia members in Garowe by providing functional literacy and vocational skills. The project is said to have achieved its goals and has proved similar projects on militia demobilization and reintegration can achieve thorough success. Many people, however, believe that the issue of demobilization and reintegration of militia groups and armed youths is far beyond the mere provision of marketable skills and functional literacy. According to the WSP research programmes of 1998-2000 on the social integration of militias and the armed youth; the criminal activities of the armed youth and militia are a direct result or manifestation of the

disintegration of the cultural and social values of the society at large. In the research document on militia(2000), WSP Somalia program in Puntland has highlighted several crucial issues that are particularly important for consideration when thinking about militia and armed youth demobilization. These include:

- *The clan militia and the armed youth have inherited disintegrated socio- cultural values and poverty factors from society.*
- *The demobilization and re-integration of the militias and armed youth need to be considered as a holistic factor that calls for an integrated strategy with shared responsibilities by the different actors that include: the family, the community, the CBO, the government and the international community.*

It is important to understand the target groups of the demobilization and re-integration initiatives before launching any program. Some define militia and the armed youths as any individual or group of people who either earn or is about to earn his living through perpetuation of violence and use of weapons. In particular, the constituents of militia and armed youths in Puntland State are believed to be:

- Ex-S.S.D.F militia men
- Former soldiers of the disbanded military regime
- Unskilled students and schools age children who lost the continuity of their education
- The pastorals and nomads who have migrated from the rural areas in search of a better living.
- Business store security guards
- Clan militia that keep clan owned weapons
- Security guards of UN and International agencies
- IDP from other regions of Somalia and poor returnees

Existence of an extreme unemployment situation has made many of these groups turn to the use of Qaad and other illicit drugs.

### **Are there any other groups?**

This discussion paper is meant to facilitate dialogue and debate among the participants, who are expected to thoroughly discuss the socio-economic aspects of the issue. Workshop participants, after identifying the real target groups, are expected to discuss all socio -economic external and internal factors that might have impact on the demobilization and re-integration initiatives. Participants will also explore possible options for an improved livelihood for the armed youths and militia groups. In this regard, we need to set up the foundation for a policy formulation on a demobilization and reintegration programme of the militias and armed youth.

## **Achievements on Demobilization and Re-integration in the Puntland Regions**

Despite financial constraints, substantial progress in the demobilization and reintegration of militia and armed youth has been achieved by Puntland Government. these include:

- Thousands of militia members, who were members of ex-combatants, clan militias and armed youth, have been integrated into the Puntland security forces.
- The establishment of Puntland State has also given employment to about 1200 civil employees who were either militia or civilians.

Since the establishment of Puntland, it seems that private demobilization of the militia and armed youth is taking place at household levels and community level. These include:

- Many former students and school age youth, who joined private schools, have learned computer skills, English language, and office management. Some of these youngsters who graduated from these schools have been employed by the Puntland administration, International Agencies, and LNGOS.
- Many youngsters and militia men who have either received or have earned some capital to start small scale businesses have invested in ventures which include: dry rations retailers, cigarette sellers, kiosks, veterinary drug sellers etc.
- Frankincense collectors and processors in Bosaso: Many youngsters who migrated from the rural areas of the Bari region have currently returned back to their homes and collect frankincense resin for income, while others have formed groups that rented frankincense stores to process harvested resin. These groups were encouraged by the high market price of the resin.
- A good example of militia demobilization and re-integration in the private sector is the number of militia and armed youth who are involved in the Galkayo butcher industry. A considerable number of former armed youth now earn income from this business activity.

## **Research Questions**

The following research questions are meant to inspire and encourage the discussion and the debate. These questions are only meant to be a guide for the debate.

- 1. What are the root causes of the emergence of militia and armed youth?**
- 2. What are the constituents of militia and armed youth? On what criteria can they be identified?**
- 3. How much do you estimate the number of militia and armed youth in Puntland? What impact has Puntland's programme of militia and youth demobilization and reintegration made on reducing the number of militia and armed youth?**
- 4. What are the available opportunities and strategies for demobilization and reintegration?**
- 5. What are the major challenges envisaged in demobilization and reintegration?**

**6. In completing the demobilization process, What will be the role of the following actors:**

- **Puntland authorities**
- **Private sector**
- **The community(Clan Leaders, Religious Leaders, etc)**
- **The family unit**
- **International Community?**

## Annex – IV: Reintegration and Demobilization Workshop Agenda

### Day One

8.00— 8.10	Participant Registration
8.10— 8.20	Opening Quranic Verses
8.20— 8.30	Introduction of Workshop Objectives
8.30— 10.00	1) What are the root causes of the emergence of militia and armed youth? 2) What are the constituents of militia and armed youth? On what criteria can they be identified ?
10.00— 10.15	Tea break
10.15— 12.00	3)How much do you estimate the number of militia and armed youth in Puntland? What impact has Puntland’s programme of reintegration and demobilization made on reducing the number of militia and armed youth?

### Day Two

8.00— 8.10	Opening Quranic Verses
8.10— 10.00	4) What are the available opportunities and strategies for reintegration and demobilization?  5) What are the major challenges envisaged in reintegration and demobilization?
10.00—10.15	Tea break
10.15—12.00	6) In completing the demobilization and reintegration process, what will be the roles of each of the following actors: - Puntland Authorities -,Private sector - The Community(Traditional Leaders, Religious Leaders, etc) - The Family Unit - International Community  Recommendations Workshop Closing

## **Annex – V: Terms of Reference for PDRC Demobilisation and Re-integration Workshop**

### Objectives

The objective of the workshop is to discuss the demobilization and re-integration policy, strategy and priorities in Puntland.

The PDRC will be expected to the following:-

1. Facilitate the proceedings of the workshop from 21.4.2001 to 22. 4. 2001.
2. Invite a representative cross section of the society including, elders, sheiks, women groups, government, militia, business people, members of parliament, NGO's, etc.
3. Provide logistical support to the workshop,
4. Ensure that all the papers to be presented a the workshop are prepared.  
Prepare a report of the workshop by 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2001.